define ethical relativism essay

Ethical Relativism

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Cultures differ widely in their moral practices. As anthropologist Ruth Benedict illustrates in Patterns of Culture , diversity is evident even on those matters of morality where we would expect to agree:

We might suppose that in the matter of taking life all peoples would agree on condemnation. On the contrary, in the matter of homicide, it may be held that one kills by custom his two children, or that a husband has a right of life and death over his wife or that it is the duty of the child to kill his parents before they are old. It may be the case that those are killed who steal fowl, or who cut their upper teeth first, or who are born on Wednesday. Among some peoples, a person suffers torment at having caused an accidental death, among others, it is a matter of no consequence. Suicide may also be a light matter, the recourse of anyone who has suffered some slight rebuff, an act that constantly occurs in a tribe. It may be the highest and noblest act a wise man can perform. The very tale of it, on the other hand, may be a matter for incredulous mirth, and the act itself, impossible to conceive as human possibility. Or it may be a crime punishable by law, or regarded as a sin against the gods. (pp.45-46)  

Other anthropologists point to a range of practices considered morally acceptable in some societies but condemned in others, including infanticide, genocide, polygamy, racism, sexism, and torture. Such differences may lead us to question whether there are any universal moral principles or whether morality is merely a matter of "cultural taste." Differences in moral practices across cultures raise an important issue in ethics -- the concept of "ethical relativism."

Ethical relativism is the theory that holds that morality is relative to the norms of one's culture. That is, whether an action is right or wrong depends on the moral norms of the society in which it is practiced. The same action may be morally right in one society but be morally wrong in another. For the ethical relativist, there are no universal moral standards -- standards that can be universally applied to all peoples at all times. The only moral standards against which a society's practices can be judged are its own. If ethical relativism is correct, there can be no common framework for resolving moral disputes or for reaching agreement on ethical matters among members of different societies.

Most ethicists reject the theory of ethical relativism. Some claim that while the moral practices of societies may differ, the fundamental moral principles underlying these practices do not. For example, in some societies, killing one's parents after they reached a certain age was common practice, stemming from the belief that people were better off in the afterlife if they entered it while still physically active and vigorous. While such a practice would be condemned in our society, we would agree with these societies on the underlying moral principle -- the duty to care for parents. Societies, then, may differ in their application of fundamental moral principles but agree on the principles.

Also, it is argued, it may be the case that some moral beliefs are culturally relative whereas others are not. Certain practices, such as customs regarding dress and decency, may depend on local custom whereas other practices, such as slavery, torture, or political repression, may be governed by universal moral standards and judged wrong despite the many other differences that exist among cultures. Simply because some practices are relative does not mean that all practices are relative.

Other philosophers criticize ethical relativism because of its implications for individual moral beliefs. These philosophers assert that if the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on a society's norms, then it follows that one must obey the norms of one's society and to diverge from those norms is to act immorally. This means that if I am a member of a society that believes that racial or sexist practices are morally permissible, then I must accept those practices as morally right. But such a view promotes social conformity and leaves no room for moral reform or improvement in a society. Furthermore, members of the same society may hold different views on practices. In the United States, for example, a variety of moral opinions exists on matters ranging from animal experimentation to abortion. What constitutes right action when social consensus is lacking?

Perhaps the strongest argument against ethical relativism comes from those who assert that universal moral standards can exist even if some moral practices and beliefs vary among cultures. In other words, we can acknowledge cultural differences in moral practices and beliefs and still hold that some of these practices and beliefs are morally wrong. The practice of slavery in pre-Civil war U.S. society or the practice of apartheid in South Africa is wrong despite the beliefs of those societies. The treatment of the Jews in Nazi society is morally reprehensible regardless of the moral beliefs of Nazi society.

For these philosophers, ethics is an inquiry into right and wrong through a critical examination of the reasons underlying practices and beliefs. As a theory for justifying moral practices and beliefs, ethical relativism fails to recognize that some societies have better reasons for holding their views than others.

But even if the theory of ethical relativism is rejected, it must be acknowledged that the concept raises important issues. Ethical relativism reminds us that different societies have different moral beliefs and that our beliefs are deeply influenced by culture. It also encourages us to explore the reasons underlying beliefs that differ from our own, while challenging us to examine our reasons for the beliefs and values we hold.

What Is Moral Relativism in Ethics? An In-Depth Examination

By Dr. Steven Wyre   |  01/31/2024

I have taught ethics for over 20 years and hear the same thing from at least one student in every group. A student obtains a cursory understanding of moral relativism (MR) as well as some other theories. When that student builds a moral compass, he or she wants to be a moral relativist and something else, too.

That student wants to embrace the “open-mindedness” part of moral relativism, but also sees value in being a utilitarian or modern virtue theorist. When I explain that doing so is like declaring oneself to be a vegetarian and then ordering filet mignon, I am usually met with bewilderment and sometimes a little pushback.

Regardless of any perceived benefits, it is impossible to be a moral relativist and anything else. As a moral theory, moral relativism is virtually worthless in guiding future moral behavior.

The Virtues of Moral Relativism as a Descriptive Theory

Moral theories need to have at least one of two functions. The first function is to describe the human condition and which human attributes can be used to determine moral “rightness” and “wrongness.”

Utilitarianism, for example, uses the belief that humans generally enjoy pleasure and avoid pain. That belief supports the idea that the morally right thing to do is whatever behavior brings about the greatest good for the greater number.

The second function of a moral theory is to serve as a guide for future behavior. For any moral theory to be useful beyond describing the human condition, it needs a “normative” aspect or the ability to prescribe how one should act.

MR provides some rudimentary guidance on how one ought to act, but I contend this guidance amounts to no more than “go and do whatever your community believes is the right thing to do.” That’s not very helpful.

I would be remiss to not mention metaethics, which scholar Lee Archie describes as “the discipline concerned with elucidating the meaning of ethical terms or the discipline concerned with the comparison of ethical theories.” (For more on the types of theory, see the Definition of Morality by Bernard and Joshua Gert.)

Moral Relativism May Be Overblown

First, it is possible to see the fuss over MR as overblown. Cursory treatments like those found on the University of Texas website “ Ethics Unwrapped ” make moral relativism sound enticing. Even strong detractors admit that “Ethical relativism reminds us that different societies have different moral beliefs and that our beliefs are deeply influenced by culture” and “encourages us to explore the reasons underlying beliefs that differ from our own, while challenging us to examine our reasons for the beliefs and values we hold.”

Psychologist Thomas Pölzler claimed the effect may “be simply negligible” in normal people living day to day. He sees the misconceptions about moral relativists as more problematic than the theory itself.

As to history, one can trace relativistic thinking to the likes of Protagoras, the Pyrrhonian skeptics, and even the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi. For various reasons including the advent of Christianity in the West, such thinking was minimized or forgotten until relatively recently.

The birth and development of fields like sociology, archeology, anthropology, and similar disciplines – as well as shifting attitudes toward practices like colonialism and imperialism – allowed relativistic thinking to flourish, even in the realm of morality. It is not as simple, however, as distinguishing between realism and anti-realism or metaphysical relativity and objectivity.

Philosopher Emrys Westacott spends some time discussing what many mistakenly assume equates to moral relativism, like cultural and descriptive relativism. Despite exposure to scholarship, many students new to ethics do not fully understand moral relativism hangs on two critical factors. Westacott lists them as being:

“1. Moral judgments are true or false and actions are right or wrong only relative to some particular standpoint (usually the moral framework of a specific community).

2. No standpoint can be proved objectively superior to any other.”

Scholar Chris Gowans differentiates between descriptive moral relativism (DMR) and metaethical moral relativism (MMR). Gowans says of descriptive moral relativism: “As a matter of empirical fact, there are deep and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these disagreements are much more significant than whatever agreements there may be.”

Metaethical moral relativism reduces Westacott’s claims to “The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons.”

What many people miss are the requisite components of “a specific community” or “a group of persons” to justify any moral claim. Moral relativism cannot be used to support moral justification based on personal beliefs.

For any action to be considered morally justified, it must be accepted as such by some community or society. Unless you can point to a group and say, “And so do they” about some moral belief, it is not justified by moral relativism. Furthermore, there is no consensus on how large this community must be to qualify.

I would venture to say that pointing to the membership in the North American Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) as justification for engaging in pedophilia or pederasty would not stand up in court. This thinking may be one of the biggest negatives with moral relativism: if some group endorses some behavior, that does not mean it should be accepted as on equal footing with other beliefs about moral behavior.

Westacott affirms that “ignoring diversity within a culture” is a huge negative for moral relativism. He also claims, “The most serious objection to moral relativism is that relativism implies that obvious moral wrongs are acceptable.” In fairness, Westacott asserts the effectiveness of the objection depends on how it is used.

Nevertheless, MR, properly understood and applied, requires some action being endorsed or condemned by some completely homogenous community with no moral diversity. Can there be one or two dissenters?

It seems possible, but that violates the theory as legitimate moral relativism. So is there any value in MR?

The Evolution of Moral Standards

It is important to note that we were not alone as a species, Homo sapiens sapiens , until relatively recently. Depending on how one defines “species,” there may have been more than 21 species of humans in our history, per the Smithsonian.

If Nicholas Longrich , senior lecturer of paleontology and evolutionary biology at The University of Bath and others are correct, it looks like our ability to “reproduce exponentially,” along with “Warfare [being our only] check on population growth,” eventually led to the wipeout of all other contenders. It could also be that we just out-survived them in a changing world.

This survival required cooperation against our enemies and against nature itself. It is not hard to imagine that as we expanded from family to clan and from clan to tribe, the rules for cooperation became more detailed. It would have been natural to include punishments for those community members failing to cooperate.

As populations expanded, so did moral standards. Eventually, you would have works like the Law Code of Hammurabi or what became the Laws of Manu .

Those documents illustrate how both politics and religion developed in tandem with rules governing moral behavior. With growing populations, leaders were needed. Throw in a little superstition along the way, and religion was born.

Both politics and religion required a moral framework with rules for governing who was included, excluded, honored, and punished. The three worked together to shape every society and determined what behavior was right or wrong.

It is easy to note the vast differences in human nature in other cultures, such as Babylonians and Aztecs, between the Shang and Zhou people of ancient China, and the many tribes of Native Americans. For that matter, just looking at the differences between tribes in America and the various clans in Scotland or Japan, we can see that there were no clear objective moral values and moral principles shared by all humans, other than preserving the right to attempt to survive. It could be argued that this right to attempt to survive is the only natural right we have as humans.

When looking at descriptive theories, MR is the best choice to explain how so many disparate moral systems evolved among humans. Maybe Frans De Waal is right; we are just another social species. Morality is our complicated method of doing what all social species do: find ways to cooperate for mutual survival and preserve human life while striving to obey moral principles.

Why Moral Relativism Won’t Work as a Predictor of Future Behavior

Gowans’ descriptive moral relativism best explains how we can have groups of humans who feel that sacrificing children for some greater good is morally acceptable alongside humans who feel that preserving the life of a child is paramount, even over the life of the mother. The theory explains how we can have groups of people who feel that freedom of expression and religion are human rights worth fighting for alongside people whose rejection of this belief is used to justify murder.

