political justice essay

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5 (page 74) p. 74 Justice

• Published: June 2003
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Justice has to do with punishment and reward, and also with equality, but how should we define it? ‘Justice’ examines what justice really means and what principles we apply to decide when outcomes are fair. One principle of just distribution is equality, and some political philosophers have claimed that it is the only principle — all justice is a kind of equality. However, need and desert give us two very basic reasons why justice can require us to treat people differently. One good reason for not treating people in the same way is that they have different needs . Doing justice is a complex matter, and what counts as giving someone his or her due is to a large extent contextually determined.

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Democracy, power, and justice : essays in political theory

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• The strange death of political philosophy
• is democracy special?
• does democracy cause inflation? - political ideas of some economists
• political accommodation and consociational democracy
• the consociational model and its dangers
• self-government revisited
• exit, voice and loyalty
• power - an economic analysis
• is it better to be powerful or lucky?
• the obscurities of power
• the uses of "power"
• and who is my neighbour?
• liberalism, Pareto optimality and the problem of objectionable preferences
• tragic choices
• can States be moral? - international morality and the compliance problem
• humanity and justice in global perspective
• justice as reciprocity
• justice between generations
• the ethics of resource depletion
• the continuing relevance of socialism.
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The Concept of Justice

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• Wojciech Sadurski 4  

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 2))

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What is the use of defining justice? One could argue that a definition of justice should be the product of reflections about justice, rather than a starting point. In the case of evaluative concepts such as liberty, democracy and justice, the distinction between defining and advocating is extremely hard to make. Any such definition presupposes certain values and those values should be defended rather than contained in an inevitably arbitrary definition.

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For a not dissimilar account of concept/conception distinction, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), pp. 5, 9–10

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Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously ( London: Duckworth, 1978 ), pp. 134–136

On definitions of ethical concepts, see Richard Robinson, Definition ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950 ), pp. 165–170.

John Stuart Mill, `Utilitarianism’, in Utilitarianism , On Liberty , Essay on Bentham , ed. by Mary Warnock ( London: Collins, 1962 ), p. 306.

Iredell Jenkins, Social Order and the Limits of Law ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980 ), p. 324.

Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962; Ist. ed. 1874), pp. 265–266.

Brian Barry, Political Argument ( London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965 ), p. 44.

Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 98–99, and in a much more developed form in his essay Noncomparative Justice’, in Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), reprinted from The Philosophical Review (1974). Subsequent references in brackets in the main text discussing Feinberg’s views are to the pages of this essay.

Phillip Montague, `Comparative and Non-Comparative Justice’, Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1980), p. 132.

Article   Google Scholar  

This example of `absolute’ (as opposed to `comparative’) principle of justice is given by Barry, op. cit. ,p. 44 in connection with p. 96.

Rachel Karniol and Dale T. Miller, `Morality and the Development of Conceptions of Justice’, in Melvin J. Lerner and Sally C. Lerner, eds., The Justice Motive in Social Behavior ( New York and London: Plenum Press, 1981 ), p. 76.

See Wojciech Sadurski, “Non-Comparative Justice” Revisited’, Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie 69 (1983), pp. 504–514, esp. 505–507.

Eugène Dupréel, Traité de morale ,Vol. 2 (Bruxelles: Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles, 1967; 1st ed. 1932), pp. 485–491.

Friedrich A. Hayek, Law , Legislation and Liberty , Vol. 2 ( London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976 ), p. 31.

Friedrich A. Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy , Politics , Economics and the History of Ideas ( London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978 ), p. 58.

See excellent discussion by John Kleinig, `Good Samaritanism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (1976), pp. 382–407, esp. pp. 391–398.

James Gordley, `Equality in Exchange’, California Law Review 69 (1981), p. 1589.

Georges Burdeau, Traité de science politique ,Vol. V (Paris: Librarie générale de droit et de la jurisprudence), p. 89.

Halsbury’s Laws of England (London: Butterworths, 1977), 4th ed., Vol. 18, p. 344. On the development of this doctrine in the United Kingdom, see S. M. Waddams, ‘Unconscionability in Contracts’, Modern Law Review 39 (1976), pp. 369–393.

Horwood v. Millar’s Timber and Trading Co. Ltd. [1917] 1 K.B. 305, 311.

This Act has been replaced by the Consumer Credit Act (1974).

Contracts Review Act, 1980 (N.S.W.), s.7(1)

John Goldring, Joan L. Pratt, D. E. J. Ryan, `The Contracts Review Act (N.S.W.)’, University of N.S.W. Law Journal 4 (1981), pp. 1–16.

Tasman Dry Cleaners (Balmain)Pty. Ltd. v. Diamond [ 1960 ] N.S.W.R. 419.

A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay [1974] 3 All E.R. 616. 36. Ibid., at p. 623. See also Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy [1974] 3 All E.R. 757.

See Lord Denning M. R. in Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. W.E.A. Records Ltd. [1975] 1 All E.R. 237, a case concerning two musicians who signed an evidently unfair contract with their manager. He said (at p. 240): “They were composers talented in music and song but not in business. In negotiation they could not hold their own”.

U.S. V. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326–328 (1941), Frankfurter, J., dissenting.

See a recent powerful restatement of this proposition by Anthony T. Kronman, `Contract Law and Distributive Justice’, Yale Law Journal 89 (1980), pp. 472–511.

Scott v. U.S., 79 U.S. 443, 445 (1870). On the recent development of this doctrine in the U.S., see particularly M. P. Ellinghaus, `In Defense of Unconscionability’, Yale Law Journal 78 (1969), pp. 757–815

John E. Murray, `Unconscionability: Unconscionability’, University of Pittsburgh Law Review 31 (1969), pp. 1–80.

See, e.g., Richard E. Epstein, `Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal’, Journal of Law and Economics 18 (1975), pp. 293–315 and Arthur Allen Leff, `Unconscionability and the Crowd — Consumers and the Common Law Tradition’, University of Pittsburgh Law Review 31 (1970), pp. 349–358.

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ,ed. by C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981, 1st ed. 1651), p. 208.

John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law (London: John Murray, 1920, 1st ed. 1832), p. 108.

Hans Kelsen, What Is Justice? ( Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971 ), p. 430.

John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), in particular pp. 363 —366.

Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972, 1st ed. 1964), pp. 33–39.

L. L. Fuller, `Positivism and Fidelity to Law’, Harvard Law Review 71 (1958), p. 474.

See also Peter P. Nicholson, `The Internal Morality of Law: Fuller and His Critics’, Ethics 84 (1974), pp. 307–320.

H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961 ), p. 206.

See A. M. Honoré, `Social Justice’, McGill Law Journal 8 (1962), p. 82.

Dupréel, op. cit. , pp.485–489; D. D. Raphael, Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone Press, 1980), pp. 80–93; Sidgwick, op. cit. , p. 293; Chaim Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument ( London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963 ), p. 63.

See Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasoning (Sydney: Maitland Publications, 1968, 1st ed. 1964), pp. 263–267.

W. J. Wagner, `Equity and Its Socialist Equivalent in the Polish Legal System’, Review of Socialist Law 1 (1975), pp. 151–169.

Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 410 (trans. A. Wedberg).

Ronald Dworkin, ’ “Natural” Law Revisited’, University of Florida Law Review 34 (1982), p. 165.

See, in particular, Neil MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), ch. 7.

See, e.g., Norman P. Barry, An Introduction to Modern Political Theory ( London: Macmillan, 1981 ), p. 119.

See also William Nelson, `The Very Idea of Pure Procedural Justice’, Ethics 90 (1980), pp. 502–511.

David Resnick, `Due Process and Procedural Justice’ in J. Roland Pennock, John W. Chapman, eds., Due Process , Nomos XVIII ( New York: New York University Press, 1977 ), p. 213.

Rupert Cross, Evidence , Australian Edition by J. A. Gobbo (Sydney: Butterworths, 1970 ), p. 288.

Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958).

Carl J. Friedrich, `Justice: The Just Political Act’, in Carl J. Friedrich, John W. Chapman, eds., Justice , Nomos VI (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 27–28, 43.

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A Brief History of the Political Essay

From swift to woolf, david bromwich considers an evolving genre.

The political essay has never been a clearly defined genre. David Hume may have legitimated it in 1758 when he classified under a collective rubric his own Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. “Political,” however, should have come last in order, since Hume took a speculative and detached view of politics, and seems to have been incapable of feeling passion for a political cause. We commonly associate political thought with full-scale treatises by philosophers of a different sort, whose understanding of politics was central to their account of human nature. Hobbes’s Leviathan , Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws , Rousseau’s Social Contract , Mill’s Representative Government , and, closer to our time, Rawls’s Theory of Justice , all satisfy that expectation. What, then, is a political essay? By the late 18th century, the periodical writings of Steele, Swift, Goldsmith, and Johnson had broadened the scope of the English essay for serious purposes. The field of politics, as much as culture, appeared to their successors well suited to arguments on society and government.

A public act of praise, dissent, or original description may take on permanent value when it implicates concerns beyond the present moment. Where the issue is momentous, the commitment stirred by passion, and the writing strong enough, an essay may sink deep roots in the language of politics. An essay is an attempt , as the word implies—a trial of sense and persuasion, which any citizen may hazard in a society where people are free to speak their minds. A more restrictive idea of political argument—one that would confer special legitimacy on an elite caste of managers, consultants, and symbolic analysts—presumes an environment in which state papers justify decisions arrived at from a region above politics. By contrast, the absence of formal constraints or a settled audience for the essay means that the daily experience of the writer counts as evidence. A season of crisis tempts people to think politically; in the process, they sometimes discover reasons to back their convictions.

The experience of civic freedom and its discontents may lead the essayist to think beyond politics. In 1940, Virginia Woolf recalled the sound of German bombers circling overhead the night before; the insect-like irritant, with its promise of aggression, frightened her into thought: “It is a queer experience, lying in the dark and listening to the zoom of a hornet which may at any moment sting you to death.” The ugly noise, for Woolf, signaled the prerogative of the fighting half of the species: Englishwomen “must lie weaponless tonight.” Yet Englishmen would be called upon to destroy the menace; and she was not sorry for their help. The mood of the writer is poised between gratitude and a bewildered frustration. Woolf ’s essay, “Thoughts on Peace in an Air Raid,” declines to exhibit the patriotic sentiment by which most reporters in her position would have felt drawn. At the same time, its personal emphasis keeps the author honest through the awareness of her own dependency.

Begin with an incident— I could have been killed last night —and you may end with speculations on human nature. Start with a national policy that you deplore, and it may take you back to the question, “Who are my neighbors?” In 1846, Henry David Thoreau was arrested for having refused to pay a poll tax; he made a lesson of his resistance two years later, when he saw the greed and dishonesty of the Mexican War: “Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison.” But to Thoreau’s surprise, the window of the prison had opened onto the life of the town he lived in, with its everyday errands and duties, its compromises and arrangements, and for him that glimpse was a revelation:

They were the voices of old burghers that I heard in the streets. I was an involuntary spectator and auditor of whatever was done and said in the kitchen of the adjacent village inn,—a wholly new and rare experience to me. It was a closer view of my native town. I was fairly inside of it. I had never seen its institutions before. This is one of its peculiar institutions; for it is a shire town. I began to comprehend what its inhabitants were about.

Slavery, at that time, was nicknamed “the peculiar institution,” and by calling the prison itself a peculiar institution, and maybe having in mind the adjacent inn as well, Thoreau prods his reader to think about the constraints that are a tacit condition of social life.

The risk of political writing may lure the citizen to write—a fact Hazlitt seems to acknowledge in his essay “On the Regal Character,” where his second sentence wonders if the essay will expose him to prosecution: “In writing a criticism, we hope we shall not be accused of intending a libel.” (His friend Leigh Hunt had recently served two years in prison for “seditious libel” of the Prince Regent—having characterized him as a dandy notorious for his ostentation and obesity.) The writer’s consciousness of provocative intent may indeed be inseparable from the wish to persuade; though the tone of commitment will vary with the zeal and composition of the audience, whether that means a political party, a movement, a vanguard of the enlightened, or “the people” at large.

Edmund Burke, for example, writes to the sheriffs of Bristol (and through them to the city’s electors) in order to warn against the suspension of habeas corpus by the British war ministry in 1777. The sudden introduction of the repressive act, he tells the electors, has imperiled their liberty even if they are for the moment individually exempt. In response to the charge that the Americans fighting for independence are an unrepresentative minority, he warns: “ General rebellions and revolts of an whole people never were encouraged , now or at any time. They are always provoked. ” So too, Mahatma Gandhi addresses his movement of resistance against British rule, as well as others who can be attracted to the cause, when he explains why nonviolent protest requires courage of a higher degree than the warrior’s: “Non-violence is infinitely superior to violence, forgiveness is more manly than punishment.” In both cases, the writer treats the immediate injustice as an occasion for broader strictures on the nature of justice. There are certain duties that governors owe to the governed, and duties hardly less compulsory that the people owe to themselves.

Apparently diverse topics connect the essays in Writing Politics ; but, taken loosely to illustrate a historical continuity, they show the changing face of oppression and violence, and the invention of new paths for improving justice. Arbitrary power is the enemy throughout—power that, by the nature of its asserted scope and authority, makes itself the judge of its own cause. King George III, whose reign spanned sixty years beginning in 1760, from the first was thought to have overextended monarchical power and prerogative, and by doing so to have reversed an understanding of parliamentary sovereignty that was tacitly recognized by his predecessors. Writing against the king, “Junius” (the pen name of Philip Francis) traced the monarch’s errors to a poor education; and he gave an edge of deliberate effrontery to the attack on arbitrary power by addressing the king as you. “It is the misfortune of your life, and originally the cause of every reproach and distress, which has attended your government, that you should never have been acquainted with the language of truth, until you heard it in the complaints of your people.”

A similar frankness, without the ad hominem spur, can be felt in Burke’s attack on the monarchical distrust of liberty at home as well as abroad: “If any ask me what a free Government is, I answer, that, for any practical purpose, it is what the people think so; and that they, and not I, are the natural, lawful, and competent judges of this matter.” Writing in the same key from America, Thomas Paine, in his seventh number of The Crisis , gave a new description to the British attempt to preserve the unity of the empire by force of arms. He called it a war of conquest; and by addressing his warning directly “to the people of England,” he reminded the king’s subjects that war is always a social evil, for it sponsors a violence that does not terminate in itself. War enlarges every opportunity of vainglory—a malady familiar to monarchies.

The coming of democracy marks a turning point in modern discussions of sovereignty and the necessary protections of liberty. Confronted by the American annexation of parts of Mexico, in 1846–48, Thoreau saw to his disgust that a war of conquest could also be a popular war, the will of the people directed to the oppression of persons. It follows that the state apparatus built by democracy is at best an equivocal ally of individual rights. Yet as Emerson would recognize in his lecture “The Fugitive Slave Law,” and Frederick Douglass would confirm in “The Mission of the War,” the massed power of the state is likewise the only vehicle powerful enough to destroy a system of oppression as inveterate as American slavery had become by the 1850s.

Acceptance of political evil—a moral inertia that can corrupt the ablest of lawmakers—goes easily with the comforts of a society at peace where many are satisfied. “Here was the question,” writes Emerson: “Are you for man and for the good of man; or are you for the hurt and harm of man? It was question whether man shall be treated as leather? whether the Negroes shall be as the Indians were in Spanish America, a piece of money?” Emerson wondered at the apostasy of Daniel Webster, How came he there? The answer was that Webster had deluded himself by projecting a possible right from serial compromise with wrong.

Two ways lie open to correct the popular will without a relapse into docile assent and the rule of oligarchy. You may widen the terms of discourse and action by enlarging the community of participants. Alternatively, you may strengthen the opportunities of dissent through acts of exemplary protest—protest in speech, in action, or both. Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. remain the commanding instances in this regard. Both led movements that demanded of every adherent that the protest serve as an express image of the society it means to bring about. Nonviolent resistance accordingly involves a public disclosure of the work of conscience—a demonstrated willingness to make oneself an exemplary warrior without war. Because they were practical reformers, Gandhi and King, within the societies they sought to reform, were engaged in what Michael Oakeshott calls “the pursuit of intimations.” They did not start from a model of the good society generated from outside. They built on existing practices of toleration, friendship, neighborly care, and respect for the dignity of strangers.

Nonviolent resistance, as a tactic of persuasion, aims to arouse an audience of the uncommitted by its show of discipline and civic responsibility. Well, but why not simply resist? Why show respect for the laws of a government you mean to change radically? Nonviolence, for Gandhi and King, was never merely a tactic, and there were moral as well as rhetorical reasons for their ethic of communal self-respect and self-command. Gandhi looked on the British empire as a commonwealth that had proved its ability to reform. King spoke with the authority of a native American, claiming the rights due to all Americans, and he evoked the ideals his countrymen often said they wished to live by. The stories the nation loved to tell of itself took pride in emancipation much more than pride in conquest and domination. “So,” wrote King from the Birmingham City Jail, “I can urge men to obey the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court because it is morally right, and I can urge them to disobey segregation ordinances because they are morally wrong.”

A subtler enemy of liberty than outright prejudice and violent oppression is the psychological push toward conformity. This internalized docility inhabits and may be said to dictate the costume of manners in a democracy. Because the rule of mass opinion serves as a practical substitute for the absolute authority that is no longer available, it exerts an enormous and hidden pressure. This dangerous “omnipotence of the majority,” as Tocqueville called it, knows no power greater than itself; it resembles an absolute monarch in possessing neither the equipment nor the motive to render a judgment against itself. Toleration thus becomes a political value that requires as vigilant a defense as liberty. Minorities are marked not only by race, religion, and habits of association, but also by opinion.

“It is easy to see,” writes Walter Bagehot in “The Metaphysical Basis of Toleration,” “that very many believers would persecute sceptics” if they were given the means, “and that very many sceptics would persecute believers.” Bagehot has in mind religious belief, in particular, but the same intolerance operates when it is a question of penalizing a word, a gesture, a wrongly sympathetic or unsympathetic show of feeling by which a fellow citizen might claim to be offended. The more divided the society, the more it will crave implicit assurances of unity; the more unified it is, the more it wants an even greater show of unity—an unmistakable signal of membership and belonging that can be read as proof of collective solidarity. The “guilty fear of criticism,” Mary McCarthy remarked of the domestic fear of Communism in the 1950s, “the sense of being surrounded by an unappreciative world,” brought to American life a regimen of tests, codes, and loyalty oaths that were calculated to confirm rather than subdue the anxiety.

Proscribed and persecuted groups naturally seek a fortified community of their own, which should be proof against insult; and by 1870 or so, the sure method of creating such a community was to found a new nation. George Eliot took this remedy to be prudent and inevitable, in her sympathetic early account of the Zionist quest for a Jewish state, yet her unsparing portrait of English anti-Semitism seems to recognize the nation-remedy as a carrier of the same exclusion it hopes to abolish. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to a widened sense of community is the apparently intuitive—but in fact regularly inculcated—intellectual habit by which we divide people into racial, religious, and ethnic identities. The idea of an international confederation for peace was tried twice, without success, in the 20th century, with the League of Nations and the United Nations; but some such goal, first formulated in the political writings of Kant, has found memorable popular expression again and again.

W. E. B. Du Bois’s essay “Of the Ruling of Men” affords a prospect of international liberty that seems to the author simply the next necessary advance of common sense in the cause of humanity. Du Bois noticed in 1920 how late the expansion of rights had arrived at the rights of women. Always, the last hiding places of arbitrary power are the trusted arenas of privilege a society has come to accept as customary, and to which it has accorded the spurious honor of supposing it part of the natural order: men over women; the strong nations over the weak; corporate heads over employees. The pattern had come under scrutiny already in Harriet Taylor Mill’s “Enfranchisement of Women,” and its application to the hierarchies of ownership and labor would be affirmed in William Morris’s lecture “Useful Work Versus Useless Toil.” The commercial and manufacturing class, wrote Morris, “ force the genuine workers to provide for them”; no better (only more recondite in their procedures) are “the parasites” whose function is to defend the cause of property, “sometimes, as in the case of lawyers, undisguisedly so.” The socialists Morris and Du Bois regard the ultimate aim of a democratic world as the replacement of useless by useful work. With that change must also come the invention of a shared experience of leisure that is neither wasteful nor thoughtless.

A necessary bulwark of personal freedom is property, and in the commercial democracies for the past three centuries a usual means of agreement for the defense of property has been the contract. In challenging the sacredness of contract, in certain cases of conflict with a common good, T. H. Green moved the idea of “freedom of contract” from the domain of nature to that of social arrangements that are settled by convention and therefore subject to revision. The freedom of contract must be susceptible of modification when it fails to meet a standard of public well-being. The right of a factory owner, for example, to employ child labor if the child agrees, should not be protected. “No contract,” Green argues, “is valid in which human persons, willingly or unwillingly, are dealt with as commodities”; for when we speak of freedom, “we mean a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying.” And again:

When we measure the progress of a society by its growth in freedom, we measure it by the increasing development and exercise on the whole of those powers of contributing to social good with which we believe the members of the society to be endowed; in short, by the greater power on the part of the citizens as a body to make the most and best of themselves.

Legislation in the public interest may still be consistent with the principles of free society when it parts from a leading maxim of contractual individualism.

The very idea of a social contract has usually been taken to imply an obligation to die for the state. Though Hobbes and Locke offered reservations on this point, the classical theorists agree that the state yields the prospect of “commodious living” without which human life would be unsocial and greatly impoverished; and there are times when the state can survive only through the sacrifice of citizens. May there also be a duty of self-sacrifice against a state whose whole direction and momentum has bent it toward injustice? Hannah Arendt, in “Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship,” asked that question regarding the conduct of state officials as well as ordinary people under the encroaching tyranny of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Citizens then, Arendt observes, had live options of political conduct besides passive obedience and open revolt. Conscientious opposition could show itself in public indications of nonsupport . This is a fact that the pervasiveness of conformism and careerism in mass societies makes harder to see than it should be.

Jonathan Swift, a writer as temperamentally diverse from Arendt as possible, shows in “A Modest Proposal” how the human creature goes about rationalizing any act or any policy, however atrocious. Our propensity to make-normal, to approve whatever renders life more orderly, can lead by the lightest of expedient steps to a plan for marketing the babies of the Irish poor as flesh suitable for eating. It is, after all—so Swift’s fictional narrator argues—a plausible design to alleviate poverty and distress among a large sector of the population, and to eliminate the filth and crowding that disgusts persons of a more elevated sort. The justification is purely utilitarian, and the proposer cites the most disinterested of motives: he has no financial or personal stake in the design. Civility has often been praised as a necessity of political argument, but Swift’s proposal is at once civil and, in itself, atrocious.

An absorbing concern of Arendt’s, as of several of the other essay writers gathered here, was the difficulty of thinking. We measure, we compute, we calculate, we weigh advantages and disadvantages—that much is only sensible, only logical—but we give reasons that are often blind to our motives, we rationalize and we normalize in order to justify ourselves. It is supremely difficult to use the equipment we learn from parents and teachers, which instructs us how to deal fairly with persons, and apply it to the relationship between persons and society, and between the manners of society and the laws of a nation. The 21st century has saddled persons of all nations with a catastrophic possibility, the destruction of a planetary environment for organized human life; and in facing the predicament directly, and formulating answers to the question it poses, the political thinkers of the past may help us chiefly by intimations. The idea of a good or tolerable society now encompasses relations between people at the widest imaginable distance apart. It must also cover a new relation of stewardship between humankind and nature.

Having made the present selection with the abovementioned topics in view—the republican defense against arbitrary power; the progress of liberty; the coming of mass-suffrage democracy and its peculiar dangers; justifications for political dissent and disobedience; war, as chosen for the purpose of domination or as necessary to destroy a greater evil; the responsibilities of the citizen; the political meaning of work and the conditions of work—an anthology of writings all in English seemed warranted by the subject matter. For in the past three centuries, these issues have been discussed most searchingly by political critics and theorists in Britain and the United States.

The span covers the Glorious Revolution and its achievement of parliamentary sovereignty; the American Revolution, and the civil war that has rightly been called the second American revolution; the expansion of the franchise under the two great reform bills in England and the 15th amendment to the US constitution; the two world wars and the Holocaust; and the mass movements of nonviolent resistance that brought national independence to India and broadened the terms of citizenship of black Americans. The sequence gives adequate evidence of thinkers engaged in a single conversation. Many of these authors were reading the essayists who came before them; and in many cases (Burke and Paine, Lincoln and Douglass, Churchill and Orwell), they were reading each other.