But what about guiding future behavior? There, MR is virtually useless.

In a multicultural society like America, a follower of MR would need to be silent on what to do as there are so many competing “communities.” The best guidance would be limited to “go do what your community agrees is the morally permissible thing to do.”

Every other normative moral theory provides justifications for actions based on rules, preferred outcomes, or perceived virtue. However, MR explicitly claims that the moral rightness or wrongness of any action is based on the whims of a community.

Additionally, MR claims that the positions of all communities are equally “right” because there are no other rational criteria for determining right and wrong. One cannot be a moral relativist and coherently favor any practice or thinking about moral justification the theory calls irrelevant.

In a TED talk, Sam Harris claimed science can do a better job of determining morality than philosophy. His claim was that actions that promote human thriving are morally encouraged and actions that hinder human thriving are morally suspect.

Can it be that simple? Perhaps so, but this kind of thinking is also rejected by some moral relativists. Moral relativism is self-defeating.

Ultimately, morally “right” or morally “wrong” behavior varies widely in different societies. MR, moral values, moral standards, moral codes, and moral norms can wear many different faces.

American Public University’s Philosophy Degree

For students interested in exploring the philosophy of religion, the University offers a B.A. in philosophy . Matters related to moral relativism are discussed in PHIL200 Introduction to Ethics and STEM270 Thinking and Acting Ethically.

Dr. Steve Wyre received his B.A. and M.A. in philosophy from the University of Oklahoma and his Ed.D. from the University of Phoenix. He has been teaching various ground-based philosophy courses since 2000 and online since 2003. Steve has also served as a subject matter expert (SME) for courses in ancient philosophy, ethics, logic and several other areas.

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Moral relativism is a complex and controversial topic, one that has sparked debate and inquiry for centuries. In essence, it is the philosophical idea that morality is not absolute, but instead relative to the individual or society in question. In other words, what may be considered morally acceptable in one culture or society may be viewed differently in another. This concept has been explored and discussed by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists alike, and can even be studied further with the help of Spires online ancient history tutors .In this article, we will provide a comprehensive overview of moral relativism, examining its implications and applications in different contexts.

Definition of Moral Relativism

Types of moral relativism, benefits of moral relativism, criticisms of moral relativism.

Additionally, it can help to foster an environment of acceptance and understanding. Moral relativism can also be beneficial in helping to create a more peaceful world. Since relativists believe that there is no one correct answer when it comes to morality, they are more open to compromise and negotiation. This can help to reduce conflict and tension between different cultures and countries.

Furthermore, moral relativism can help to protect people from oppression. By recognizing that morality is not absolute, it allows individuals the freedom to make their own decisions without fear of punishment or discrimination. This can be especially helpful in countries where certain groups are oppressed or discriminated against based on their beliefs or values. Finally, moral relativism can help to promote personal growth and development. By accepting that different cultures have different values and beliefs, individuals are free to explore and experiment with different moral perspectives.

Subjectivism is further divided into two categories: conventionalism and individualism. Conventionalism implies that moral values are determined by a set of agreed-upon rules or laws. Individualism, on the other hand, proposes that each individual has the right to determine what is morally acceptable for them. Cultural relativism also has two subcategories: ethical relativism and aesthetic relativism.

If morality is relative and subjective, it can be difficult to decide which values to adhere to in a given situation. Furthermore, moral relativism may lead to moral nihilism, which suggests that all actions are morally permissible and none are more right or wrong than any other. This can lead to a situation where individuals have no moral compass and cannot make ethical decisions. Another common criticism of moral relativism is that it fails to account for universal human rights. If morality is relative, then it follows that some cultures may condone practices that are universally seen as unethical, such as slavery or genocide.

What Is Moral Relativism?

This means that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to morality, as it is ultimately based on the individual's personal beliefs and values. To better understand this concept, let's look at a few examples. In some cultures, it is considered morally acceptable for men to have multiple wives, whereas in others it is not. Similarly, in some cultures it is considered morally acceptable to eat animals, whereas in others it is not. As you can see, what is considered morally right or wrong can vary drastically from one culture to another. Another way to think about moral relativism is to consider the concept of “cultural relativity”.

This means that different cultures have different sets of values and beliefs, and that these values and beliefs can be quite different from one another. For example, in some cultures it is considered morally acceptable to practice polygamy, while in others it is frowned upon. Similarly, in some cultures it is considered morally acceptable to eat animals, while in others it is not. At its core, moral relativism suggests that morality cannot be absolute and that instead, we must take into account the context in which a moral decision is being made. In other words, what may be considered morally right or wrong in one culture may not necessarily be considered so in another culture.

Ultimately, this means that our decisions should be based on an understanding of the cultural context in which they are made rather than on a universal set of rules or principles. Moral relativism is an ethical theory that suggests that morality is not universal and can be relative to cultural norms. This article explored the definition, types, benefits, and criticisms of moral relativism. It is important to consider different ethical perspectives in order to understand the complexities of moral relativism, as well as its implications for society. It is also important to consider the potential benefits and drawbacks of this theory.

We encourage readers to do further research on the topic in order to gain a better understanding of moral relativism.

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Ethical Relativism

by James R. Beebe

Dept. of Philosophy

University at Buffalo

Copyright ã 2003

Outline of Essay :

I. Introduction

II. Arguments in Favor of Conventional Ethical Relativism

A. Cultural Diversity

B. Avoiding Ethnocentrism

C. Culturally Conditioned Values

D. Lack of Knowledge

III. Arguments Against Conventional Ethical Relativism

A. A Universal Conscience

B. Conflicting Cultures

C. Create Your Own Culture

D. Reformers

E. Culture vs. Culture

F. Consistency

G. Diversity and Dependency

IV. Arguments in Favor of Subjective Ethical Relativism

A. Immunity to Some Earlier Objections

B. The Importance of Individual Liberty

C. Tolerance

D. Lack of Entitlement

E. Lack of Knowledge

V. Arguments Against Subjective Ethical Relativism

A. Violent Lifestyles

B. Judging Other People

C. Deciding for Yourself

D. The Psychology of Belief

E. The Truth of Relativism

F. Living Together in Peace

G. Moral Absolutes in Relativism

H. You Can’t Live It Out

VI. Conclusion

            Although most people are unfamiliar with the term ‘ethical relativism,’ almost everyone has probably encountered relativist slogans like the following:

(1) What’s right for you may not be what’s right for me.

(2) What’s right for my culture won’t necessarily be what’s right for your culture.

(3) There are no absolute moral truths.

(4) No moral principles are true for all people at all times and in all places.

(5) No ethical principle is any better than any other.

(6) All ethical opinions, lifestyles and worldviews are equally right.

It is possible to be a relativist either about all truths whatsoever or only about truths in certain domains—e.g., truths in ethics or religion.  Though some people claim to be relativists about all truths across the board, it is more common today for people to be relativists about ethics and to be absolutists about truths in other areas, like science and mathematics.  Because ethical relativism is the most common variety of relativism, it will be the focus of our discussion in this essay. 

            There are two basic kinds of ethical relativism: subjective ethical relativism and conventional (or cultural) ethical relativism.  The two kinds of relativism are defined as follows:

Subjective ethical relativism = df the view that:

(i) there are no absolute or universally true moral principles; and

(ii) the truth of moral principles is relative to individuals.

Conventional ethical relativism = df the view that:

(ii) the truth of moral principles is relative to cultures.

Notice that both views deny that there are any absolute or objective ethical truths.  Let’s call the view that there are absolute or universally correct moral principles ‘ moral absolutism .’  The only difference between two relativist views is that they disagree about that to which ethical truths or principles are supposed to be relative.  Each version of ethical relativism, then, is composed of both a negative and a positive element—the negative claim that there are no absolute or objective ethical truths and a positive account of that to which ethical truths are relative. 

            According to subjective ethical relativism (‘subjective relativism,’ for short), whatever you think is right for you really is right for you, and no one can tell you any differently.  What is right for you is completely up to you to decide.  You are sovereign over the principles that can tell you how to live your life. 

            According to conventional ethical relativism (‘conventional relativism,’ for short), what is right for you as an individual depends upon what your culture thinks is right for you.  What your culture says is right for you really is right for you.  The culture or society is the highest authority about what is right for individuals living within that society.  On this view, an individual’s will is subordinated to the will of the cultural majority. 

            In the next two sections we will consider arguments for and against conventional ethical relativism.  We will put off discussing subjective ethical relativism until after we have finished discussing conventional relativism.

            The argument from cultural diversity seeks to support conventional relativism by appealing to empirical facts about the wide variety of cultural practices around the globe.  The argument goes like this: Centuries ago, when cultures were relatively isolated and little information was known about distant lands, it might have been reasonable to think that the traditions and practices of one’s own culture represented the only right way of doing things.  But now we know that each of our conventions and norms reflects only one out of an endless number of possibilities and that other cultures have opted for other ways of doing things.  In this modern age of worldwide communication and information it is no longer reasonable to view the practices of one’s own culture as being the only correct cultural practices.

            Louis Pojman (1999, p. 27) describes some of the facts about cultural diversity that are often cited in support of this position:

For instance, Eskimos allow their elderly to die by starvation, whereas we believe that this is morally wrong.  The Spartans of ancient Greece and the Dobu of New Guinea believe that stealing is morally right; but we believe it is wrong.  Many cultures, past and present, have practiced or still practice infanticide.  A tribe in East Africa once threw deformed infants to the hippopotamus, but our society condemns such acts.  Sexual practices vary over time and clime.  Some cultures permit homosexual behavior, whereas others condemn it.  Some cultures, including Moslem societies, practice polygamy, while Christian cultures view it as immoral.  Anthropologist Ruth Benedict describes a tribe in Melanesia that views cooperation and kindness as vices, and anthropologist Colin Turnbull has documented that the Ik in northern Uganda have no sense of duty toward their children or parents.  There are societies that make it a duty for children to kill their aging parents (sometimes by strangling). 

According to the present argument, to think that your culture’s way of doing things is the only right way or the best way to do things reflects an extreme ignorance of the wide cultural diversity that has always existed in the world.  The anthropological study of foreign lands has (or ought to have) opened our eyes and set us free from any closed-minded adherence to the parochial standards of our own culture.  Faced with the tremendous cultural diversity the world offers, it is simply not reasonable to think that one set of cultural practices can be the one and only right set.  Hence, we must conclude that all cultural practices are equally valid.

            The first argument in favor of conventional relativism uses facts about cultural diversity to argue against moral absolutism.  The second argument claims that there is something intrinsically wrong with the view of moral absolutism itself.  Moral absolutism implies that some cultures are better, ethically speaking, than others.  Conventional relativists, however, argue that such a claim is ethnocentric.  Ethnocentrism , roughly, is judging another culture through the eyes of your own culture and not trying to see things from their perspective.  This almost inevitably leads to thinking that your culture is superior to others.  Most people today agree that ethnocentrism belongs in the same category with racism, sexism and other unacceptable forms of discrimination.  To be racist is to think that, simply because someone belongs to a different ethnic group, that person is inferior.  To be sexist is to think that, simply because someone is a member of the opposite sex, that person is inferior.  All forms of bigotry and prejudice involve judging other people solely on the basis of their group membership.  Ethnocentrism is not any different.  Instead of looking down on other races or sexes, the ethnocentric person looks down on and devalues other cultures. 