Writing Politics contains no example of the half-political, half-commercial genre of “leadership” writing. Certain other principles that guided the editor will be obvious at a glance, but may as well be stated. Only complete essays are included, no extracts. This has meant excluding great writers—Hobbes, Locke, Wollstonecraft, and John Stuart Mill, among others—whose definitive political writing came in the shape of full-length books. There are likewise no chapters of books; no party manifestos or statements of creed; nothing that was first published posthumously. All of these essays were written at the time noted, were meant for an audience of the time, and were published with an eye to their immediate effect. This is so even in cases (as with Morris and Du Bois) where the author had in view the reformation of a whole way of thinking. Some lectures have been included—the printed lecture was an indispensable medium for political ideas in the 19th century—but there are no party speeches delivered by an official to advance a cause of the moment.

Two exceptions to the principles may prove the rule. Abraham Lincoln’s letter to James C. Conkling was a public letter, written to defend the Emancipation Proclamation, in which, a few months earlier, President Lincoln had declared the freedom of all slaves in the rebelling states; he now extended the order to cover black soldiers who fought for the Union: “If they stake their lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive—even the promise of freedom. And the promise being made, must be kept.” Lincoln was risking his presidency when he published this extraordinary appeal and admonition, and his view was shared by Frederick Douglass in “The Mission of the War”: “No war but an Abolition war, no peace but an Abolition peace.” The other exception is “The Roots of Honour,” John Ruskin’s attack on the mercenary morality of 19th-century capitalism . He called the chapter “Essay I” in Unto This Last , and his nomenclature seemed a fair excuse for reprinting an ineradicable prophecy.

__________________________________

From Writing Politics , edited by David Bromwich. Copyright © 2020 by David Bromwich; courtesy of NYRB Classics.

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Aristotle’s Political Theory

Aristotle (b. 384–d. 322 BCE), was a Greek philosopher, logician, and scientist. Along with his teacher Plato, Aristotle is generally regarded as one of the most influential ancient thinkers in a number of philosophical fields, including political theory. Aristotle was born in Stagira in northern Greece, and his father was a court physician to the king of Macedon. As a young man he studied in Plato’s Academy in Athens. After Plato’s death he left Athens to conduct philosophical and biological research in Asia Minor and Lesbos, and he was then invited by King Philip II of Macedon to tutor his young son, Alexander the Great. Soon after Alexander succeeded his father, consolidated the conquest of the Greek city-states, and launched the invasion of the Persian Empire. Aristotle returned as a resident alien to Athens, and was a close friend of Antipater, the Macedonian viceroy. At this time (335–323 BCE) he wrote, or at least worked on, some of his major treatises, including the Politics . When Alexander died suddenly, Aristotle had to flee from Athens because of his Macedonian connections, and he died soon after. Aristotle’s life seems to have influenced his political thought in various ways: his interest in biology seems to be reflected in the naturalism of his politics; his interest in comparative politics and his qualified sympathies for democracy as well as monarchy may have been encouraged by his travels and experience of diverse political systems; he reacts critically to his teacher Plato, while borrowing extensively, from Plato’s Republic , Statesman , and Laws ; and his own Politics is intended to guide rulers and statesmen, reflecting the high political circles in which he moved.

Supplement: Characteristics and Problems of Aristotle’s Politics

Supplement: Presuppositions of Aristotle’s Politics

Supplement: Political Naturalism

4. Study of Specific Constitutions

5. aristotle and modern politics, glossary of aristotelian terms, a. greek text of aristotle’s politics, b. english translations of aristotle’s politics, c. anthologies, d. single-authored commentaries and overviews, e. studies of particular topics, other internet resources, related entries, 1. political science in general.

The modern word ‘political’ derives from the Greek politikos , ‘of, or pertaining to, the polis’. (The Greek term polis will be translated here as ‘city-state’. It is also commonly translated as ‘city’ or simply anglicized as ‘polis’. City-states like Athens and Sparta were relatively small and cohesive units, in which political, religious, and cultural concerns were intertwined. The extent of their similarity to modern nation-states is controversial.) Aristotle’s word for ‘politics’ is politikê , which is short for politikê epistêmê or ‘political science’. It belongs to one of the three main branches of science, which Aristotle distinguishes by their ends or objects. Contemplative science (including physics and metaphysics) is concerned with truth or knowledge for its own sake; practical science with good action; and productive science with making useful or beautiful objects ( Top . VI.6.145a14–16, Met . VI.1.1025b24, XI.7.1064a16–19, EN VI.2.1139a26–8). Politics is a practical science, since it is concerned with the noble action or happiness of the citizens (although it resembles a productive science in that it seeks to create, preserve, and reform political systems). Aristotle thus understands politics as a normative or prescriptive discipline rather than as a purely empirical or descriptive inquiry.

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle describes his subject matter as ‘political science’, which he characterizes as the most authoritative science. It prescribes which sciences are to be studied in the city-state, and the others — such as military science, household management, and rhetoric — fall under its authority. Since it governs the other practical sciences, their ends serve as means to its end, which is nothing less than the human good. “Even if the end is the same for an individual and for a city-state, that of the city-state seems at any rate greater and more complete to attain and preserve. For although it is worthy to attain it for only an individual, it is nobler and more divine to do so for a nation or city-state” ( EN I.2.1094b7–10). The two ethical works (the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics ) explain the principles that form the foundations for the Politics : that happiness is the highest human good, that happiness is the activity of moral virtue defined in terms of the mean, and that justice or the common advantage is the political good. Aristotle’s political science thus encompasses the two fields which modern philosophers distinguish as ethics and political philosophy. (See the entry on Aristotle’s ethics .) Political philosophy in the narrow sense is roughly speaking the subject of his treatise called the Politics . For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary document:

2. Aristotle’s View of Politics

Political science studies the tasks of the politician or statesman ( politikos ), in much the way that medical science concerns the work of the physician (see Politics IV.1). It is, in fact, the body of knowledge that such practitioners, if truly expert, will also wield in pursuing their tasks. The most important task for the politician is, in the role of lawgiver ( nomothetês ), to frame the appropriate constitution for the city-state. This involves enduring laws, customs, and institutions (including a system of moral education) for the citizens. Once the constitution is in place, the politician needs to take the appropriate measures to maintain it, to introduce reforms when he finds them necessary, and to prevent developments which might subvert the political system. This is the province of legislative science, which Aristotle regards as more important than politics as exercised in everyday political activity such as the passing of decrees (see EN VI.8).

Aristotle frequently compares the politician to a craftsman. The analogy is imprecise because politics, in the strict sense of legislative science, is a form of practical knowledge, while a craft like architecture or medicine is a form of productive knowledge. However, the comparison is valid to the extent that the politician produces, operates, maintains a legal system according to universal principles ( EN VI.8 and X.9). In order to appreciate this analogy it is helpful to observe that Aristotle explains the production of an artifact such as a drinking cup in terms of four causes: the material, formal, efficient, and final causes ( Phys . II.3 and Met . A.2). For example, clay (material cause) is molded into a roughly cylindrical shape closed at one end (formal cause) by a potter (efficient or moving cause) so that it can contain a beverage (final cause). (For discussion of the four causes see the entry on Aristotle’s physics .)

One can also explain the existence of the city-state in terms of the four causes. It is a kind of community ( koinônia ), that is, a collection of parts having some functions and interests in common ( Pol . II.1.1261a18, III.1.1275b20). Hence, it is made up of parts, which Aristotle describes in various ways in different contexts: as households, or economic classes (e.g., the rich and the poor), or demes (i.e., local political units). But, ultimately, the city-state is composed of individual citizens (see III.1.1274a38–41), who, along with natural resources, are the “material” or “equipment” out of which the city-state is fashioned (see VII.14.1325b38–41).

The formal cause of the city-state is its constitution ( politeia ). Aristotle defines the constitution as “a certain ordering of the inhabitants of the city-state” (III.1.1274b32–41). He also speaks of the constitution of a community as “the form of the compound” and argues that whether the community is the same over time depends on whether it has the same constitution (III.3.1276b1–11). The constitution is not a written document, but an immanent organizing principle, analogous to the soul of an organism. Hence, the constitution is also “the way of life” of the citizens (IV.11.1295a40–b1, VII.8.1328b1–2). Here the citizens are that minority of the resident population who possess full political rights (III.1.1275b17–20).

The existence of the city-state also requires an efficient cause, namely, its ruler. On Aristotle’s view, a community of any sort can possess order only if it has a ruling element or authority. This ruling principle is defined by the constitution, which sets criteria for political offices, particularly the sovereign office (III.6.1278b8–10; cf. IV.1.1289a15–18). However, on a deeper level, there must be an efficient cause to explain why a city-state acquires its constitution in the first place. Aristotle states that “the person who first established [the city-state] is the cause of very great benefits” (I.2.1253a30–1). This person was evidently the lawgiver ( nomothetês ), someone like Solon of Athens or Lycurgus of Sparta, who founded the constitution. Aristotle compares the lawgiver, or the politician more generally, to a craftsman ( dêmiourgos ) like a weaver or shipbuilder, who fashions material into a finished product (II.12.1273b32–3, VII.4.1325b40–1365a5).

The notion of final cause dominates Aristotle’s Politics from the opening lines:

Since we see that every city-state is a sort of community and that every community is established for the sake of some good (for everyone does everything for the sake of what they believe to be good), it is clear that every community aims at some good, and the community which has the most authority of all and includes all the others aims highest, that is, at the good with the most authority. This is what is called the city-state or political community. [I.1.1252a1–7]

Soon after, he states that the city-state comes into being for the sake of life but exists for the sake of the good life (2.1252b29–30). The theme that the good life or happiness is the proper end of the city-state recurs throughout the Politics (III.6.1278b17–24, 9.1280b39; VII.2.1325a7–10).

To sum up, the city-state is a hylomorphic (i.e., matter-form) compound of a particular population (i.e., citizen-body) in a given territory (material cause) and a constitution (formal cause). The constitution itself is fashioned by the lawgiver and is governed by politicians, who are like craftsmen (efficient cause), and the constitution defines the aim of the city-state (final cause, IV.1.1289a17–18). Aristotle’s hylomorphic analysis has important practical implications for him: just as a craftsman should not try to impose a form on materials for which it is unsuited (e.g. to build a house out of sand), the legislator should not lay down or change laws which are contrary to the nature of the citizens. Aristotle accordingly rejects utopian schemes such as the proposal in Plato’s Republic that children and property should belong to all the citizens in common. For this runs afoul of the fact that “people give most attention to their own property, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls to them to give attention” ( Pol. II.3.1261b33–5). Aristotle is also wary of casual political innovation, because it can have the deleterious side-effect of undermining the citizens’ habit of obeying the law (II.8.1269a13–24). For a further discussion of the theoretical foundations of Aristotle’s politics, see the following supplementary document:

It is in these terms, then, that Aristotle understands the fundamental normative problem of politics: What constitutional form should the lawgiver establish and preserve in what material for the sake of what end?

3. General Theory of Constitutions and Citizenship

Aristotle states, “The politician and lawgiver is wholly occupied with the city-state, and the constitution is a certain way of organizing those who inhabit the city-state” (III.1.1274b36–8). His general theory of constitutions is set forth in Politics III. He begins with a definition of the citizen ( politês ), since the city-state is by nature a collective entity, a multitude of citizens. Citizens are distinguished from other inhabitants, such as resident aliens and slaves; and even children and seniors are not unqualified citizens (nor are most ordinary workers). After further analysis he defines the citizen as a person who has the right ( exousia ) to participate in deliberative or judicial office (1275b18–21). In Athens, for example, citizens had the right to attend the assembly, the council, and other bodies, or to sit on juries. The Athenian system differed from a modern representative democracy in that the citizens were more directly involved in governing. Although full citizenship tended to be restricted in the Greek city-states (with women, slaves, foreigners, and some others excluded), the citizens were more deeply enfranchised than in modern representative democracies because they were more directly involved in governing. This is reflected in Aristotle’s definition of the citizen (without qualification). Further, he defines the city-state (in the unqualified sense) as a multitude of such citizens which is adequate for a self-sufficient life (1275b20–21).

Aristotle defines the constitution ( politeia ) as a way of organizing the offices of the city-state, particularly the sovereign office (III.6.1278b8–10; cf. IV.1.1289a15–18). The constitution thus defines the governing body, which takes different forms: for example, in a democracy it is the people, and in an oligarchy it is a select few (the wealthy or well born). Before attempting to distinguish and evaluate various constitutions Aristotle considers two questions. First, why does a city-state come into being? He recalls the thesis, defended in Politics I.2, that human beings are by nature political animals, who naturally want to live together. For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary document:

Aristotle then adds, “The common advantage also brings them together insofar as they each attain the noble life. This is above all the end for all both in common and separately” (III.6.1278b19–24). Second, what are the different forms of rule by which one individual or group can rule over another? Aristotle distinguishes several types of rule, based on the nature of the soul of the ruler and of the subject. He first considers despotic rule, which is exemplified in the master-slave relationship. Aristotle thinks that this form of rule is justified in the case of natural slaves who (he asserts without evidence) lack a deliberative faculty and thus need a natural master to direct them (I.13.1260a12; slavery is defended at length in Politics I.4–8). Although a natural slave allegedly benefits from having a master, despotic rule is still primarily for the sake of the master and only incidentally for the slave (III.6.1278b32–7). (Aristotle provides no argument for this: if some persons are congenitally incapable of governing themselves, why should they not be ruled primarily for their own sakes?) He next considers paternal and marital rule, which he also views as defensible: “the male is by nature more capable of leadership than the female, unless he is constituted in some way contrary to nature, and the elder and perfect [is by nature more capable of leadership] than the younger and imperfect” (I.12.1259a39–b4).

Aristotle is persuasive when he argues that children need adult supervision because their rationality is “imperfect” ( ateles ) or immature. But he is unconvincing to modern readers when he alleges (without substantiation) that, although women have a deliberative faculty, it is “without authority” ( akuron ), so that females require male supervision (I.13.1260a13–14). (Aristotle’s arguments about slaves and women appear so weak that some commentators take them to be ironic. However, what is obvious to a modern reader need not have been so to an ancient Greek, so that it is not necessary to suppose Aristotle’s discussion is disingenuous.) It is noteworthy, however, that paternal and marital rule are properly practiced for the sake of the ruled (for the sake of the child and of the wife respectively), just as arts like medicine or gymnastics are practiced for the sake of the patient (III.6.1278b37–1279a1). In this respect they resemble political rule, which is the form of rule appropriate when the ruler and the subject have equal and similar rational capacities. This is exemplified by naturally equal citizens who take turns at ruling for one another’s advantage (1279a8–13). This sets the stage for the fundamental claim of Aristotle’s constitutional theory: “constitutions which aim at the common advantage are correct and just without qualification, whereas those which aim only at the advantage of the rulers are deviant and unjust, because they involve despotic rule which is inappropriate for a community of free persons” (1279a17–21).

The distinction between correct and deviant constitutions is combined with the observation that the government may consist of one person, a few, or a multitude. Hence, there are six possible constitutional forms ( Politics III.7):

This six-fold classification (which is doubtless adapted from Plato’s Statesman 302c–d) sets the stage for Aristotle’s inquiry into the best constitution, although it is modified in various ways throughout the Politics . For example, he observes that the dominant class in oligarchy (literally rule of the oligoi , i.e., few) is typically the wealthy, whereas in democracy (literally rule of the dêmos , i.e., people) it is the poor, so that these economic classes should be included in the definition of these forms (see Politics III.8, IV.4, and VI.2 for alternative accounts). Also, polity is later characterized as a kind of “mixed” constitution typified by rule of the “middle” group of citizens, a moderately wealthy class between the rich and poor ( Politics IV.11).

Aristotle’s constitutional theory is based on his theory of justice, which is expounded in Nicomachean Ethics book V. Aristotle distinguishes two different but related senses of “justice” — universal and particular — both of which play an important role in his constitutional theory. Firstly, in the universal sense “justice” means “lawfulness” and is concerned with the common advantage and happiness of the political community ( NE V.1.1129b11–19, cf. Pol. III.12.1282b16–17). The conception of universal justice undergirds the distinction between correct (just) and deviant (unjust) constitutions. But what exactly the “common advantage” ( koinê sumpheron ) entails is a matter of scholarly controversy. Some passages imply that justice involves the advantage of all the citizens; for example, every citizen of the best constitution has a just claim to private property and to an education ( Pol. VII.9.1329a23–4, 13.1332a32–8). But Aristotle also allows that it might be “in a way” just to ostracize powerful citizens even when they have not been convicted of any crimes (III.13.1284b15–20). Whether Aristotle understands the common advantage as safeguarding the interests of each and every citizen has a bearing on whether and to what extent he anticipates what moderns would understand as a theory of individual rights. (See Fred Miller and Richard Kraut for differing interpretations.)

Secondly, in the particular sense “justice” means “equality” or “fairness”, and this includes distributive justice, according to which different individuals have just claims to shares of some common asset such as property. Aristotle analyzes arguments for and against the different constitutions as different applications of the principle of distributive justice (III.9.1280a7–22). Everyone agrees, he says, that justice involves treating equal persons equally, and treating unequal persons unequally, but they do not agree on the standard by which individuals are deemed to be equally (or unequally) meritorious or deserving. He assumes his own analysis of distributive justice set forth in Nicomachean Ethics V.3: Justice requires that benefits be distributed to individuals in proportion to their merit or desert. The oligarchs mistakenly think that those who are superior in wealth should also have superior political rights, whereas the democrats hold that those who are equal in free birth should also have equal political rights. Both of these conceptions of political justice are mistaken in Aristotle’s view, because they assume a false conception of the ultimate end of the city-state. The city-state is neither a business enterprise to maximize wealth (as the oligarchs suppose) nor an association to promote liberty and equality (as the democrats maintain). Instead, Aristotle argues, “the good life is the end of the city-state,” that is, a life consisting of noble actions (1280b39–1281a4). Hence, the correct conception of justice is aristocratic, assigning political rights to those who make a full contribution to the political community, that is, to those with virtue as well as property and freedom (1281a4–8). This is what Aristotle understands by an “aristocratic” constitution: literally, the rule of the aristoi , i.e., best persons. Aristotle explores the implications of this argument in the remainder of Politics III, considering the rival claims of the rule of law and the rule of a supremely virtuous individual. Here absolute kingship is a limiting case of aristocracy. Again, in books VII-VIII, Aristotle describes the ideal constitution in which the citizens are fully virtuous.

Although justice is in Aristotle’s view the foremost political virtue ( Pol . III.9.1283a38–40), the other great social virtue, friendship, should not be overlooked, because the two virtues work hand in hand to secure every sort of association ( EN VIII.9.1159b26–7). Justice enables the citizens of a city-state to share peacefully in the benefits and burdens of cooperation, while friendship holds them together and prevents them from breaking up into warring factions (cf. Pol . II.4.1262b7–9). Friends are expected to treat each other justly, but friendship goes beyond justice because it is a complex mutual bond in which individuals choose the good for others and trust that others are choosing the good for them (cf. EE VII.2.1236a14–15, b2–3; EN VIII.2.1155b34–3.1156a10). Because choosing the good for one another is essential to friendship and there are three different ways in which something can be called ‘good’ for a human being—virtuous (i.e., good without qualification), useful, or pleasant—there are three types of friendship: hedonistic, utilitarian, and virtuous. Political (or civic) friendship is a species of utilitarian friendship, and it is the most important form of utilitarian friendship because the polis is the greatest community. Opposed to political friendship is enmity, which leads to faction or civil war ( stasis ) or even to political revolution and the breakup of the polis, as discussed in Book V of the Politics. Aristotle offers general accounts of political or civic friendship as part of his general theory of friendship in EE VII.10 and EN VIII.9–12.

The purpose of political science is to guide “the good lawgiver and the true politician” (IV.1.1288b27). Like any complete science or craft, it must study a range of issues concerning its subject matter. For example, gymnastics (physical education) studies what sort of training is best or adapted to the body that is naturally the best, what sort of training is best for most bodies, and what capacity is appropriate for someone who does not want the condition or knowledge appropriate for athletic contests. Political science studies a comparable range of constitutions (1288b21–35): first, the constitution which is best without qualification, i.e., “most according to our prayers with no external impediment”; second, the constitution that is best under the circumstances “for it is probably impossible for many persons to attain the best constitution”; third, the constitution which serves the aim a given population happens to have, i.e., the one that is best “based on a hypothesis”: “for [the political scientist] ought to be able to study a given constitution, both how it might originally come to be, and, when it has come to be, in what manner it might be preserved for the longest time; I mean, for example, if a particular city happens neither to be governed by the best constitution, nor to be equipped even with necessary things, nor to be the [best] possible under existing circumstances, but to be a baser sort.” Hence, Aristotelian political science is not confined to the ideal system, but also investigates the second-best constitution or even inferior political systems, because this may be the closest approximation to full political justice which the lawgiver can attain under the circumstances.

Regarding the constitution that is ideal or “according to prayer,” Aristotle criticizes the views of his predecessors in the Politics and then offers a rather sketchy blueprint of his own in Politics VII–VIII. Although his own political views were influenced by his teacher Plato, Aristotle is highly critical of the ideal constitution set forth in Plato’s Republic on the grounds that it overvalues political unity, it embraces a system of communism that is impractical and inimical to human nature, and it neglects the happiness of the individual citizens ( Politics II.1–5). In contrast, in Aristotle’s “best constitution,” each and every citizen will possess moral virtue and the equipment to carry it out in practice, and thereby attain a life of excellence and complete happiness (see VII.13.1332a32–8). All of the citizens will hold political office and possess private property because “one should call the city-state happy not by looking at a part of it but at all the citizens.” (VII.9.1329a22–3). Moreover, there will be a common system of education for all the citizens, because they share the same end ( Pol . VIII.1).

If (as is the case with most existing city-states) the population lacks the capacities and resources for complete happiness, however, the lawgiver must be content with fashioning a suitable constitution ( Politics IV.11). The second-best system typically takes the form of a polity (in which citizens possess an inferior, more common grade of virtue) or mixed constitution (combining features of democracy, oligarchy, and, where possible, aristocracy, so that no group of citizens is in a position to abuse its rights). Aristotle argues that for city-states that fall short of the ideal, the best constitution is one controlled by a numerous middle class which stands between the rich and the poor. For those who possess the goods of fortune in moderation find it “easiest to obey the rule of reason” ( Politics IV.11.1295b4–6). They are accordingly less apt than the rich or poor to act unjustly toward their fellow citizens. A constitution based on the middle class is the mean between the extremes of oligarchy (rule by the rich) and democracy (rule by the poor). “That the middle [constitution] is best is evident, for it is the freest from faction: where the middle class is numerous, there least occur factions and divisions among citizens” (IV.11.1296a7–9). The middle constitution is therefore both more stable and more just than oligarchy and democracy.

Although Aristotle classifies democracy as a deviant constitution (albeit the best of a bad lot), he argues that a case might be made for popular rule in Politics III.11, a discussion which has attracted the attention of modern democratic theorists. The central claim is that the many may turn out to be better than the virtuous few when they come together, even though the many may be inferior when considered individually. For if each individual has a portion of virtue and practical wisdom, they may pool these moral assets and turn out to be better rulers than even a very wise individual. This argument seems to anticipate treatments of “the wisdom of the multitude” such as Condorcet’s “jury theorem.” In recent years, this particular chapter has been widely discussed in connection with topics such as democratic deliberation and public reason.

In addition, the political scientist must attend to existing constitutions even when they are bad. Aristotle notes that “to reform a constitution is no less a task [of politics] than it is to establish one from the beginning,” and in this way “the politician should also help existing constitutions” (IV.1.1289a1–7). The political scientist should also be cognizant of forces of political change which can undermine an existing regime. Aristotle criticizes his predecessors for excessive utopianism and neglect of the practical duties of a political theorist. However, he is no Machiavellian. The best constitution still serves as a regulative ideal by which to evaluate existing systems.

These topics occupy the remainder of the Politics . Books IV–VI are concerned with the existing constitutions: that is, the three deviant constitutions, as well as polity or the “mixed” constitution, which are the best attainable under most circumstances (IV.2.1289a26–38). The mixed constitution has been of special interest to scholars because it looks like a forerunner of modern republican regimes. The whole of book V investigates the causes and prevention of revolution or political change ( metabolê ) and civil war or faction ( stasis ). Books VII–VIII are devoted to the ideal constitution. As might be expected, Aristotle’s attempt to carry out this program involves many difficulties, and scholars disagree about how the two series of books (IV–VI and VII–VIII) are related to each other: for example, which were written first, which were intended to be read first, and whether they are ultimately consistent with each other. Most importantly, when Aristotle offers practical political prescriptions in Books IV–VI, is he guided by the best constitution as a regulative ideal, or is he simply abandoning political idealism and practicing a form of Realpolitik?For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary document:

Aristotle has continued to influence thinkers up to the present throughout the political spectrum, including conservatives (such as Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, and Eric Voegelin), communitarians (such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel), liberals (such as William Galston and Martha C. Nussbaum), libertarians (such as Tibor R. Machan, Douglas B. Rasmussen, and Douglas J. Den Uyl), and democratic theorists (such as Jill Frank and Gerald M. Mara).