            Conventional relativists claim that their position—unlike moral absolutism—is not ethnocentric.  Because conventional relativists maintain that all cultures are equally valid and that no culture is any better than any other, they claim their position avoids any kind of ethnocentrism.  Because ethnocentrism is a pernicious form of discrimination, the apparent fact that conventional relativism avoids it and moral absolutism seems to fall into it is a reason for choosing conventional relativism over moral absolutism. 

 C. Culturally Conditioned Values

            The third argument for conventional relativism begins by focusing on the source of our values and beliefs about morality.  Think about how people have acquired most of their views about what is right and wrong.  From infancy our parents and teachers have sought to instill within us the values of our society.  Friends, books, television, movies, and sometimes priests or preachers have also contributed to helping us internalize the values of the society around us.  Children in America today grow up thinking that women and minorities deserve the same educational and professional opportunities as white men.  One hundred years ago, children in America grew up with different views because those around them impressed upon them a different set of values.  Most women from the nineteenth-century did not believe that women should have the same educational and professional opportunities as men.  It wasn’t just nineteenth-century men who thought that.  Because the women of a century or more ago were surrounded by a culture that did not place a high value on the capacities of women, most of them simply internalized the values of their society and accepted them as true.  It is only because women today grow up in a different cultural milieu that they find themselves with different views about the equality of the sexes.  We are conditioned by our cultures to have the ethical values and beliefs that we do.

            If we were to try to make judgments about the rightness or wrongness of the practices of some other culture, our thoughts would inevitably reflect the beliefs and values of our own culture.  If culture A ’s practices are different from culture B ’s, how is a person from culture A going to assess the practices of culture B ?  If that person were to rely upon the standards of culture A , the practices of culture B would obviously be viewed as wrong because they deviate from what culture A ’s standards say are right.  Of course, if you were to ask someone from culture B about culture A , we would get the same result in the opposite direction. 

            If we were somehow able to throw off all of the cultural baggage we have inherited from our social environments and to break free from all of the cultural conditioning that has shaped our minds, our emotions and our personalities, we might then be able to formulate a completely neutral and objective assessment of some other culture.  However, conventional relativists claim, this is not a realistic human possibility.  We can never get beyond the cultural conditioning that has shaped us and our views of morality.  Therefore, any time we try to sit in judgment on other cultures, we’re going to be just like the hypothetical people from culture A and culture B above: our judgments will simply reflect the values of our own societies.  Since this is the fundamental human condition, there is no reason to think that the judgments any person makes about some other culture will have any objective validity or truth.  Such judgments will always be subjective and culturally conditioned.

            It is as if we all are wearing tinted glasses, the particular tint of your glasses being a function of your upbringing and cultural background.  People from different cultures have glasses that are tinted different colors from ours.  Consequently, their view of reality will be different.  The catch is this: No one can take off their glasses and see reality as it really is in itself.  No one can view truth or reality, except through the distorting lenses of their own cultural biases. 

            Conventional relativists claim that those who believe in moral absolutes are simply blind to the cultural influences that have shaped their ethical opinions.  Absolutists think they can view reality as it is in itself, when in fact they can only see a prejudiced and subjective view of reality. 

            Since we are incapable of freeing ourselves from the cultural influences that have shaped our ethical views, what kinds of judgments should we form about other cultures?  According to conventional relativism, we should stop judging other cultures altogether.  We should stop pretending that our ethical judgments and opinions reflect anything more than the contingent, historical forces that have shaped our lives. 

 D. Lack of Knowledge

            The argument from lack of knowledge makes explicit a theme that is probably implicit in some of the earlier arguments for conventional relativism.  According to this argument, if there is some absolute or objective fact about which cultural practices are the right ones, we simply have no way of discovering what this fact is.  Even if we wanted to believe in moral absolutism, we would be faced with the daunting—and perhaps unanswerable—question, “How can we tell for certain that these cultural practices but not those are morally correct?”  Where would we go to obtain an answer to this question?  Some people suggest that certain sacred texts contain the answers we seek.  But the question that arises for these people is, “How can we tell for certain that this sacred text but not that one contains the absolute truth?”  How do we know that any sacred text will tell us the truth?  Once again the conventional relativist will point out that people raised to believe in one sacred text will think that theirs contains the truth, but people raised to believe in another sacred text will think that theirs is the only true sacred text. 

            For those who do not want to bring religion into the debate, the question is equally challenging.  There are just as many different secular opinions about what is right or wrong as there are religious opinions.  In science we can rely upon experimental methods and empirical observations to resolve differences of opinion.  But what can we use to resolve ethical disagreements?  There do not seem to be any experiments we can run or empirical observations we can make that could show some ethical judgments or principles to be the right ones.  In ethics there seems to be no way to prove some answers right and other answers wrong. 

            Since none of us seems to have any privileged access to the absolute truth about morality, conventional relativists urge us to stop treating our own ethical opinions as infallible or indubitable.  Every culture has its own view of morality.  Since we have no way to prove that some views are better than others, we should simply treat them all as being equally valid or correct.

            Some people respond to the conventional relativist’s arguments—particularly the culturally conditioned values argument—by claiming that all people have an innate ability to know what is right and wrong.  This source of this inborn ability, they say, is your conscience.  Your conscience tells you what the right thing to do is, and it’s the thing that makes you feel bad when you do something you know is wrong.  Because everyone has a conscience, moral absolutists say, we can rise above the cultural conditioning we have received from our social environments.  Contrary to what conventional relativists maintain, we can take off our colored glasses.  Our conscience shows us the truth about morality—not what our culture says is the truth, but the truth itself. 

            Mark Twain’s portrait of Huckleberry Finn provides a compelling counterexample to this line of argument.  Huck is helping his slave friend Jim run away from Miss Watson, Jim’s owner.  The two of them are taking a raft down the Mississippi River to a place where Jim will be legally free.  Huck says:

Jim said it made him all over trembly and feverish to be so close to freedom.  Well I can tell you it made me all over trembly and feverish, too, to hear him, because I begun to get it through my head that he was most free—and who was to blame for it?  Why, me .  I couldn’t get that out of my conscience, no how nor no way.... It hadn’t ever come home to me, before, what this thing was that I was doing.  But now it did; and it stayed with me, and scorched me more and more.  I tried to make out to myself that I warn’t to blame, because I didn’t run Jim off from his rightful owner; but it warn’t no use, conscience up and say, every time: “But you knowed he was running for his freedom, and you could a paddled ashore and told somebody.”  That was so—I couldn’t get around that, no way.  That was where it pinched.  Conscience says to me: “What had poor Miss Watson done to you, that you could see her [racial epithet] go off right under your eyes and never say one single word?  What did that poor old woman do to you, that you could treat her so mean?...”  I got to feeling so mean and miserable I most wished I was dead.  (Quoted in Bennett 1997, pp. 23-24)

Jim tells Huck that he plans to work hard and save enough money to buy his wife and children out of slavery.  He goes on to say that, if he is unable to save enough money to buy them, he will steal them.  Huck is horrified at hearing this:

Thinks I, this is what comes of my not thinking.  Here was this [racial epithet] which I had as good as helped to run away, coming right out flat-flooted and saying he would steal his children—children that belonged to a man I didn’t even know; a man that hadn’t ever done me no harm. 

I was sorry to hear Jim say that, it was such a lowering of him.  My conscience got to stirring me up hotter than ever, until at last I says to it: “Let up on me—it ain’t too late, yet—I’ll paddle ashore at first light, and tell.”  I felt easy, and happy, and light as a feather, right off.  All my troubles was gone.  (Quoted in Bennett 1997, p. 24)

When Huck gets the chance, he sets off toward shore in a canoe, telling Jim he is simply going to look around.  In reality, he plans to turn Jim in. 

As I shoved off, [Jim] says: “Pooty soon I’ll be a-shout’n for joy, en I’ll say, it’s all on accounts o’ Huck I’s a free man...  Jim won’t ever forgit you, Huck; you’s de bes’ fren’ Jim’s ever had; en you’s de only fren’ old Jim’s got now.”

I was paddling off, all in a sweat to tell on him; but when he says this, it seemed to kind of take the tuck all out of me.  I went along slow then, and I warn’t right down certain whether I was glad I started or whether I warn’t.  When I was fifty yards off, Jim says:

“Dah you goes, de ole true Huck; de on’y white genlman dat ever kep’ his promise to ole Jim.”  Well, I just felt sick.  But I says, I got to do it—I can’t get out of it.  (Quoted in Bennett 1997, p. 25)

While ashore, Huck runs into two white men searching for runaway slaves.  They ask Huck whether the man on his raft is white or black.  Huck tells us:

I didn’t answer up prompt.  I tried to, but the words wouldn’t come.  I tried, for a second or two, to brace up and out with it, but I warn’t man enough—hadn’t the spunk of a rabbit.  I see I was weakening; so I just give up trying, and up and says: “He’s white.”  (Quoted in Bennett 1997, p. 25)

            Huck’s conscience was telling him that the right thing to do was to turn Jim in.  Jim was the property of Miss Watson, and his children were the property of someone else.  This “stolen” property needed to be returned to its rightful owner.  In Huck’s mind, he didn’t have the moral fiber, the courage, or the strength of will to do what was right.  He does not turn Jim in, but he does not think that he has done the right thing.  He despises himself for his weakness, and his conscience tells him that he is a morally despicable person. 

            We see that Huck’s conscience is not something that rises above the cultural conditioning he has received throughout his life.  Instead, it merely reflects the values of the slave-owning society he grew up in.  In response to the conventional relativist’s culturally conditioned values argument, some moral absolutists want to argue that only part of us is subject to cultural conditioning.  There is, they claim, another part of us that is immune to cultural conditioning—a part that can really tap into the absolute truth about morality without reflecting the contingent values of our society.  Twain’s very believable description of Huck suggests that cultural conditioning may very well extend so deeply into our psyche that there is no part of us that is left unaffected.  Even our consciences appear to be shaped by the values of our society.  Thus, it seems that this first argument against conventional relativism does not succeed. 

 B. Conflicting Cultures

            Consider the following case: Lacey is both a feminist and a Roman Catholic.  (This case is a modified version of Pojman’s (1997, p. 36) case of Mary, who is a U.S. citizen and a Roman Catholic.)  In her law practice, she specializes in defending the rights of women.  Most of the time, her commitments to feminism and Catholicism do not conflict with each other.  Her religion views women as being created in the image of God and as having an intrinsic value that should not be violated.  Consequently, Catholicism condemns most of the same abuses and injustices suffered by women that feminism condemns.  However, there is one obvious issue where Lacey’s joint commitments conflict: abortion.  According to the feminist movement, abortion is morally permissible.  According to Catholicism, however, abortion is not morally permissible. 