It is not surprising that such diverse political persuasions can lay claim to Aristotle as a source. For his method often leads to divergent interpretations. When he deals with a difficult problem, he is inclined to consider opposing arguments in a careful and nuanced manner, and he is often willing to concede that there is truth on each side. For example, though he is critical of democracy, in one passage he allows that the case for rule by the many based on the superior wisdom of the multitude “perhaps also involves some truth” ( Pol. III.11.1281a39–42). Again, he sometimes applies his own principles in a questionable manner, for example, when he reasons that because associations should be governed in a rational manner, the household should be run by the husband rather than by the wife, whose rational capacity “lacks authority” (I.13.1260a13). Modern commentators sympathetic with Aristotle’s general approach often contend that in this case he applies his own principles incorrectly–leaving open the question of how they should be applied. Further, the way he applies his principles may have seemed reasonable in his socio-political context–for example, that the citizen of a polity (normally the best attainable constitution) must be a hoplite soldier (cf. III.7,1297b4)–but it may be debatable how these might apply within a modern democratic nation-state.

The problem of extrapolating to modern political affairs can be illustrated more fully in connection with Aristotle’s discussion of legal change in Politics II.8. He first lays out the argument for making the laws changeable. It has been beneficial in the case of medicine, for example, for it to progress from traditional ways to improved forms of treatment. An existing law may be a vestige of a primitive barbaric practice. For instance, Aristotle mentions a law in Cyme that allows an accuser to produce a number of his own relatives as witnesses to prove that a defendant is guilty of murder. “So,” Aristotle concludes, “it is evident from the foregoing that some laws should sometimes be changed. But to those who look at the matter from a different angle, caution would seem to be required” (1269a12–14). Since the law gets its force from the citizens’ habit of obedience, great care should be exercised in making any change in it. It may sometimes be better to leave defective laws in place rather than encouraging lawlessness by changing the laws too frequently. Moreover, there are the problems of how the laws are to be changed and who is to change them. Although Aristotle offers valuable insights, he breaks off the discussion of this topic and never takes it up elsewhere. We might sum up his view as follows: When it comes to changing the laws, observe the mean: don’t be too bound by traditional laws, but on the other hand don’t be overeager in altering them. It is obvious that this precept, reasonable as it is, leaves considerable room for disagreement among contemporary “neo-Aristotelian” theorists. For example, should the laws be changed to allow self-described transsexual persons to use sexually segregated restrooms? Conservatives and liberals might agree with Aristotle’s general stricture regarding legal change but differ widely on how to apply it in a particular case.

Most scholars of Aristotle advisedly make no attempt to show that he is aligned with any contemporary ideology. Rather, insofar as they find him relevant to our times, it is because he offers a remarkable synthesis of idealism and pragmatism unfolding in deep and thought-provoking discussions of perennial concerns of political philosophy: the role of human nature in politics, the relation of the individual to the state, the place of morality in politics, the theory of political justice, the rule of law, the analysis and evaluation of constitutions, the relevance of ideals to practical politics, the causes and cures of political change and revolution, and the importance of a morally educated citizenry.

• action: praxis
• citizen: politês
• city-state: polis (also ‘city’ or ‘state’)
• community: koinônia
• constitution: politeia (also ‘regime’)
• faction: stasis (also ‘civil war’)
• free: eleutheros
• friendship: philia
• good: agathos
• happiness: eudaimonia
• happy: eudaimôn
• justice: dikaiosunê
• lawgiver: nomothetês
• master: despotês
• nature: phusis
• noble: kalon (also ‘beautiful’ or ‘fine’)
• people ( dêmos )
• political: politikos (of, or pertaining to, the polis )
• political science: politikê epistêmê
• politician: politikos (also ‘statesman’)
• practical: praktikos
• practical wisdom: phronêsis
• revolution: metabolê (also ‘change’)
• right: exousia (also ‘liberty’)
• ruler: archôn
• self-sufficient: autarkês
• sovereign: kurios
• virtue: aretê (also ‘excellence’)
• without qualification: haplôs (also ‘absolute’)
• without authority: akuron

Note on Citations . Passages in Aristotle are cited as follows: title of treatise (italics), book (Roman numeral), chapter (Arabic numeral), line reference. Line references are keyed to the 1831 edition of Immanuel Bekker which had two columns (“a” and “b”) on each page. Politics is abbreviated as Pol. and Nicomachean Ethics as NE . In this article, “ Pol . I.2.1252b27”, for example, refers to Politics book I, chapter 2, page 1252, column b, line 27. Most translations include the Bekker page number with column letter in the margin followed by every fifth line number.

Passages in Plato are cited in a similar fashion, except the line references are to the Stephanus edition of 1578 in which pages were divided into five parts (“a” through “e”).

Caveat on Bibliography. Although fairly extensive, this bibliography represents only a fraction of the secondary literature in English. However, the items cited here contain many references to other valuable scholarly work in other languages as well as in English.

• Dreizehnter, Alois, Aristoteles’ Politik , Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1970 [generally the most reliable critical edition].
• Ross, W. D., Aristotelis Politica , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957.
• Barker, Ernest, revised by Richard Stalley, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Jowett, Benjamin, revised in The Complete Works of Aristotle (The Revised Oxford Translation), Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, vol. II, pp. 1986–2129.
• Lord, Carnes, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013, revised edition.
• Rackham, H., Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 1932.
• Reeve, C. D. C., Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2017 (new translation).
• Simpson, Peter L. P., Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
• Sinclair, T. A., revised by Trevor J. Saunders, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983.

The Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford University Press) includes translation and commentary of the Politics in four volumes:

• Trevor J. Saunders, Politics I–II (1995).
• Richard Robinson with a supplementary essay by David Keyt, Politics III–IV (1995).
• David Keyt, Politics V–VI (1999).
• Richard Kraut, Politics VII–VIII (1997).
• Also of interest is the Constitution of Athens , an account of the history and workings of the Athenian democracy. Although it was formerly ascribed to Aristotle, it is now thought by most scholars to have been written by one of his pupils, perhaps at his direction toward the end of Aristotle’s life. A reliable translation with introduction and notes is by P. J. Rhodes, Aristotle: The Athenian Constitution . Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984.
• Barnes, Jonathan, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji (eds.), Articles on Aristotle (Volume 2: Ethics and Politics), London: Duckworth, 1977.
• Boudouris, K. J. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, 2 volumes, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995.
• Deslauriers, Marguerite, and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
• Höffe, Otfried (ed.), Aristoteles Politik , Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001.
• Keyt, David, and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
• Kraut, Richard, and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.
• Lockwood, Thornton, and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
• Lord, Carnes, and David O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
• Patzig, Günther (ed.), Aristoteles’ Politik: Akten des XI. Symposium Aristotelicum , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990.
• Aquinas, Thomas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics , translated by Richard J. Regan, Indianapolis Publishing Co.: Hackett, 2007.
• Barker, Ernest, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle , London: Methuen, 1906; reprinted, New York: Russell & Russell, 1959.
• Bodéüs, Richard, The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s Ethics , Albany: SUNY Press, 1993.
• Brill, Sara, Aristotle on the Concept of the Shared Life , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
• Hansen, Mogens Herman, Reflections on Aristotle’s Politics , Copenhagen: Tusculaneum Press, 2013.
• Keyt, David, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017.
• Kontos, Pavlos, Aristotle on the Scope of Practical Reason: Spectators, Legislators, Hopes, and Evils , Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2021.
• Kraut, Richard, Aristotle: Political Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Mulgan, Richard G., Aristotle’s Political Theory , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
• Newman, W. L., The Politics of Aristotle , 4 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1887–1902; reprinted Salem, NH: Ayer, 1985.
• Nichols, Mary, Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle’s Politics , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992.
• Pangle, Lorraine Smith, Reason and Character: The Moral Foundations of Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020.
• Pellegrin, Pierre, Endangered Excellent: On the Political Philosophy of Aristotle , translated by Anthony Preus, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2020.
• Riesbeck, David J., Aristotle on Political Community , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
• Roberts, Jean, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle and the Politics , London and New York: Routledge, 2009.
• Schütrumpf, Eckart, Aristoteles: Politik , 4 vols. Berlin and Darmstadt: Akademie Verlag, 1999–2005.
• Simpson, Peter, A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle , Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
• Strauss, Leo, “On Aristotle’s Politics,” in The City and Man , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, pp. 13–49.
• Susemihl, Franz, and R. D. Hicks, The Politics of Aristotle , London: Macmillan, 1894. [Includes books I–III and VII–VIII renumbered as IV–V.]
• Trott, Adriel M., Aristotle on the Nature of Community , New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
• Veogelin, Eric, Order and History (Vol. III: Plato and Aristotle ), Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1977.
• Yack, Bernard, The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

1. Biographical and Textual Studies

• Barker, Ernest, “The Life of Aristotle and the Composition and Structure of the Politics ,” Classical Review , 45 (1931), 162–72.
• Jaeger, Werner, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948.
• Kelsen, Hans, “Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian Policy,” in Jonathan Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle (Volume 2: Ethics and Politics), London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 170–94.
• Lord, Carnes, “The Character and Composition of Aristotle’s Politics ,” Political Theory , 9 (1981), 459–78.

2. Methodology and Foundations of Aristotle’s Political Theory

• Adkins, A. W. H., “The Connection between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 75–93.
• Cherry, Kevin M., Plato, Aristotle and the Purpose of Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
• Depew, David J., “The Ethics of Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Ryan K. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 399–418.
• Frank Jill, “On Logos and Politics in Aristotle,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 9–26.
• Frede, Dorothea, “The Political Character of Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 14–37.
• Gerson, Lloyd, “On the Scientific Character of Aristotle’s Politics,” in K. I. Boudouris, K. I. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995, vol. I, pp. 35–50.
• Irwin, Terence H., “Moral Science and Political Theory in Aristotle,” History of Political Thought , 6 (1985), pp. 150–68.
• Kahn, Charles H., “The Normative Structure of Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Günther Patzig (ed.) Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 369–84.
• Kamtekar, Rachana, “The Relationship between Aristotle’s Ethical and Political Discourses ( NE X 9),” in Ronald Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 370–82.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 165–95.
• Lockwood, Thornton, “ Politics II: Political Critique, Political Theorizing, Political Innovation,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 64–83.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “The Unity of Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” in David Konstan and David Sider (eds.), Philoderma: Essays in Greek and Roman Philosophy in Honor of Phillip Mitsis (Siracusa: Parnassos Press, 2022), pp. 215–43.
• Ober, Joshua, “Aristotle’s Political Sociology: Class, Status, and Order in the Politics ,” in Carnes Lord and David O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
• Pellegrin, Pierre, “On the ‘Platonic’ Part of Aristotle’s Politics ,” in William Wians (ed.) Aristotle’s Philosophical Development , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996, pp. 347–59.
• –––, “Is Politics a Natural Science?” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 27–45.
• –––, “Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Christopher Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 558–85.
• Peonids, F., “The Relation between the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics Revisited,” History of Political Thought 22 (2001): 1–12.
• Rowe, Christopher J., “Aims and Methods in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 57–74.
• Salkever, Stephen G., “Aristotle’s Social Science,” Political Theory , 9 (1981), pp. 479–508; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 27–64.
• –––, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
• Santas, Gerasimos X.,“The Relation between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” in K. I. Boudouris, K. I. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995, vol. I, pp. 160–76.
• Smith, Nicholas D. and Robert Mayhew, “Aristotle on What the Political Scientist Needs to Know,” in K. I. Boudouris (ed.) Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Athens: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, 1995, vol. I, pp. 189–98.
• Vander Waerdt, Paul A., “The Political Intention of Aristotle’s Moral Philosophy,” Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985), 77–89.
• –––, “The Plan and Intention of Aristotle’s Ethical and Political Writings,” Illinois Classical Studies 16 (1991), 231–53.

3. Political Naturalism

• Ambler, Wayne, “Aristotle’s Understanding of the Naturalness of the City,” Review of Politics , 47 (1985), 163–85.
• Annas, Julia, “Aristotle on Human Nature and Political Virtue,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 731–54.
• Berryman, Sylvia, Aristotle on the Sources of the Ethical Life , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2919, esp. Ch. 3 “Naturalism in Aristotle’s Politics. ”
• Chan, Joseph, “Does Aristotle’s Political Theory Rest on a Blunder?” History of Political Thought , 13 (1992), 189–202.
• Chappell, Timothy, “‘Naturalism’ in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” in Ryan K. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 382–98.
• Cherry, K. and E. A. Goerner, “Does Aristotle’s Polis Exist ‘By Nature’?” History of Political Thought , 27 (2006), 563–85.
• Cooper, John M., “Political Animals and Civic Friendship,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 220–41; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 65–89.
• DePew, David J., “Humans and Other Political Animals in Aristotle’s Historia Animalium ,” Phronesis , 40 (1995), 156–76.
• –––, “Political Animals and the Genealogy of the Polis : Aristotle’s Politics and Plato’s Statesman ,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 238–57.
• Everson, Stephen, “Aristotle on the Foundations of the State,” Political Studies , 36 (1988), 89–101.
• Karbowski, Joseph, “Political Animals and Human Nature in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 221–37.
• Keyt, David, “The Meaning of BIOS in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics ,” Ancient Philosophy , 9 (1989), 15–21; reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 101–9.
• –––, “Three Basic Theorems in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 118–41; reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 111–38.
• Kullmann, Wolfgang, “Man as a Political Animal in Aristotle,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 94–117.
• Lloyd, Geoffrey, “Aristotle on the Natural Sociability, Skills and Intelligence of Animals,” in Verity Harte and Melissa Lane (eds.), Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 277–94.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle: Naturalism,” in Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 321–43.
• Mulgan, Richard, “Aristotle’s Doctrine that Man is a Political Animal,” Hermes , 102 (1974), 438–45.
• Reeve, C. D. C., “The Naturalness of the Polis in Aristotle,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 512–25.
• Roberts, Jean, “Political Animals in the Nicomachean Ethics ,” Phronesis , 34 (1989), 185–202.

4. Household: Women, Children, and Slaves

• Booth, William James, “Politics and the Household: A Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics Book One,” History of Political Thought , 2 (1981), 203–26.
• Brunt, P. A., “Aristotle and Slavery,” in Studies in Greek History and Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 434–88.
• Chambliss, J. J., “Aristotle’s Conception of Children and the Poliscraft,” Educational Studies , 13 (1982), 33–43.
• Cole, Eve Browning, “Women, Slaves, and ‘Love of Toil’ in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 127–44.
• Deslauriers, Marguerite, “The Virtues of Women and Slaves,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 25 (2003), 213–31.
• –––, “Political Rule Over Women in Politics ,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 46–63.
• Fortenbaugh, W. W., “Aristotle on Slaves and Women,” in Jonathan Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle , vol. 2, Ethics and Politics. London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 135–9.
• Frank, Jill, “Citizens, Slaves, and Foreigners: Aristotle on Human Nature,” American Political Science Review , 98 (2004), 91–104.
• Freeland, Cynthia, Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle , University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998.
• Garnsey, Peter, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
• Lindsay, Thomas K., “Was Aristotle Racist, Sexist, and Anti-Democratic?: A Review Essay,” Review of Politics 56 (1994), 127–51.
• Lockwood, Thornton, “Justice in Aristotle’s Household and City,” Polis , 20 (2003), 1–21.
• –––, “Is Natural Slavery Beneficial?” Journal of the History of Philosophy , 45 (2007), 207–21.
• Mayhew, Robert, The Female in Aristotle’s Biology: Reason or Rationalization , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
• Modrak, Deborah, “Aristotle: Women, Deliberation, and Nature,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 207–21.
• Mulgan, Robert G., “Aristotle and the Political Role of Women,” History of Political Thought , 15 (1994), 179–202.
• Nagle, D. Brendan, The Household as the Foundation of Aristotle’s Polis , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
• Pellegrin, Pierre, “Natural Slavery,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 92–116.
• Saxenhouse, Arlene W., “Family, Polity, and Unity: Aristotle on Socrates’ Community of Wives,” Polity , 15 (1982), 202–19.
• Schofield, Malcolm, “Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Theory of Slavery,” in Günther Patzig (ed.) Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 1–27; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 91–119.
• Senack, Christine M., “Aristotle on the Woman’s Soul,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 223–36.
• Simpson, Peter, “Aristotle’s Criticism of Socrates’ Communism of Wives and Children,” Apeiron , 24 (1991), 99–114.
• Smith, Nicholas D., “Plato and Aristotle on the Nature of Women,” Journal of the History of Philosophy , 21 (1983), 467–78.
• –––, “Aristotle’s Theory of Natural Slavery,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 142–55.
• Spelman, E. V., “Aristotle and the Politicization of the Soul,” in Sandra Harding and M. B. Hintikka (eds) Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science , Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983, pp. 17–30.
• –––, “Who’s Who in the Polis,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 99–125.
• Stauffer, Dana J., “Aristotle’s Account of the Subjection of Women,” Journal of Politics , 70 (2008), 929–41.

5. Political Economy

• Ambler, Wayne H., “Aristotle on Acquisition,” Canadian Journal of Political Science , 17 (1984), 487–502.
• Crespo, Ricardo F., A Re-assessment of Aristotle ’ s Economic Thought . London: Routledge, 2014.
• Dobbs, Darrell, “Aristotle’s Anticommunism,” American Journal of Political Science , 29 (1985), 29–46.
• Finley, M. I., “Aristotle and Economic Analysis,” in Jonathan Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle , vol. 2, Ethics and Politics. London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 140–58.
• Gallagher, Robert L., Aristotle’s Critique of Political Economy with a Contemporary Application. London: Routledge, 2018.
• Hadreas, Peter, “Aristotle on the Vices and Virtue of Wealth,” Journal of Business Ethics, 39 (2002), 361–76.
• Hartman, Edwin M., “Virtue, Profit, and the Separation Thesis: An Aristotelian View,” Journal of Business Ethics ,99 (2011), 5–17.
• –––, Virtue in Business: Conversations with Aristotle . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
• Inamura, Kazutaka, “The Role of Reciprocity in Aristotle’s Theory of Political Economy,” History of Political Thought , 32 (2011), 565–87.
• Irwin, Terence H., “Aristotle’s Defense of Private Property,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.). A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 200–25.
• Judson, Lindsay, “Aristotle on Fair Exchange,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 15 (1997), 147–75.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle and the Joy of Working,” in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, pp. 223–39.
• Mathie, William,“Property in the Political Science of Aristotle,” in Anthony Parel & Thomas Flanagan(eds.), Theories of Property: Aristotle to the Present . Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1979, pp. 12–35.
• Mayhew, Robert, “Aristotle on Property,” The Review of Metaphysics , 46 (1993), 802–31.
• McNeill, D., “Alternative Interpretations of Aristotle on Exchange and Reciprocity,” Public Affairs Quarterly , 4 (1990), 55–68.
• Mei, Todd S., “The Preeminence of Use: Reevaluating the Relation between Use and Exchange in Aristotle’s Economic Thought,” American Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2009), 523–48.
• Meikle, Scott, “Aristotle on Money” Phronesis 39 (1994), 26–44.
• –––, Aristotle’s Economic Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Miller, Fred D. Jr., “Property Rights in Aristotle,” in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 121–44.
• –––, “Was Aristotle the First Economist?” Apeiron , 31 (1998), 387–98.
• –––, “Aristotle and Business: Friend or Foe?” in Eugene Heath and Byron Kaldis (eds.), Wealth, Commerce and Philosophy: Foundational Thinkers and Business Ethics , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017, pp. 31–52.
• Morris, Tom, If Aristotle Ran General Motors: The New Soul of Business , New York: Henry Holt, 1997.
• Nielsen, Karen Margrethe, “Economy and Private Property,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 67–91.
• Solomon, Robert C., “Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics,” Business Ethics Quarterly , 2 (1992), 317–39.
• –––, “Aristotle, Ethics, and Business Organizations,” Organization Studies, 25 (2004), 1021–43.

6. Political Justice and Injustice

• Brunschwig, Jacques, “The Aristotelian Theory of Equity,” in Michael Frede and Gisela Striker (eds.), Rationality in Greek Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 115–55.
• Marguerite Deslauriers, “Political Unity and Inequality,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 117–43.
• Georgiadis, Constantine, “Equitable and Equity in Aristotle,” in Spiro Panagiotou (ed.), Justice, Law and Method in Plato and Aristotle , Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1987, pp. 159–72.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle’s Theory of Distributive Justice,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 238–78.
• –––, “The Good Man and the Upright Citizen in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), Freedom, Reason, and the Polis: Essays in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 220–40. Reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 197–221.
• –––, “Nature and Justice,” in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, pp. 1–19.
• Lockwood, Thornton, “Polity, Political Justice, and Political Mixing,” History of Political Thought , 27 (2006), 207–22.
• Morrison, Donald, “The Common Good,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 176–98.
• Nussbaum, Martha C., “Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 153–87.
• Roberts, Jean, “Justice and the Polis,” in Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 344–65.
• Rosler, Andrés, “Civic Virtue: Citizenship, Ostracism, and War,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 144–75.
• Saxonhouse, Arlene W., “Aristotle on the Corruption of Regimes: Resentment and Justice,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 184–203.
• Schütrumpf, Eckart, “Little to Do With Justice: Aristotle on Distributing Political Power,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 163–83.
• Young, Charles M., “Aristotle on Justice,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy , 27 (1988), 233–49.
• Zingano, Marco, “Natural, Ethical, and Political Justice,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 199–222.

7. Political Friendship and Enmity

• Hatzistavrou, Antony, “Faction,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 301–23.
• Irrera, Elena, “Between Advantage and Virtue: Aristotle’s Theory of Political Friendship,” History of Political Thought , 26 (2005), 565–85.
• Jang, Misung, “Aristotle’s Political Friendship as Solidarity,” in Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer, & Nuno M.S. Coelho (eds.), Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics, Dordrecht: Springer, 2018. pp. 417–33.
• Kalimtzis, Kostas, Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease: An Inquiry into Stasis , Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000.
• Kreft, Nora, “Aristotle on Friendship and Being Human,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 182–99.
• Kronman, Anthony, “Aristotle’s Idea of Political Fraternity,” American Journal of Jurisprudence , 24 (1979),114–138.
• Leontsini, Eleni, “The Motive of Society: Aristotle on Civic Friendship, Justice, and Concord,” Res Publica , 19 (2013), 21–35.
• Ludwig, Paul W., Rediscovering Political Friendship: Aristotle’s Theory and Modern Identity, Community, and Equality , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle on Deviant Constitutions,” in K. I. Boudouris, K. I. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995, vol. II, pp. 105–15.
• Mulgan, Richard, “The Role of Friendship in Aristotle’s Political Theory,” in Preston King, and Heather Devere (eds.), The Challenge to Friendship in M odernity , London: Frank Cass, 2000, pp. 15–32.
• Schofield, Malcolm, “Political Friendship and the Ideology of Reciprocity,” in Saving the City , London: Routledge, 1999, pp. 82–99.
• Schwarzenbach, Sibyl, “On Civic Friendship,” Ethics , 107 (1996), 97–128.
• Skultety, Steven C.,. “Defining Aristotle’s Conception of Stasis in the Politics ,” Phronesis 54 (2009), 346–70.
• –––, Conflict in Aristotle ’ s Political Philosophy , Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 2019.
• Sosa, Javier Echeñique & Jose Antonio Errázuriz Besa, “Aristotle on Personal Enmity,” Ancient Philosophy , 62 (2022), 215–31.
• Ward, Ann, “Friendship and politics in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics ,” European Journal of Political Theory , 10 (2011), 443–62.
• Weed, Ronald, Aristotle on Stasis: A Psychology of Political Conflict , Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2007.
• Yack, Bernard, “Community and Conflict in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” Review of Politics , 47 (1985), 92–112.
• –––, “Natural Right and Aristotle’s Understanding of Justice,” Political Theory , 18 (1990), 216–37.