            Conventional relativism claims that what is right for you as an individual is determined by the culture you belong to.  Lacey, however, belongs to more than one culture, and the values of the two cultures conflict.  So, is abortion morally permissible for Lacey or not?  Which culture takes precedence over the other?  Which one should she listen to? 

            Some students think that Lacey should listen to the Catholic church more than to the feminist movement.  But why?  If you find yourself belonging to one religious culture and one secular culture, why should the religious culture take priority?  Simply because it is a religious culture?  That doesn’t seem like much of a reason.  And what do you do if you belong to two secular cultures whose views conflict?  How do you decide which one to follow?

            Before offering an answer to these questions, I want to present another case, due to Pojman (1997, p. 36): John is a college student.  He belongs to a fraternity that is racist in both its creed and its practices.  However, John is also a member of the larger university community, and the university is officially non-racist in its policies and procedures.  The university, it turns out, is located in a town that is overwhelmingly racist.  Because this is John’s sixth year of college (he’s had some trouble with calculus), John has been living, working, shopping, and paying taxes in this town for quite some time.  He is, thus, very much an integral part of his community.  Of course, this town is located in a nation that is officially non-racist in its policies.  So, is racism right or wrong for John?

            Pojman (1997, p. 36) writes,

As a member of a racist university fraternity, KKK, John has no obligation to treat his fellow Black students as an equal, but as a member of the university community (which accepts the principle of equal rights), he does have the obligation; but as a member of the surrounding community (which [rejects] the principle of equal rights), he again has no such obligation; but then again, as a member of the nation at large (which accepts the principle), he is obligated to treat his fellow students with respect. 

Conventional relativism says that what is right for John depends upon what his culture says is right.  But which of the overlapping and conflicting cultures that he belongs to should be listen to? 

            Some students think that the nation is the most important culture John belongs to and that, therefore, he should not be racist.  But what if John identifies more with his fraternity than he does with his country?  Suppose that members of his fraternity believe the nation has gone downhill ever since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and that it is their sworn duty to combat civil rights for minorities wherever they can.  It is difficult to see how, in such a case, the culture that defines what is right for John should be the nation when he has rejected the beliefs, principles and practices of that nation. 

            Moreover, opting for the nation as the relevant culture for John seems completely arbitrary.  Conventional relativism itself does not say anything about nations, as opposed to smaller cultures.  John could just as well identify with white people worldwide or college students worldwide or people in Western industrialized nations or even with humanity itself.  Why should national affiliation trump all others? 

            The most tempting solution to the dilemmas facing Lacey and John is one that conventional relativists cannot accept.  It is natural to think that the decision about which culture to identify with should be left up to Lacey and John.  They should each decide for themselves which culture’s values will be the ones that determine what is right and wrong for them.  However, this way out of the dilemma is not open to the conventional relativist.  It is subjective relativism that claims that morality is relative to individuals and that individuals can decide what is right and wrong for them.  But conventional relativism says that it is cultures—not individuals—that decide.  A conventional relativist who says that Lacey and John can decide for themselves what is right for them would be giving up on conventional relativism and adopting subjective relativism instead.  Is there a solution to this dilemma that does not require abandoning conventional relativism?  It is difficult to see what such a solution could be. 

            Conventional relativism appears to work fairly well when we are considering a culture other than our own, especially when that culture meets the following conditions:

(a) The culture is non-Western and non-industrialized.

(b) The culture would be described by ethnocentric Westerners as “primitive.” 

(c) The culture is monolithic or homogeneous, meaning that there is (or at least appears to outsiders to be) only one uniform social structure that defines the culture’s social relations.

Condition (c) is simply another way of saying that the culture is not pluralistic.  In other words, it does not contain a variety of overlapping and sometimes conflicting cultures that (as in the Lacey and John cases) cause problems for conventional relativism.  I doubt that “primitive” cultures are ever as uniform or homogeneous on the inside as they appear to Western observers who have only limited and superficial exposure to them.  But even if Western stereotypes of these cultures were accurate, the fact remains that conventional relativism could not be made to work very well when applied to an obviously pluralistic and modern society like our own.  Each of us (like Lacey and John) belongs to many different subcultures, and this sometimes results in conflict.  It seems much more plausible to say that we must each, as individuals, decide what is right for ourselves than to say that “our culture” (whatever that is) decides what is right for us.  In short, subjective relativism seems like it might work better in America than conventional relativism. 

 C. Create Your Own Culture

            Thinking about the cases of Lacey and John, in which people belong to many different overlapping cultures, raises questions about the nature of a culture.  What exactly is a culture anyway?  Cultural anthropologist Richley Crapo (1993, p. 24) defines a culture as “a learned system of beliefs, feelings, and rules for living around which a group of people organize their lives.”  According to this definition, the shared way of life of any group of people counts as that group’s culture.  This seems to imply that you could organize any group of people into some set of shared practices, beliefs and rules and it would count as a culture.  In other words, you could create you own culture.

            David Koresh did.  If you are charismatic enough, you can take any rule—regardless of how lame-brained, idiotic, cruel, ignorant or twisted it may be—and convince at least some people to go along with it.  One of the rules that David Koresh instituted in the Branch Davidian culture was that married couples living in the Branch Davidian compound outside of Waco, TX, were not allowed to have sex with each other.  Only David Koresh was allowed to have sex with the women of the compound, and he could have sex with whomever he wanted.  This included sex with young girls.  According to conventional relativism, David Koresh’s sexual lifestyle was right for him.  Why?  Because the norms of his culture—which was in part something of his own making—said that it was OK. 

            If there is some kind of activity you would like to engage in but that is viewed as immoral by the rest of society, take heart.  According to conventional relativism, all you have to do is to convince a few of your buddies to go along with you, and—Voila!—you will made the previously questionable activity morally correct for you. 

            Surely it is absurd to think that any seemingly evil practice can become morally good simply by convincing a few other people to go along with it.  And yet that is what conventional relativism seems to imply. 

 D. Reformers

            Conventional relativism subordinates the will of the individual to the will of the cultural majority.  What is right for you as an individual is not up to you to decide.  What is right for you is what your culture says is right.  Think about what conventional relativism implies about reformers like Martin Luther King, Jr., or Mahatma Gandhi.  Reformers are people whose beliefs and actions run contrary to those of their surrounding culture and who strive to change the beliefs and actions of their culture for the better.  If MLK’s culture says that African-Americans should not be allowed to eat at the same lunch counters, drink out of the same water fountains, attend the same schools, and sit in the same seats on crowded buses as white people, then it was morally wrong for MLK to praise Rosa Parks for refusing to yield her bus seat to a white person one cold December day in 1955.  If the culture says that African-Americans should be treated as second-class citizens, then according to conventional relativism you are morally obligated to treat African-Americans as second-class citizens.  It is morally wrong for you to buck the system.  The system is always right.  In the eyes of conventional relativism, reformers are—by definition—always in the wrong. 

            It is difficult to stomach the idea that the majority is always right and that the status quo should always be respected.  The people whom we treat as our greatest heroes were people who stood up to the system and fought against the tyranny of the majority.  When was the last time you saw an action movie starring Mel Gibson or Harrison Ford in which they were on the side of the powerful majority?  Our movie heroes are always lone individuals, often misunderstood by those around them, who take courageous stands against the injustices of their society. 

            The fact that conventional relativism implies that reformers are always wrong provides a strong reason for thinking that conventional relativism is false. 

 E. Culture vs. Culture

            Consider the following case: Lothar is a barbarian.  Raping, pillaging and plundering are central to Lothar’s barbarian culture.  One day Lothar and his band of warriors set off for Pleasantville, a quiet little town in sunny, southern California.  The residents of Pleasantville are peace-loving vegetarians and animal rights activists who, when they are not tending to their organic farms or making pottery for burning incense, work as strong advocates for conventional relativism.  When Lothar’s barbarian war party arrives in Pleasantville, the sandal-shod residents of Pleasantville are faced with a dilemma: Should they defend themselves against the barbarian attack or not? 

            You may be thinking, “Dilemma?  What dilemma?  How can the question of whether they should defend themselves against an unwanted attack be difficult to answer?  Of course, they should defend themselves!”  Despite the plausibility of this response, it is important to see that the Pleasantvilleans’ belief in conventional relativism poses a problem for them.  As conventional relativists, they believe that the right thing for Lothar to do is determined by his culture.  But Lothar’s culture says that adult barbarian men should display their bravery and strength by sacking at least one city (preferably one with a Starbucks) per year.  So, according to conventional relativism, it is morally right for Lothar to sack Pleasantville.  Since it is morally correct for him to do so, it doesn’t seem right for the residents of Pleasantville to try and stop the barbarian attack.  They would be keeping Lothar from doing what, according to their own moral standards, is the morally right thing for him to do.  However, if the citizens of Pleasantville do not defend themselves against the barbarian invasion, they will be brutalized and killed. 

            Another problem that would be generated by any attempted defense of Pleasantville concerns ethnocentrism.  One of the main motivations for conventional relativism is that it supposedly allows us to avoid ethnocentrism—the view that our culture is superior to others.  A great deal of harm has been done throughout the ages by people who have forced their way of life upon other cultures.  By claiming that all cultures are morally equal and that no culture is morally better than any other, conventional relativism is supposed to help us lead more tolerant lives.  But killing barbarians doesn’t seem to be a very good way to display tolerance for barbarian culture.  By keeping the barbarians from sacking Pleasantville, the Pleasantvilleans would be ethnocentrically forcing the barbarians to accept what they think is right in opposition to what the barbarians think is right. 

            It is difficult to see how the citizens of Pleasantville could be morally justified in fighting against the barbarians.  Their belief in conventional relativism seems to undermine any moral justification they might have for fighting.  Keep in mind that I am not asking whether they would fight against Lothar and his warring band.  I am asking about the morality of their actions.  I want to know whether conventional relativism can provide a reason for thinking that the defeat of the barbarians would be a morally good thing.  I am unable to see how conventional relativists could provide such a reason.  Since it is absurd to think that it might not be justified for them to defend themselves, the case of Lothar and the barbarians provides a reason for thinking that conventional relativism is false.

            (If my tale of Lothar and the barbarians seems a little too far-fetched to some of you, note that I could have told basically the same story as a clash between the culture of a violent urban gang and the culture of the law-abiding citizens in the city where the gang lives.  Clashes between cultures with opposing viewpoints are more than merely fictional.) 

 F. Consistency

            What should conventional relativists say about a culture that is ethnocentric?  Is it right for them to be ethnocentric?  Or is it wrong?  Remember, according to conventional relativism, what is right for you to do is determined by your culture.  If your culture is ethnocentric, it seems like it should be morally right for you to act in an ethnocentric way.  And yet conventional relativists condemn ethnocentrism as morally wrong.  They use the fact that most people today view ethnocentrism as being wrong as a way to motivate people to become conventional relativists.  But if my culture says that it is OK to look down upon other cultures, then according to conventional relativism it should be OK for me to do so.

            What if my culture is absolutist?  What if a belief in absolute moral truths is a central feature of my culture?  According to conventional relativism, it should be right for me to believe in the existence of moral absolutes.  But, of course, a belief in moral absolutes is incompatible with a belief in conventional relativism because the first component of conventional relativism is the claim that there are no moral absolutes.  So, if my culture is absolutist, conventional relativism says that it is right for me to believe that conventional relativism is false.  Think carefully about this claim before reading further.  Does it make sense for a conventional relativist to believe that conventional relativism is true and yet at the same time to believe that it is OK for me to think that conventional relativism is false?  Conventional relativists think that it does.  It might (just barely) be possible for a conventional relativist to act consistently on their relativist views, but it looks like it will be extremely difficult. 

 G. Diversity and Dependency

            One of the most common ways to argue in favor of conventional relativism involves appealing to facts about cultural diversity.  Conventional relativists say, “How can you believe in moral absolutes?  Just look at all of the moral diversity in the world.  It should be obvious that no moral truths are universal or absolute.”  This line of argument, however, involves a confusion.  To sort out the confusion Pojman (1999, pp. 37-38) distinguishes between the following two claims:

The Diversity Thesis :

What is considered morally right and wrong varies from society to society, so there are no moral principles that all societies accept.

The Dependency Thesis :

What really is morally right and wrong depends upon what societies think is morally right and wrong.

(I have changed the wording of the dependency thesis, but the idea remains the same.)  The diversity thesis makes a claim about people’s moral opinions—about what they think is right or wrong.  It simply says there is a wide diversity of human opinion about morality.  Taken by itself, that claim is pretty harmless and indeed uncontroversial.  The diversity thesis itself does not make any value judgments about this diversity of opinion.  It simply reports the existence of the diversity. 

            Some people try to suggest there really are some moral principles that all societies accept.  It is difficult to know whether this is really true because so many social scientists disagree about this issue.  Some say that the ban on incest is the only universally accepted moral rule, while others claim there are dozens of other such rules.  Many social scientists claim there are no universally accepted moral rules at all.  It’s hard to know who to believe.  We do not, however, need to resolve this issue in order to consider the heart of the controversy concerning conventional relativism.  The most important of the two claims above is the dependency thesis, not the diversity thesis. 

            The dependency thesis says that moral principles depend upon cultural acceptance for their validity or correctness.  In other words, if a culture accepts some principle, then it will be right for the members of that culture.  If they do not accept another principle, that principle will not be right for that culture.  The heart of conventional relativism is the claim that cultural acceptance determines morality. 

            To illustrate the differences between the two theses, think about what a moral absolutist like Socrates would say about the diversity thesis.  Would he think it was true or false?  Many students are initially tempted to think that Socrates would disagree with the diversity thesis.  But think carefully about it.  The diversity thesis simply claims that people disagree about what is right and wrong.  How could Socrates deny that this is obviously true?  A moral absolutist need not (indeed should not) deny that people disagree about morality.  The difference between the conventional relativist and the moral absolutist concerns how the two parties view the diversity of moral opinions.  Conventional relativists think that everybody is equally right, while moral absolutists think that only some moral opinions are right while the rest are all wrong.  According to moral absolutism, the fact that there is an extremely wide diversity of opinions about morality simply shows that there are a lot of very mistaken people in the world. 

            Distinguishing between the diversity thesis and the dependency thesis allows us to see that—contrary to what most conventional relativists think—demonstrating how much diversity of opinion there is in the world does not in any way undermine moral absolutism.  Many relativists think that conventional relativism can be (and has been) proven true simply by doing enough anthropological research on the divergent beliefs and practices of people around the globe.  All of this anthropological research, however, simply supports the diversity thesis.  But it provides no reason for believing the dependency thesis.  Consequently, the argument from cultural diversity fails to show that conventional relativism is true. 

            Conventional relativism seems to face several serious problems.  It is, however, only one of the two main versions of relativism.  Some people claim that subjective relativism is more defensible than conventional relativism.  In this section we examine some of the main arguments offered in favor of subjective relativism. 

 A. Immunity to Some Earlier Objections

            One point in favor of subjective relativism is that it does not fall prey to some of the same objections that were levied against conventional relativism.  For example, recall the cases of Lacey and John.  They each belonged to overlapping cultures with conflicting values, and there did not seem to be any way for conventional relativism to say whether abortion was morally permissible for Lacey or whether racism was morally permissible for John.  Subjective relativism, however, can easily handle this sort of case.  According to subjective relativism, Lacey and John are free to choose how they will live their lives.  If Lacey chooses to make the values of the Catholic church her own personal values, then abortion will not be morally permissible for her.  If, however, she chooses to identify more with the feminist movement and to adopt their values, abortion will be morally permissible for her.  Similar considerations apply in John’s case.  By making moral correctness a function of personal choice, subjective relativism avoids the problem of conflicting cultures. 

            Subjective relativism is also able to provide a seemingly more acceptable verdict in the case of reformers who challenge or reject the values of their culture.  Because conventional relativism subordinates the will of the individual to the will of the culture or society, it seems that little room is left over for individuals to make their own, autonomous decisions about how they ought to live their lives.  Conventional relativism says that anyone who challenges the values of their society will be in the wrong.  Subjective relativism, however, says that what is right for you is up to you.  Regardless of what the majority says or what anyone else in your culture thinks, you are the one who should decide what kind of lifestyle or what kind of values you will adopt.  If you want to be a reformer and you want to challenge the society around you, subjective relativism says you are acting rightly if you are true to yourself. 

            Subjective relativism, then, seems to give answers to the ultimate questions about morality that are more plausible than those given by conventional relativism.  Consequently, some objections that seem to undermine conventional relativism do not harm subjective relativism in any way. 

 B. The Importance of Individual Liberty

            By relativizing ethical truth to individuals rather than cultures, subjective relativism is able to give more consideration to the importance of individual liberty.  In America we place an extremely high value on our freedom, our ability to direct the course of our own lives.  Subjective relativism makes individual liberty and freedom central to morality.  According to subjective relativism, it is not right for anyone to try to force their oppressive morality upon you against your wishes.  The only morality that is right for you is one that you have autonomously chosen. 

            Many subjective relativists believe that the theories of conventional relativism and moral absolutism do not adequately respect individual liberty.  Conventional relativism makes the culture or the majority in control and allows them to trample on the rights of individuals to choose how to live their lives.  Moral absolutism says that you don’t have any choice about what is right for you.  The moral absolutes that define morality are all predetermined ahead of time, and you have no say in the matter.  Because subjective relativism respects individual liberty more than conventional relativism and moral absolutism, subjective relativists claim this is a reason for choosing subjective relativism over these other views. 

 C. Tolerance

            Subjective relativists argue that conventional relativism’s emphasis on tolerance of other cultures is good but that it does not go far enough.  Conventional relativism says that no culture is better than any other and that we should treat them all as being equally valid.  However, conventional relativism does not make tolerance of other people within a society a priority.  Subjective relativists claim that it is not only cultures but individuals as well who deserve to be treated with tolerance.  Subjective relativism claims that no individual’s ethical opinions, values or lifestyle is any better than any other individual’s.  All opinions about morality and lifestyles should be treated as being equally good.  Tolerance of other individuals, then, is an important part of subjective relativism. 

            Think about all of the injustices that have been committed because of intolerance.  In the years following the Protestant Reformation, Protestants and Catholics slaughtered each other by the thousands because each side would not tolerate the religious views of the other side.  Racism, genocide and ethnic cleansing all involve an unwillingness to tolerate other people who are different from us.  Subjective relativists believe that most of the world’s intolerance results from a belief in moral absolutism.  If you believe in moral absolutes, you think there is only one right way to do things.  Moral absolutists think that everybody who disagrees with them is dead wrong.  It is this kind of belief that has led people throughout the centuries to think it is OK to abuse and slaughter other people.  They are the pagans, the barbarians, the heretics.  So, it is only right to rid the world of their corrupting influence. 

            Subjective relativism promotes tolerance and takes its advocacy of tolerance farther than conventional relativism does.  Moral absolutism seems to lead to intolerance.  Subjective relativists think the choice is clear: subjective relativism is preferable to either conventional relativism or moral absolutism. 

 D. Lack of Entitlement

            Subjective relativists ask, “Who’s to judge what is really right and wrong for everybody?  What person has the entitlement or authority to sit in judgment on the rest of us?”  Their answer is: “Nobody.”  When you judge other people, you are placing yourself above them and pretending that you have the authority to decide what is right and wrong for them.  But you do not have any such authority.  So, it is inappropriate for you to judge other people.  If you actually did have the authority to make such judgments, there might not be a problem.  As it is, however, there is nothing that entitles you to pass judgment on anyone else.  You’re no better than the rest of us.  Thus, you have no business judging us. 

            Not only do we not have the authority or entitlement to judge other people, there is something problematic about the act of judging itself.  Judging someone else displays an intolerance for the judged person’s way of life.  To judge another person is to do something unkind to that person.  It is not unlike insulting them because it involves say negative things about them. 

            Subjective relativism urges us to admit that we are not entitled to stand in judgment over other people.  According to subjective relativism, we should view other people’s opinions about morality, their lifestyles, their habits, and their actions as being as equally valid as our own.  It is only by adopting subjective relativism that people can learn to stop judging others. 

 E. Lack of Knowledge

            Subjective relativists have their own lack of knowledge argument that is similar to the one offered by conventional relativists.  None of us, they note, can really tell for sure what is the absolute truth about morality.  What is right for us is something that we each have to make up our own minds about.  Conventional relativists correctly note that none of us has an infallible access to absolute truth, but they go wrong in concluding that what is right for you is something to be determined by your culture.  It is ultimately a personal decision.  You have to decide for yourself what the right way to live is. 

            Moral absolutists think they have everything all figured out.  They think they know what is right for everybody, and they try to force their morality on everyone else.  It is arrogant of them to think they know what the absolute truth is.  No one person has any better access to the truth than the rest of us.  So, none of us should presume to speak on behalf of everyone else.  What is right for you is something for you to decide and no one else. 

            The arguments offered in favor of subjective relativism can sound very convincing to many people.  There are, however, some serious problems for the view lurking just below the surface. 

 A. Violent Lifestyles

            Subjective relativism would have us believe that no opinion about morality is any better than any other and that no lifestyle is any better than any other.  All moral opinions and lifestyles are equally valid, they say.  Consider now the lifestyle of the Baton Rouge serial killer.  If no lifestyles are any better or any worse than any others, that means the lifestyle of the serial killer is not any worse than the lifestyles of Baton Rouge’s law-abiding citizens.  Remember: we are supposed to be tolerant of all lifestyles.  Also, according to subjective relativism, the opinion that rape and murder are morally wrong is not any better than the opinion that rape and murder are fine and dandy.  Both opinions are equally valid.  Each person (including the Baton Rouge serial killer!) gets to decide what is right and wrong for that person.  If a serial killer has decided that rape and murder are right for him, then these horrible crimes really are right for him, and it is inappropriate for us to think any differently. 

            Can anyone seriously believe that the subjective relativist’s assessments of the Baton Rouge serial killer’s lifestyle and ethical views are correct?  I don’t see how they could.  Subjective relativism’s claim that all lifestyles and all opinions about morality are equally valid cannot be true. 