8. Citizenship, Civic Obligation, and Political Rights

• Allan, D. J., “Individual and State in the Ethics and Politics ,” Entretiens sur l’Antiquité Classique IX, La ‘Politique’ d’Aristote , Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1964, pp. 53–95.
• Barnes, Jonathan, “Aristotle and Political Liberty,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 249–63; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 185–201.
• Collins, Susan D., Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
• Frede, Dorothea, “Citizenship in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 167–84.
• Horn, Christoph, “Law, Governance, and Political Obligation,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 223–46.
• Irwin, Terence H., “The Good of Political Activity,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 73–98.
• Kraut, Richard, “Are There Natural Rights in Aristotle?” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 755–74.
• Lane, Melissa, “Claims to Rule: The Case of the Mutlitude,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 247–74.
• Long, Roderick T., “Aristotle’s Conception of Freedom,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 775–802; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 384–410.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle and the Origins of Natural Rights,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 873–907.
• –––, “Aristotle’s Theory of Political Rights,” in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 309–50.
• Morrison, Donald, “Aristotle’s Definition of Citizenship: A Problem and Some Solutions,” History of Philosophy Quarterly , 16 (1999), 143–65.
• Mulgan, Robert G., “Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation,” Political Theory , 18 (1990), 195–215.
• Roberts, Jean, “Excellences of the Citizen and of the Individual,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 555–65.
• Samaras, Thanassis, “Aristotle and the Question of Citizenship,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 123–41.
• Schofield, Malcolm, “Sharing in the Constitution,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 831–58; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 353–80.
• Zuckert, Catherine H., “Aristotle on the Limits and Satisfactions of Political Life,” Interpretation , 11 (1983), 185–206.

9. Constitutional Theory

• Balot, Ryan, “The ‘Mixed Regime’ In Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 103–22.
• Bates, Clifford A., Aristotle’s “Best Regime”: Kingship, Democracy, and the Rule of Law , Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003.
• Bobonich, Christopher, “Aristotle, Decision Making, and the Many,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 142–62.
• Cherry, Kevin M., “The Problem of Polity: Political Participation in Aristotle’s Best Regime,” Journal of Politics , 71 (2009), 406–21.
• Coby, Patrick, “Aristotle’s Three Cities and the Problem of Faction,” Journal of Politics , 50 (1988), 896–919.
• Destrée, Pierre, “Aristotle on Improving Imperfect Cities,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 204–23.
• Dietz, Mary G., “Between Polis and Empire: Aristotle’s Politics ,” American Political Science Review 106 (2012), 275–93.
• Garsten, Bryan, “Deliberating and Acting Together,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 324–49.
• Huxley, G., “On Aristotle’s Best State,” in Paul Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (eds.), Crux: Essays Presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix , London: Duckworth, 1985, pp. 139–49.
• Johnson, Curtis N., Aristotle’s Theory of the State , New York: Macmillan, 1990.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle and Anarchism,” Reason Papers , 18 (1993), 133–52; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety. Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 203–22.
• Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle’s Critique of False Utopias,” in Otfried Höffe (ed.), Aristoteles Politik , Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001, pp. 59–73.
• Lintott, Andrew, “Aristotle and Democracy,” The Classical Quarterly (New Series), 42 (1992), 114–28.
• Mayhew, Robert, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Republic , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.
• –––, “Rulers and Ruled,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 526–39.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle on the Ideal Constitution,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 540–54.
• –––, “The Rule of Reason,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 38–66.
• Mulgan, Richard, “Aristotle’s Analysis of Oligarchy and Democracy,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 307–22.
• –––, “Constitutions and the Purpose of the State,” in Otfried Höffe (ed.), Aristoteles Politik , Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001, pp. 93–106.
• Mulhern, J. J., “ Politeia in Greek Literature, Inscriptions, and in Aristotle’s Politics : Reflections on Translation and Interpretation,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 84–102.
• Murray, O., “Polis and Politeia in Aristotle,” in Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), The Ancient Greek City-State , Copenhagen: Muksgaard, 1993, pp. 197–210.
• Ober, Joshua, “Aristotle’s Natural Democracy,” in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 223–43.
• –––, “Democracy’s Wisdom: An Aristotelian Middle Way for Collective Judgment,” American Political Science Review , 107 (2013), 104–22.
• –––, “Nature, History, and Aristotle’s Best Possible Regime,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 224–43.
• Polansky, Ronald, “Aristotle on Political Change,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 322–45.
• Rosler, Andres, Political Authority and Obligation in Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
• Rowe, C. J., “Reality and Utopia,” Elenchos , 10 (1989), 317–36.
• –––, “Aristotelian Constitutions,” in Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 366–89.
• Strauss, Barry, “On Aristotle’s Critique of Athenian Democracy,” in Carnes Lord and David O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, pp. 212–33.
• Vander Waert, Paul A., “Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Best Regime,” Phronesis , 30 (1985), 249–73.
• Waldron, Jeremy, “The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle’s Politics ,” Political Theory , 20 (1992), 613–41; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 145–65.
• Wilson, James L., “Deliberation, Democracy, and the Rule of Reason in Aristotle’s Politics ,” American Political Science Review , 105 (2011), 259–74.

10. Education

• Burnyeat, Myles F., “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good,” in Amelie O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pp. 69–92.
• Curren, Randall R., Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.
• Depew, David J., “Politics, Music, and Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ideal State,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 346–80.
• Destrée, Pierre, “Education, Leisure, and Politics,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 301–23.
• Frede, Dorothea, “The Deficiency of Human Nature: The Task of a ‘Philosophy of Human Nature’,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 258–74.
• Jimenez, Marta, Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.
• Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle on Method and Moral Education,” in Jyl Gentzler (ed.), Method in Ancient Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 171–90.
• –––, “Aristotle on Becoming Good: Habituation, Reflection, and Perception,” in Christopher Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 529–57.
• Lord, Carnes, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982.
• Lynch, John Patrick, Aristotle’s School , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
• Muzio, G. D., “Aristotle on Improving One’s Character,” Phronesis , 45 (2000), 205–19.
• Reeve, C. D. C,  “Aristotelian Education,” in A. O. Rorty (ed.), Philosophers on Education , London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 51–65.
• Stalley, Richard, “Education and the State,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 566–76.
• Brooks, Richard O. and James B. Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003.
• Burns, Tony, “Aristotle and Natural Law,” History of Political Thought , 19 (1998), 142–66.
• Duke, George, Aristotle and Law: The Politics of Nomos , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Gordley, James R., “Tort Law in the Aristotelian Tradition,” in Salvador Rus Rufino (ed.), Aristoteles: El Pensamiento Politico y Juridico . León & Seville: University of León & University of Seville, 1999, pp. 71–97.
• Hamburger, Max, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle’s Legal Theory , New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951.
• Huppes-Cluysenaer, Liesbeth & Nuno M..S. Coelho (eds.), Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics , Dordrecht: Springer, 2018.
• Miller, Eugene, “Prudence and the Rule of Law,” American Journal of Jurisprudence , 24 (1979), 181–206.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle’s Philosophy of Law,” in Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Carrie-Ann Biondi (eds.), A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics [vol. 6 of A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence , ed. Enrico Pattaro]. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007, pp.79–110.
• Schroeder, Donald N., “Aristotle on Law,” Polis , 4 (1981), 17–31; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 37–51.
• Wormuth, F. D., “Aristotle on Law,” in M. R. Korvitz and A. E. Murphy (eds.), Essays in Political Theory Presented to G. H. Sabine,  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1948, pp. 45–61.
• Zanetti, Gianfrancesco, “Problematic Aspects of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Law,” Archiv f ü r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie , 81 (1995), 49–64.

12. Aristotle and Contemporary Politics

• Biondi, Carrie-Ann, “Aristotle on the Mixed Constitution and Its Relevance for American Political Thought,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), Freedom, Reason, and the Polis: Essays in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 176–98.
• Frank, Jill, A Democracy of Distinction: Aristotle and the Work of Politics , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
• Galston, William A., Justice and the Human Good , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
• Garver, Eugene, Aristotle’s Politics: Living Well and Living Together , Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011.
• Goodman, Lenn E. and Robert Talise (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics Today , Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.
• Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle and Rawls on the Common Good,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 350–74.
• Lord, Carnes, “Aristotle and the Idea of Liberal Education,” in Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick (eds.), Demokrateia: A Conversation of Democracy, Ancient and Modern , Princeton: Princeton University Press Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, pp. 271–88.
• Machan, Tibor R., “Aristotle and the Moral Status of Business,”  Journal of Value Inquiry , 38 (2004), 217–33.
• Mara, Gerald M., “The Culture of Democracy: Aristotle’s Athênaiôn Politeia as Political Theory,” in Aristide Tessitore (ed.), Aristotle and Modern Politics: The Persistence of Political Philosophy , Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002, 307–41.
• Mulgan, Robert G., “Was Aristotle an ‘Aristotelian Social Democrat’?” Ethics , 111 (2000), 79–101.
• Murphy, James Bernard, The Moral Economy of Labor: Aristotelian Themes in Economic Theory , New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.
• Nussbaum, Martha C., “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” in R. Bruce Douglas, Gerald M. Mara, and Henry S. Richardson (eds.) Liberalism and the Good , London: Routledge, 1990, pp. 203–52.
• –––, “Capabilities and Human Rights,” Fordham Law Review , 66 (1997), 273–300; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 413–40.
• –––, “Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities: A Response to Anthony, Arneson, Charlesworth, and Mulgan,” Ethics , 111 (2000), 102–40.
• Pack, Spencer J., “Aristotle’s Difficult Relationship with Modern Economic Theory,” Foundations of Science , 13 (2008), 256–80.
• Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Douglas J. Den Uyl, Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order , La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991.
• –––, Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics , University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005.
• Schollmeier, Paul, Rewriting Contemporary Political Philosophy with Plato and Aristotle: An Essay on Eudaimonic Politics,  London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019.
• Salkever, Stephen S., Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
• Tessitore, Aristide (ed.), Aristotle and Modern Politics: The Persistence of Political Philosophy , Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002.
• Wallach, John C., “Contemporary Aristotelianism,” Political Theory , 20 (1992), 613–41.

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Essay on Justice | India | Political Science

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Here is an essay on ‘Justice’ for class 11 and 12. Find paragraphs, long and short essays on ‘Justice’ especially written for school and college students.

Essay on Justice

1. essay on the introduction to justice in indian constitution:.

Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy aim at the fulfillment of aspirations, ideals and objectives of the constitutional fathers enshrined in the Preamble to the Constitution. The Preamble of the Constitution promises the Indian people social, economic and political justice, liberty to thought, expression, belief, faith and worship and the equality of status and opportunity.

Fundamental Rights mainly guarantee ‘Equality’ and ‘Freedom’ to the Indian citizens, the Directive Principles of State Policy aim at establishing a social system in which they may get social, economic and political justice. The ultimate aim of both is to achieve the ideas of justice, liberty and equality fixed by the Indian Constitution.

Fundamental Rights, Directive Principles of State Policy and Justice :

Justice is an essential condition for the all-round development of the personality of an individual. According to Salmond, “Justice means to distribute the due share to everybody.” Provisions have been made for the attainment of social, political and economic justice for Indian people after the political independence of the country in 1947.

2. Essay on the Social Justice :

Social justice means to abolish social inequalities and to provide equal opportunities to everybody in social life. Before 1947, there were so many social inequalities in India. The framers of the Indian Constitution were determined to end all such inequalities. In order to put an end to social inequalities following provisions have been made in the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy.

(a) Equality before Law :

In order to provide social justice, it is essential that those who live in the society should be equal before law. Article 14 of Fundamental Rights of the Indian Constitution provides that the State shall not deny to any person equality before law or equal protection of a law within the territory of India. It means that in India, laws do not discriminate between rich and poor, high and low.

(b) Prohibition of Discrimination :

It is essential for social justice that in the society all discriminations should end and there should be no privileged class. Article 15 of the Indian Constitution provides for a ban on discrimination based on caste, color, race, religion, sex etc. Every individual has been given the right to freely visit all shops, public restaurants, hotels, and places of public entertainments, wells, tanks, public bath, roads and other places of public utility.

(c) Equality of Opportunity in Public Appointments :

In order to establish social justice, it is essential that there should equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to appointment to any office. Article 16 of the Fundamental Rights provides for equal opportunities to all the Indian citizens in the matter of public appointments. The government will not discriminate against the Indian people in the matter of public appointments on the basis of caste, color, race, religion, sex and place of birth etc. But the State can keep some seats reserved for the members of scheduled and backward classes in the matter of public appointments.

(d) Abolition of Untouchability :

Article 17 of Fundamental Rights provides for the abolition of centuries old social evil of untouchability. Untouchability has been declared as a punishable offence under the laws.

(e) Abolition of Titles :

In order to bring about social justice, under Article 18 of the Fundamental Rights, the State has been restrained from conferring any title, except military and academic titles.

(f) Prohibition of Exploitation :

Social justice demands that there should be no exploitation of man by man. Article 23 and 24 of the Indian Constitution provides for the abolition of all sort of exploitation. Article 23 provides for a ban of human trade, ‘Begar’ or work without any wages and getting work done against the will of the individual. Similarly Article 24 provides for a ban on dangerous work being got done by children below the age of 14 years. The aim of these Articles and provisions is to end slavery and bonded labor.