 B. Judging Other People

            Subjective relativism claims that it is wrong to be judgmental, that we should not judge other people.  Something about this claim seems reasonable.  However, subjective relativism’s claim that we should not think that anyone else’s lifestyle or opinion is wrong seems absurd.  But if forming an opinion about someone else is judging them, how can we accept the first relativist claim and reject the second? 

            The key to understanding this issue is realizing there is an ambiguity in the phrase “judging someone else.”  In the most basic sense of this phrase, to judge someone else is to form an opinion about them.  For example, Louisiana voters were recently asked to decide whether Kathleen Blanco or Bobby Jindal should be their next governor.  Voters had to form an opinion about which candidate they think will do the best job.  Regardless of which candidate you may have voted for, no one will condemn you for having “judged other people.”  That’s what you were supposed to do.  In this sense of “judging,” it is impossible not to judge other people.  In fact, it is necessary in order to get along in society.

            The foregoing example reveals that there must be another sense of the phrase “judging someone else” that is reasonably taken to be objectionable.  When we speak of judging someone else in a negative sense, what we sometimes have in mind is an inappropriate rejection of the person being judged.  We have probably all seen an episode of some television show with the following motif: A couple’s estranged son has finally come home.  He has been gone for years, and they have hardly spoken since he left.  The mother weeps tears of joy.  However, the son has brought with him a “special friend,” and he has some important news to share: “Mom, Dad, I’m gay.”  The father disowns the son and will not speak to him.  He says, “You are no longer my son” and orders his son to leave his house.  The father is intolerant, unloving and verbally abusive. 

            When we call the father “judgmental,” we are not merely saying that the father has formed some opinion or other about his son.  We mean there is something about his opinions and the way he is acting upon them that is inappropriate.  To judge other people in this negative sense means that you will shun them, disown them, cut off whatever relationship you had with them, refuse to associate with them, look down upon them, exclude them, or deny them the same privileges as those who have not been so judged.  Subjective relativists claim that judging in this negative sense is wrong.  That seems like a reasonable suggestion.  Responding in a hateful way to another person is usually going to be a bad thing. 

            However, this does not mean that we should stop judging them in the first sense discussed above, but this is what subjective relativists recommend.  Couldn’t the television father continue to believe that his son’s alternative sexual lifestyle was morally wrong but embrace and love his son anyway?  Disagreeing with another person does not (and should not) always lead to shunning, excluding or disowning that person.  In other words, “judging someone” in the first sense of forming an opinion about that person, does not always lead to “judging someone” in the second sense of rejecting or cutting off all social ties with that person.  You can still love someone with whom you disagree. 

            Subjective relativists, however, do not distinguish between these two senses of “judging other people.”  They argue that, since the second sort of judging is inappropriate, so is the first.  But this conclusion does not logically follow.  It is possible to judge in the first sense but not the second.  However bad the second sense of judging may be, this does not mean that the first sense is also bad. 

 C. Deciding for Yourself

            Subjective relativists claim that you should get to decide what is right for you.  Something about this claim seems very true.  As autonomous, rational agents, we have the ability to make our own decisions, and our autonomy and rationality should be respected by others.  However, is seems absurd to think that the Baton Rouge serial killer should be free to decide that rape and murder are right for him.  We need to distinguish two different senses “deciding for yourself.”  Subjective relativists slide from using one sense of “deciding for yourself” to using a completely different sense, without acknowledging this is what they are doing. 

            In one sense, you must decide for yourself what to believe not only in ethics but in every area of your life.  You must evaluate the evidence that is available to you, the arguments for and against various positions, and make up your mind about what you think is true.  For example, if you are unsure about whether to believe in global warming, you can go to the library, check out some books, read some journal articles, and familiarize yourself with the various arguments that have been put forward.  Then, you must decide for yourself whether you think the evidence supports or does not support a belief in global warming.  Talking about “deciding for yourself” in this sense seems unobjectionable. 

            However, subjective relativists also like to talk about “deciding for yourself” in another sense.  In this second sense, subjective relativists claim that the fact that you chose lifestyle X for yourself makes lifestyle X right for you.  To see that this sense of “deciding for yourself” is different from the first, recall the global warming case.  Choosing to believe in global warming does not make global warming a fact.  When it comes to issues like global warming, your choices determine your beliefs, but they do not determine the facts.  You hope that your belief in global warming corresponds to the facts.  But the facts do not depend upon you believing in them in order for them to be the facts.  The facts are the way they are, regardless of what you think about them. 

            By contrast, subjective relativists claim that in ethics your choices determine not only your ethical beliefs but also the ethical facts.  If you decide that cheating on your boyfriend or girlfriend is morally permissible, that makes cheating morally permissible for you.  You never have to wonder or worry whether your ethical beliefs correspond to the facts.  Your beliefs create the ethical facts.  Without your beliefs, there would be no ethical facts about what is right for you.  So, there is never any possibility that you could be wrong about what is right for you.  According to subjective relativism, believing so makes it so. 

            Subjective relativists claim that, because we must obviously decide for ourselves what to believe (in the first sense of “deciding for yourself”) in ethics, we are also able to decide for ourselves (in the second sense of “deciding for yourself”) what the ethical facts are.  In their discussions of “deciding for yourself,” they never distinguish the two senses and use the plausibility of the first sense illicitly to support the second sense.  But the fact that the first sense gives no support to the second sense.  Consequently, subjective relativists cannot appeal to the importance of autonomous decision making to show that their view is true. 

 D. The Psychology of Belief

            The subjective relativism position also seems to misunderstand the psychology of belief.  Subjective relativists believe it is OK for you to think that capital punishment is right but that you should not think the opinions of those who oppose capital punishment are any less correct than your own.  Think about that for a minute.  Is what they recommend even psychologically possible?  How can I believe that position A is true and yet at the same time believe that those who think that position A is false are just as right as I am?  That sounds like nonsense.  If I believe position A is true, I am committed to believing that anyone who thinks position A is false is wrong.  Subjective relativism seems to be asking us to do something that is not humanly possible. 

 E. The Truth of Relativism

            Consider the following simply question: Do subjective relativists believe that subjective relativism is true?  This may seem like an utterly ridiculous question, unless you think carefully about it.  At first glance, the answer seems obvious.  Of course, they believe subjective relativism is true.  That’s what makes them subjective relativists.  However, this seemingly obvious answer causes serious problems for the subjective relativist. 

            Subjective relativists deny that there are any absolute truths in ethics.  No ethical principle, they say, is true for all people at all times and in all places.  The problem, however, is that subjective relativists think subjective relativism is the TRUTH about ethics.  They do not merely think that subjective relativism is true-for-them.  They think it is true for all people at all times and in all places.  They seem to be contradicting themselves.  Subjective relativism also claims that no moral view is any better than any other.  Since subjective relativism is itself a moral view, this means that subjective relativism is not any better than any other moral view, such as moral absolutism.  And yet you will never meet a subjective relativist who does not think that moral absolutism is just plain wrong.  They contradict themselves once again. 

            (By the way, conventional relativism falls prey to this same problem.  Conventional relativists also deny that there are any absolute truths in ethics, but they claim that conventional relativism is the absolute truth about ethics.  They also claim that no culture’s moral viewpoint is any better than any other, and yet they claim that any culture that subscribes to conventional relativism is correct while any culture that subscribes to moral absolutism is objectively wrong.)

            Is there any way for the subjective relativists to keep from contradicting themselves.  There might be one way, but it has some serious drawbacks.  Instead of claiming that subjective relativism is TRUE, subjective relativists could argue that subjective relativism is simply true-for-them and not necessarily true-for-others.  So, if you are a moral absolutist, this kind of subjective relativist would not try to tell you that you are wrong—even if you were intolerant and ethnocentric.  The subjective relativist I am imagining would claim that, while subjective relativism is true-for-them, moral absolutism would still be true-for-you.  This kind of subjective relativist does not fall into self-contradiction. 

            However, the subjective relativist’s position is no longer a very interesting one.  The features that make subjective relativism an attractive position for a lot of people are no longer present: the emphasis on trying to get other people to be more tolerant, the opposition to ethnocentrism, the critique of the injustices done in the name of moral absolutism, etc.  Subjective relativists want other people to become relativists, too.  They want to tell those who believe in moral absolutes that they are really wrong for being absolutists.  Relativists of all stripes are continually criticizing people who believe in absolute moral truths for being closed-minded, intolerant, dogmatic, politically incorrect, and just plain wrong.  But if belief in moral absolutism is merely wrong-for-the-subjective-relativist but not necessarily wrong-for-you, then the relativist is not in a position to criticize you for being an absolutist.  Going with the option under consideration avoids a contradiction, but only by making it impossible for the subjective relativist to disagree with absolutists.

            Consequently, although the position I have just sketched is logically possible, you will never meet a subjective relativist who believes in it.  All of the subjective relativists you will ever come across will believe that subjective relativism is the fundamental, objective and universal truth about morality.  This is not something they can believe in without contradicting themselves.  (For more on contradictions, point your browser to: http://www.geocities.com/beebejames/Contradictions101.)

 F. Living Together in Peace

            Subjective relativists suggest that the only way for us to live together in peace in a pluralistic society like ours is for us to treat everyone else’s opinions and lifestyles as being as equally valid as our own.  They suggest that moral absolutism leads to intolerance and injustice.  If we all stopped thinking that our opinions and ways were superior to those of other people, we would have a more peaceful, more egalitarian society. 

            Subjective relativists, however, misunderstand what democracy is all about.  Living together peacefully in a democracy does not mean having no opinions about what is right and wrong.  It means living together in peace with those with whom you strongly disagree.  It is ridiculous to think that we will never have a peaceful, just and fair society as long as Democrats are convinced that Republicans are wrong (and vice versa), pro-lifers are convinced that pro-choicers are wrong (and vice versa), evangelical Christians are convinced that purveyors of pornography are wrong (and vice versa), proponents of the death penalty are convinced that opponents of it are wrong (and vice versa), and proponents of affirmative action are convinced that opponents of it are wrong (and vice versa).  Subjective relativism makes the absurd suggestion that the only way to live together in harmony is to stop having any convictions about what is right or wrong.  Subjective relativists want us to stop thinking that anybody else’s opinion is wrong.  As long we think that, they say, we will be intolerant, judgmental and unjust.  Such a position completely misunderstands the beauty of democracy. 

            Citizens in a democracy are expected to respect the rights of others and to find peaceful means of resolving their disagreements.  You don’t have to agree with the people on the other side of the aisle, but you are not free to abuse them or deprive them of their rights simply because they disagree with you.  You are free to debate, to persuade, to campaign, to make commercials, and to donate money to political parties or private organizations that promote your interests.  But you are not free to harm those with whom you disagree.  That’s democracy: peaceful disagreement.  It’s not (as subjective relativism suggests) a lack of any real disagreement. 

 G. Moral Absolutes in Relativism

            Subjective relativists contradict themselves not only in claiming that subjective relativism is true but also by believing in the following absolute moral truths:

(1) Every person deserves to be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of race, religion, class, color or creed.

(2) Different lifestyles and cultures should be treated with tolerance.

(3) Intolerance is morally wrong.

(4) The basic human rights of every individual should be defended by a free and just society. 

(5) We should strive to provide the citizens of our nation with as much individual liberty as is compatible with the free exercise of everyone else’s liberty. 

(6) It is wrong to deprive those with whom one disagrees of their right to make their voices heard in an arena of public discourse. 

(7) Racism, sexism and all forms of hateful discrimination are unjust and have no place in an equitable and peaceful society. 

Every relativist I have ever met (or expect to meet) believes in (1) through (7).  And they do not merely believe that (1) through (7) are true-for-them.  They believe these truths apply to all people in all cultures at all times and in all places.  In other words, relativists (subjective and conventional) treat (1) through (7) as moral absolutes.  Thus, contrary to the explicit statements of their own position, they do believe in moral absolutes after all. 

 H. You Can’t Live It Out

            Not only are self-contradictory positions necessarily false, they are also impossible to put into practice.  You couldn’t really live your life in accordance with subjective relativism if you wanted to. 

            Suppose that Boudreaux deliberates about what he should do in the following manner:

(a) One is morally obliged to keep one’s promises. 

(b) I promised my cousin Jethro that I would attend the premiere of his performance art piece. 

(c) I am morally obligated to attend Jethro’s premiere. 

(d) I want to do what is right. 

(e) Therefore, I will attend Jethro’s premiere. 

Statement (a) is an expression of a universal principle about what is morally right or wrong.  (b) is a statement of descriptive fact regarding Boudreaux’s interaction with Jethro.  (c) states a logical consequence of (a) and (b).  (d) expresses one of Boudreaux’s desires, which provides him (let us suppose) with sufficient motivation for caring about (c) and for following through with what he knows to be right.  Finally, (e) expresses Boudreaux’s decision or determination to undertake the specified course of action. 

            Suppose, however, that Boudreaux is a subjective relativist and consider what effect this might have on his practical deliberations.  Since he denies that there are any absolute moral truths, the moral principle in (a) can only be interpreted as being true-for-him, if he has decided to believe in it.  But Boudreaux could just as well have chosen to believe in any of the following, incompatible moral principles:

(f) One is morally obliged to keep one’s promises, unless it is inconvenient to do so. 

(g) One is morally obliged to keep one’s promises only if one has promised to do something pleasurable. 

(h) One is not morally obliged to keep any of one’s promises. 

Which one of these is right-for-Boudreaux?  Whichever one he happens to believe in.  Remember: According to subjective relativism, what is right-for-him is whatever he thinks is right-for-him.  So, none of the above options can be any more accurate or true than the others.  Since, according to subjective relativism, whatever Boudreaux believes to be right really is right-for-him, there is no reason for him to worry that his beliefs might be wrong-for-him.  They are right-for-Boudreaux of necessity.

            How is Boudreaux supposed to choose which one to believe or adopt?  His relativism cannot be of any help in this matter.  If Boudreaux had chosen (f) instead of (a), then (f) would have been right-for-him.  If he had chosen (g), then (g) would have been right-for-him.  And so on.  There is no belief choice he can make which will be ‘wrong-for-him.’ 

            In such circumstances, it is difficult to see how genuine practical deliberation can still be possible.  To deliberate is to weigh one’s options in light of one’s evidence, reasons, consequences and background beliefs.  But no process of weighing is applicable in the relativist’s case because every belief has equal weight or merit.  Regardless of what ethical beliefs Boudreaux may have, each of them is ‘true-for-him.’  Subjective relativism seems to make it impossible for Boudreaux’s practical choices to be anything but arbitrary.

            We have seen that conventional relativism and subjective relativism are both subject to very serious objections.  However, you should not forget that both forms of relativism also put forward some very challenging arguments against moral absolutism.  Relativists seem to be right about the evils of ethnocentrism and the virtue of tolerance.  Both forms of relativism also try to promote a seemingly healthy respect for other ways of life and other people.  Both relativists and absolutists face philosophical objections they must answer if their views of morality are going to be fully adequate. 

Bennett, Jonathan. 1997. “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn.” In Christina Sommers and Fred Sommers (eds.), Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life: Introductory Readings in Ethics . Ft. Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, pp. 20-34.

Crapo, Richley H. 1993. Cultural Anthropology: Understanding Ourselves & Others , 3rd edn. Guilford, CT: Dushkin Publishing.

Pojman, Louis. 1999. Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong , 3rd edn. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Moral Relativism

Moral relativism has the unusual distinction—both within philosophy and outside it—of being attributed to others, almost always as a criticism, far more often than it is explicitly professed by anyone. Nonetheless, moral relativism is a standard topic in metaethics, and there are contemporary philosophers who defend forms of it: The most prominent are Gilbert Harman and David B. Wong. The term ‘moral relativism’ is understood in a variety of ways. Most often it is associated with an empirical thesis that there are deep and widespread moral disagreements and a metaethical thesis that the truth or justification of moral judgments is not absolute, but relative to some group of persons. Sometimes ‘moral relativism’ is connected with a normative position about how we ought to think about or act towards those with whom we morally disagree, most commonly that we should tolerate them.

1. Historical Background

2. forms and arguments, 3. descriptive moral relativism, 4. are moral disagreements rationally resolvable, 5. metaethical moral relativism, 6. mixed positions: a rapprochement between relativists and objectivists, 7. relativism and tolerance, bibliography, other internet resources, related entries.

Though moral relativism did not become a prominent topic in philosophy or elsewhere until the twentieth century, it has ancient origins. In the classical Greek world, both the historian Herodotus and the sophist Protagoras appeared to endorse some form of relativism (the latter attracted the attention of Plato in the Theaetetus ). It should also be noted that the ancient Chinese Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi (formerly spelled Chuang-Tzu) put forward a nonobjectivist view that is sometimes interpreted as a kind of relativism.

Among the ancient Greek philosophers, moral diversity was widely acknowledged, but the more common nonobjectivist reaction was moral skepticism, the view that there is no moral knowledge (the position of the Pyrrhonian skeptic Sextus Empiricus), rather than moral relativism, the view that moral truth or justification is relative to a culture or society. This pattern continued through most of the history of Western philosophy. There were certainly occasional discussions of moral disagreement—for example in Michel de Montaigne's Essays or in the dialogue David Hume attached to An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals . These discussions pertained to moral objectivity, but moral relativism as a thesis explicitly distinguished from moral skepticism ordinarily was not in focus. Prior to the twentieth century, moral philosophers did not generally feel obliged to defend a position on moral relativism.

Nonetheless, the increasing awareness of moral diversity (especially between Western and non-Western cultures) on the part of Europeans in the modern era is an important antecedent to the contemporary concern with moral relativism. During this time, the predominant view among Europeans and their colonial progeny was that their moral values were superior to the moral values of other cultures. Few thought all moral values had equal or relative validity, or anything of that sort. The main impetus for such a position came from cultural anthropology. Anthropologists were fascinated with the diversity of cultures, and they produced detailed empirical studies of them—especially “primitive,” non-Western ones. Early on anthropologists accepted the assumption of European or Western superiority. But this was challenged by Franz Boas, and his students—in particular, Ruth Benedict, Melville J. Herskovits, and Margaret Mead—explicitly articulated influential forms of moral relativism in the twentieth century. In 1947, on the occasion of the United Nations debate about universal human rights, the American Anthropological Association issued a statement declaring that moral values are relative to cultures and that there is no way of showing that the values of one culture are better than those of another. Anthropologists have never been unanimous in asserting this, and more recently human rights advocacy on the part of some anthropologists has mitigated the relativist orientation of the discipline. Nonetheless, prominent anthropologists such as Richard A. Shweder and the late Clifford Geertz have defended relativist positions in recent years.

An important early bridge from anthropology to philosophy was established by Edward Westermarck (1906-8 and 1932), a social scientist who wrote anthropological and philosophical works defending forms of empirical as well as metaethical moral relativism. In the post-war period, moral philosophers began devoting considerable attention to moral relativism and some—most notably Richard B. Brandt (1954) and John Ladd (1957)—took quite seriously the empirical effort of anthropology to understand the moralities of different cultures. Since then, the explicit focus on anthropological inquiries has mostly (though not entirely) subsided among philosophers. However, the preoccupation with moral relativism has not, and there is now an enormous literature on the subject (the Bibliography below is very limited). Most of these discussions are situated in the domain of “pure metaethics,” but not all. For example, there is considerable work on moral relativism in connection with human rights (with which some forms of relativism are in obvious conflict) and also with feminist philosophy (where it has been both criticized and defended vis-a-vis feminist concerns). There are also discussions of moral relativism in applied fields such as medical ethics.

In general, the term ‘relativism’ refers to many different ideas. For example, in anthropology it sometimes connotes, among other things, the rather uncontroversial notion that anthropologists should strive to be impartial and unprejudiced in their empirical inquires. However, in moral philosophy ‘relativism’ is usually taken to suggest an empirical, a metaethical, or a normative position. The empirical position is usually:

Descriptive Moral Relativism ( DMR ). As a matter of empirical fact, there are deep and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these disagreements are much more significant than whatever agreements there may be.

This is often thought to have been established by anthropology and other empirical disciplines. However, DMR is not uncontroversial: Empirical as well as philosophical objections have been raised against it. Hence, it is one focal point of debate.

The metaethical position usually concerns the truth or justification of moral judgments, and it has been given somewhat different definitions. Metaethical relativists generally suppose that many fundamental moral disagreements cannot be rationally resolved, and on this basis they argue that moral judgments lack the moral authority or normative force that moral objectivists usually contend these judgments may have. Hence, metaethical relativism is in part a negative thesis that challenges the claims of moral objectivists. However, it often involves a positive thesis as well, namely that moral judgments nonetheless have moral authority or normative force, not absolutely or universally (as objectivists contend), but relative to some group of persons such as a society or culture. This point is typically made with respect to truth or justification (or both), and the following definition will be a useful reference point:

Metaethical Moral Relativism ( MMR ). The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons.

With respect to truth-value, this means that a moral judgment such as ‘Polygamy is morally wrong’ may be true relative to one society, but false relative to another. It is not true, or false, simply speaking. Likewise, with respect to justification, this judgment may be justified in one society, but not another. Taken in one way, this last point is uncontroversial: The people in one society may have different evidence available to them than the people in the other society. But proponents of MMR usually have something stronger and more provocative in mind: That the standards of justification in the two societies may differ from one another and that there is no rational basis for resolving these differences. This is why the justification of moral judgments is relative rather than absolute.

It is important to note several distinctions that may be made in formulating different metaethical relativist positions. First, it is sometimes said that the truth or justification of moral judgments may be relative to an individual person as well as a group of persons. In this article, the latter will be assumed, as in the definition of MMR , unless otherwise noted. Second, that to which truth or justification is relative may be the persons making the moral judgments or the persons about whom the judgments are made. These are sometimes called appraiser and agent relativism respectively. Appraiser relativism suggests that we do or should make moral judgments on the basis of our own standards, while agent relativism implies that the relevant standards are those of the persons we are judging (of course, in some cases these may coincide). Appraiser relativism is the more common position, and it will usually be assumed in the discussion that follows. Finally, MMR may be offered as the best explanation of what people already believe, or it may be put forward as a position people ought to accept regardless of what they now believe. There will be occasion to discuss both claims below, though the latter is probably the more common one.