(g) Promotion of the Interests of Backward and Weaker Section of Society :

Through the provisions of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy, the State has been given directions for the protection of the interests of backward and weaker sections of the Indian society. It is the sacred duty of the State to protect the people from exploitation and social injustice.

(h) Protection of the Interests of Minorities :

In order to protect the interest of minorities and to save them from the exploitation of majority community. Article 24 of the Indian Constitution gives the right to protect and preserve the language, script and culture to the people living in any part of the country. According to Article 30, the minorities have been given the right to establish and administer their own educational institutions.

(i) Special Facilities for Weaker Sections of Society :

Social justice demands that special facilities should be provided by the State to improve the conditions of weak and backward classes of society. There is provision both in the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy that the State shall promote the educational and economic interests of weaker sections, especially of backward classes, scheduled costs and scheduled tribes and protect them from social injustice and exploitation.

In short it can be concluded that with the provision of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy almost all the arrangements have been made for the establishment of social justice in the country.

3. Essay on the Economic Justice :

Economic justice means that the individual is provided with the bare necessities of food, clothes and shelter, the abolition of the unequal distribution of wealth and the provision of equal and appropriate opportunities for the earning of his livelihood. The provision of economic justice is essential for the attainment of social justice and the success of democracy. The chapters of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy make the following provisions for the attainment of economic justice in the country.

(a) Right to Property is made Legal Right :

According to the 44th Constitutional Amendment, the Right to Property has been made merely a legal right. For the fulfillment of this objective Article 300 (A) has been inserted into the Constitution. The aim of this amendment was to remove the obstacles in the path of the establishment of economic justice.

(b) Adequate Means of Livelihood :

In order to give economic justice, it is essential to fulfill the basic needs of the public. Article 39 (a) of the Directive Principles says that the State shall direct its economic policy in such a way that all citizens have the right to an adequate means of livelihood. According to Article 41, the State shall within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make provision for work to all citizens.

(c) To Check the Concentration of Wealth and Means of Production :

For the establishment of economic justice it is essential to check the concentration of wealth and the means of production in fewer hands. The Indian Constitution makes a provision for the acquisition of property of the people by the State for the furtherance of the public interest. Article 39 (b) provides that the ownership and control over the material resources would be conducted in such a manner as to do public welfare. According to Article 39 (c), the economic organisation in the country would be controlled in such a manner that wealth is not concentrated in the hands of fewer people and the means of production are not used against the interests of Indian people.

(d) Equal Pay for Equal Work :

Economic justice requires that men and women should get equal pay for equal work. Article 39 (d) of the Indian Constitution provides that the State shall endeavor to secure equal pay for men and women for equal work.

(e) Protection against Economic Exploitation :

For the establishment of economic justice, it is essential that there is no economic exploitation of one class by another class. Under Article 23 of the Fundamental Rights, traffic of human beings, beggar and bonded labor are prohibited. Besides, in Article 39 (e) of the Directive Principles of State Policy, it has been provided that the State shall see that health and strength of workers, men and women and the tender age of children are not abused. The workers will not be forced by economic necessity to enter vocations unsuited to their age or strength.

(f) Social Security :

Economic justice demands that arrangements should be made to give economic assistance to those who are unemployed, old age and sick. Article 41 of the Directive Principles of State Policy provides that the State working within its resources and the limits of its progress and development, shall made available public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age and sickness.

(g) Participation of Workers in the Management of Industries :

Workers participation in the management of industries ensures economic justice. Article 43A of the Indian Constitution provides that the State shall take steps by suitable legislation or in any other way to secure participation of workers in the management of industries.

4. Essay on the Political Justice :

By the term political justice it is implied that the citizens equally share the use of political power in the State so that they may be able to associate themselves with the administration and also fully enjoy all types of political freedom. Article 326 of the Indian Constitution entitles every Indian citizen above the age of 18 years to exercise his right to vote to elect his representatives without any sort of discrimination or limitations. In addition to this, the following provisions have been made for the attainment of political justice through the operation of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy.

(a) Right to Hold Public Office :

Political justice can be established if all the people are given equal rights to occupy public offices. Article 16 of the Constitution provides that there should be equality of opportunities for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. No citizen shall be discriminated against on ground of religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth.

(b) Right to Criticise the Government :

Article 19 of the Indian Constitution empowers the citizens of India with the freedom to express his views. In this way every Indian citizen gets the right to criticise the Government and thus plays his role in making the government a responsible one.

(c) Right to form Political Organisations :

According to Article 19 of the Indian Constitution, the Indian citizens are empowered to form political organisations for the protection of their interests.

(d) Right to Protest :

The Indian citizens have also been given the right to protest. They can demonstrate their protest against the government by means of observing strikes, processions, rallies and public meetings etc.

(e) Protection of Rights :

In order to get political justice it is essential that the rights of all citizens should be equally protected. Article 32 of the Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution clearly states that citizens can appeal to the High Courts and the Supreme Court for the protection of their Fundamental Rights. The Courts can issue writs for the protection of fundamental rights.

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After 17 Years in Prison, I’m a Different Person. Do Cases Like Mine Deserve a Second Look?

By Joseph Sanchez

Mr. Sanchez is a writer incarcerated in New York.

At 21, I was a full-time college student. I also sold drugs and carried guns. In the early-morning hours of April 7, 2007, I was shot on a Bronx street, along with two other people. I survived. One person didn’t. The third, who was badly injured, gave testimony at trial that suggested I shot everyone, including myself. Based on that, I was convicted of all charges.

I maintain my innocence, but I am not here to convince you of that. Innocent-man narratives often discount the need for reforms to help all people, including guilty people. I want to tell you instead about the person I have become over the past 17 years in prison and the people I have met here.

At Sullivan Correctional Facility, a maximum-security prison in the Catskill Mountains in New York, I’m incarcerated with men who have earned college degrees while incarcerated and who fill their days with volunteer work. Despite bettering our lives — or aging out of criminal behavior — we have no opportunity to demonstrate our rehabilitation outside of parole hearings that may come decades in the future.

Lawmakers across the country have proposed so-called Second Look laws. The First Step Act, which was signed into law by President Donald Trump in 2018, gave federal judges the discretion to reduce the sentences of people convicted of federal crimes when there’s compelling evidence to do so.

In New York, State Senator Julia Salazar has introduced legislation that could help reset past policies that contributed to ballooning populations in state prisons. The state’s Second Look legislation would allow judges to weigh factors like victim impact statements, age, whether the prisoners were penalized for bringing their cases to trial (instead of accepting a plea bargain) and participation in rehabilitation programming when considering sentence reductions.

The bill is receiving plenty of support, including from people who will make decisions about the fates of prisoners, like the chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Rowan Wilson . While running for re-election last year, Bronx District Attorney Darcel Clark said , “Ultimately, there may be individuals who are incarcerated on sentences that no longer meet today’s sensibility of justice.”

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Former High-Ranking New York State Government Employee Charged with Acting as an Undisclosed Agent of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party

BROOKLYN, NY – Earlier today, in federal court in Brooklyn , an indictment was unsealed charging Linda Sun with violating and conspiring to violate the Foreign Agents Registration Act, visa fraud, alien smuggling, and money laundering conspiracy. Sun is alleged to have acted on behalf of the government of the People’s Republic of China (the “PRC”) and the Chinese Communist Party (the “CCP”). Sun’s husband and co-defendant Chris Hu was also charged with money laundering conspiracy, as well as conspiracy to commit bank fraud and misuse of means of identification .

Sun and Hu were arrested this morning and are scheduled to be arraigned later today before United States Magistrate Judge Peggy Kuo.

Breon Peace, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Matthew G. Olsen, Assistant Attorney General of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, Christie M. Curtis, Acting Assistant Director in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York Field Office (FBI), and Thomas M. Fattorusso, Special Agent in Charge, Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI), announced the prosecution.

“As alleged, while appearing to serve the people of New York as Deputy Chief of Staff within the New York State Executive Chamber, the defendant and her husband actually worked to further the interests of the Chinese government and the CCP,” stated United States Attorney Breon Peace.  “The illicit scheme enriched the defendant’s family to the tune of millions of dollars.  Our Office will act decisively to prosecute those who serve as undisclosed agents of a foreign government.”

Mr. Peace expressed his appreciation to the Department of Justice’s National Security Division, the New York State Office of the Inspector General, the New York State Police and the U.S. Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) for their work on the case.  He also thanked the New York State Executive Chamber for its cooperation with the investigation.

“As alleged in the indictment, Linda Sun, a former New York State government employee, acted as an undisclosed agent of the Chinese government while her husband, Christopher Hu, facilitated the transfer of millions of dollars in kickbacks for personal gain. Sun wielded her position of influence among executives to covertly promote PRC and CCP agendas, directly threatening our country’s national security. The FBI is committed to protect the American people from any threat actors who seek to influence officials at the direction of foreign entities,” stated FBI Acting Assistant Director Curtis.

“Sun is alleged to be an undisclosed agent of the PRC and CCP, using Chinese money and her influence within the state of New York to benefit the Chinese government. Sun and her husband then laundered millions of dollars for the foreign country and used the monetary benefits of this scheme to buy luxury vehicles and million dollars properties here in New York,” Thomas M. Fattorusso, Special Agent in Charge of IRS CI New York.  “It is with the unwavering determination of federal law enforcement to root-out foreign agents and their schemes that Sun and Hu will now face justice for their criminal acts.”

As alleged in the indictment, while working for the New York State government – including in high-ranking posts in the Executive Chamber of the New York State government and in multiple state agencies – Sun also acted as an undisclosed agent of the PRC and the CCP. Acting at the request of PRC government officials and the CCP representatives, Sun engaged in numerous political activities in the interests of the PRC and the CCP, including blocking representatives of the Taiwanese government from having access to high-level New York State officers; changing high-level New York State officers’ messaging regarding issues of importance to the PRC and the CCP; obtaining official New York State proclamations for PRC government representatives without proper authorization; attempting to facilitate a trip to the PRC by a high-level New York State politician; and arranging meetings for visiting delegations from the PRC government with New York State government officials. 

Sun also repeatedly violated internal rules and protocols within the New York State government to provide improper benefits to PRC and the CCP representatives, including by providing unauthorized invitation letters from the office of high-level New York State officers that were used to facilitate travel by PRC government officials into the United States for meetings with New York State government officials.  Sun’s unauthorized invitation letters for the PRC government delegation constituted false statements made in connection with immigration documents and induced the foreign citizens into unlawfully entering the United States.

Sun never registered as a foreign agent with the Attorney General, and in fact actively concealed that she took actions at the order, request, or direction of PRC government and the CCP representatives. 

In return for these and other actions, Sun received substantial economic and other benefits from representatives of the PRC government and the CCP, including the facilitation of millions of dollars in transactions for the PRC-based business activities of Hu; travel benefits; tickets to events; promotion of a close family friend’s business; employment for Sun’s cousin in the PRC; and Nanjing-style salted ducks prepared by a PRC government official’s personal chef that were delivered to the residence of Sun’s parents.  Sun and Hu laundered the monetary proceeds of this scheme to purchase, among other items, real estate property in Manhasset, New York currently valued at $4.1 million, a condominium in Honolulu, Hawaii currently valued at $2.1 million, and various luxury automobiles, including a 2024 Ferrari.  Sun never disclosed any benefits she received from representatives of the PRC government and the CCP to the New York State government, as she was required to do as a New York State government employee. 

Hu also laundered unlawful proceeds through bank accounts opened in the name of a close relative but that were actually for Hu’s exclusive use.  To open these accounts, Hu unlawfully used an image of the relative’s driver’s license.

The charges in the indictment are allegations and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

The government’s case is being handled by the Office’s National Security & Cybercrime Section.  Assistant United States Attorneys Alexander A. Solomon and Robert Pollack are in charge of the prosecution, with the assistance of Trial Attorney Scott Claffee from the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section and Litigation Analyst Mary Clare McMahon.  Assistant U.S. Attorney Laura Mantell of the Office’s Asset Recovery Section is handling forfeiture matters.

The Defendants :

LINDA SUN Age: 41 Manhasset , New York

CHRIS HU Age: 40 Manhasset , New York

E.D.N.Y. Docket No. 24-CR-346 (BMC)

John Marzulli Danielle Blustein Hass U.S. Attorney's Office (718) 254-6323

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