Metaethical moral relativist positions are typically contrasted with moral objectivism. Let us say that moral objectivism maintains that moral judgments are ordinarily true or false in an absolute or universal sense, that some of them are true, and that people sometimes are justified in accepting true moral judgments (and rejecting false ones) on the basis of evidence available to any reasonable and well-informed person. There are different ways of challenging moral objectivism. Moral skepticism says that we are never justified in accepting or rejecting moral judgments. Other views—variously called moral non-cognitivism, expressivism, anti-realism, nihilism, etc.—contend that moral judgments lack truth-value, at least beyond the truth-value implied by the minimalist claim that to assert that S is true is simply to assert S (a related view, the error theory, claims that moral judgments are always false). MMR is often distinguished from all of these views: Instead of denying truth-value or justification, it affirms relative forms of these. However, metaethical moral relativist views are sometimes regarded as connected with positions that say moral judgments lack truth-value, since the relativist views contend that moral judgments lack truth-value in an absolute or universal sense. This is sometimes simply a question of terminology, but not always. If it is said that moral judgments lack truth-value (beyond the claim of minimalism), then there cannot be relative truth-value in the sense that moral relativists usually intend (though it might be contended that there is a sense in which there could still be justification). As will be seen below, there is a debate about the relationship between MMR and non-cognitivist or expressivist positions.

Most arguments for MMR are based on DMR and the contention that it is implausible to suppose fundamental moral disagreements can always be resolved rationally. Both Harman (1996) and Wong (1984 and 2006) have stressed this theme, and it will be considered in some detail in subsequent sections. However, some arguments for MMR have a somewhat different approach, and two of these should be noted here.

First, MMR might be defended as a consequence of the general relativist thesis that the truth or justification of all judgments is not absolute or universal, but relative to some group of persons. For example, this general position might be maintained on the ground that each society has its own conceptual scheme and that conceptual schemes are incommensurable with one another. Hence, we can only speak of truth or justification in relative terms (see entry on Relativism section 4.2 ). This position might be thought to have the disadvantage that it can only be put forward as true or justified relative to some conceptual scheme (the suggestion is usually that this scheme is our own), and many find it implausible with regard to common sense judgments and judgments in the natural sciences. However, this is one avenue to MMR . But most proponents of MMR focus on distinctive features of morality and reject general relativism. In fact, they often contrast morality and science with respect to issues of truth and justification. For example, Harman (2000b) and Wong (1996 and 2006) both associate moral relativism with naturalism, a position that presupposes the objectivity of the natural sciences.

Second, a metaethical moral relativist position might be defended by emphasizing aspects of morality other than, or at least in addition to, disagreement. For example, Harman (2000a) has argued that a moral judgment that a person ought to do X (an “inner judgment”) implies that the person has motivating reasons to do X , and that a person is likely to have such reasons only if he or she has implicitly entered into an agreement with others about what to do. Hence, moral judgments of this kind are valid only for groups of persons who have made such agreements. An action may be right relative to one agreement and wrong relative to another (this combines agent and appraisal relativism insofar as Harman assumes that the person making the judgment and the person to whom the judgment is addressed are both parties to the agreement).

Harman's relativism is presented as a thesis about logical form, but the relativist implication arises only because it is supposed that the relevant motivating reasons are not universal and so probably arose from an agreement that some but not all persons have made. In this sense, moral disagreement is an important feature of the argument. But the main focus is on the internalist idea that inner judgments imply motivating reasons, reasons that are not provided simply by being rational, but require particular desires or intentions that a person may or may not have. Internalism in this sense is a controversial view, and many would say that a moral judgment can apply to a person whether or not that person is motivated to follow it (see the section on psychology and moral motivation in the entry on moral epistemology ). However, internalism is not a standard feature of most arguments for moral relativism, and in fact some relativists are critical of internalism (for example, see Wong 2006: ch. 7)

It is worth noting that internalism is one expression of a more general viewpoint that emphasizes the action-guiding character of moral judgments. Though Harman and others (for example, Dreier 1990 and 2006) have argued that a form of moral relativism provides the best explanation of internalism, a more common argument has been that the action-guiding character of moral judgments is best explained by a non-cognitivist or expressivist account according to which moral judgments lack truth-value (at least beyond the claim of minimalism). In fact, some have claimed that the expressivist position avoids, and is superior to, moral relativism because it accounts for the action-guiding character of moral judgments without taking on the problems that moral relativism is thought to involve (for instance, see Blackburn 1998: ch. 9 and 1999, and Horgan and Timmons 2006). By contrast, others have maintained that positions such as non-cognitivism and expressivism are committed to a form of moral relativism (for example, see Bloomfield 2003, Foot 2002b, and Shafer-Landau 2003: ch 1). For a discussion of non-cognitivism and related positions, see the entry on Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.)

Finally, the term ‘moral relativism’ is sometimes associated with a normative position concerning how we ought to think about, or behave towards, persons with whom we morally disagree. Usually the position is formulated in terms of tolerance. In particular, it is said that we should not interfere with the actions of persons that are based on moral judgments we reject, when the disagreement is not or cannot be rationally resolved. This is thought to apply especially to relationships between our society and those societies with which we have significant moral disagreements. Since tolerance so-understood is a normative thesis about what we morally ought to do, it is best regarded, not as a form of moral relativism per se , but as a thesis that has often been thought to be implied by relativist positions such as DMR and MMR . Despite the popularity of this thought, most philosophers believe it is mistaken. The question is what philosophical relationship, if any, obtains between moral relativism and tolerance.

The remainder of this entry will discuss DMR , the contention that it is unlikely that fundamental moral disagreements can be rationally resolved, arguments for and challenges to MMR , mixed positions that combine moral relativism and moral objectivism, and the relationship between moral relativism and tolerance.

Most discussions of moral relativism begin with, and are rooted in, DMR . Though this is not sufficient to establish MMR , the most common rationales for MMR would be undermined if DMR were incorrect. Moreover, if DMR were generally rejected, it is likely that MMR would have few proponents. Hence, it is important to consider whether or not DMR is correct. Defenders of DMR usually take it to be well-established by cultural anthropology and other empirically-based disciplines, and many believe it is obvious to anyone with an elementary understanding of the history and cultures of the world. Examples of moral practices that appear sharply at odds with moral outlooks common in the United States are not hard to come by: polygamy, arranged marriages, suicide as a requirement of honor or widowhood, severe punishments for blasphemy or adultery, female circumcision or genital mutilation (as it is variously called), and so on. At a more general level, Wong (1984) has argued that at least two different approaches to morality may be found in the world: a virtue-centered morality that emphasizes the good of the community, and a rights-centered morality that stresses the value of individual freedom.

Though it is obvious that there are some moral disagreements, it is another matter to say that these disagreements are deep and widespread, and that they are much more significant than whatever agreements there may be. Philosophers have raised two kinds of objection to this contention: a priori arguments that DMR could not be true, and a posteriori arguments that DMR is probably not true or at least has not been established to be true.

A priori objections maintain that we can know DMR is false on the basis of philosophical considerations, without recourse to empirical evidence. One argument, expressed in general form by Donald Davidson (1984), states that disagreement presupposes considerable agreement (see Davidson, Donald). According to Davidson, a methodological constraint on the translation of the language of another society is that we must think they agree with us on most matters. For example, suppose we believed there were numerous disagreements between us and another society about trees. As the disagreements piled up, we reasonably would begin to think we had mistranslated a word in the language of the other society as ‘tree’: It is more likely that (what we take to be) their false beliefs about trees are really beliefs about something else. By generalization, it follows that there could not be extensive disagreements about trees between our society and the other one. Of course, there could be some disagreements. But these disagreements would presuppose substantial agreements in other respects. Davidson (2004a and 2004b) and others (for example, Cooper 1978 and Myers 2004) have claimed that this argument applies to moral concepts. If they are right, there cannot be extensive disagreements about morality, and the agreements are more significant than the disagreements. DMR cannot be true.

Davidson's argument is controversial. One response is that, even if it were compelling in some cases, it would not have force with respect to moral concepts. ‘Tree’ is an ordinary, descriptive concept based on direct observation. In view of this, mistranslation seems more likely than substantial disagreement. But what about concepts concerning what is amusing, interesting, or exciting? These have to do with human reactions to the world, and it may be said that our knowledge of human nature suggests that some reactions vary widely. A claim that there is much disagreement about what people find amusing—about what makes them laugh—does not immediately generate the suspicion of mistranslation. If moral concepts were more similar to ‘amusing’ than to ‘tree’, as some believe, then the Davidsonian argument might not undermine DMR even if it were convincing in other cases. Davidson, however, believed the argument applies across the board, to evaluations as well as empirical beliefs. Another response to his argument is to claim that, even if it does apply to evaluations, it would only apply to very basic ones and would leave room for substantial disagreements beyond these (if this were the case, then Davidson would have established only what I call a mixed position in section 6 below).

Another a priori objection to DMR was suggested by Philippa Foot (1978a and 1978b) in a response to emotivism. Just as there are shared criteria of ‘rude’ such that not just anything could be considered rude, she argued, there are shared criteria of moral concepts such that not just anything could be a moral virtue or obligation. For example, there are substantial constraints on what could be considered courage. Hence, there are significant limits to the extent of moral disagreements.

One response to this argument, interpreted as an objection to DMR , is that it faces a dilemma. On the one hand, if ‘courage’ is understood broadly, in terms of confronting a difficulty to achieve some good, then it is likely that most everyone values courage. However, this leaves room for very different conceptions of courage. Both warriors and pacifists may value it, but they may regard very different kinds of actions as courageous. This puts less pressure on DMR , a point Foot later conceded to some extent (see the section on “ Mixed Positions ” below). On the other hand, if courage is defined narrowly, for example, as the virtue of a warrior who faces the threat of death in battle (as suggested by Aristotle), then there may be little disagreement about the scope of the concept, but considerable disagreement about whether courage so-defined should be valued (pacifists would say no). A proponent of DMR might say that this is also a significant moral disagreement. Against this, it may be said that our understanding of human nature and culture shows that everyone values courage understood within some fairly significant limits. This is a more empirical point, in line with the objections in the last paragraph of this section.

Some versions of the a priori approach emphasize the constraints imposed by “thinner” moral concepts such as goodness, rightness, or morality itself (for example, see Garcia 1988). Once again, a defender of DMR might say that, if these concepts have enough content to preclude significant disagreement in their application, then it is likely that many societies do not apply them at all—a form of moral disagreement in itself. Another response would be to argue, following R.M. Hare (1981), that a formal analysis, for example in terms of a kind of prescriptivity, is plausible with respect to some thinner moral concepts, and that this is consistent with significant moral disagreements. However, the a priori critics question the adequacy of any such analysis. Much of this debate concerns the acceptability of formal versus material definitions of morality (see morality, definition of).

The second approach to rejecting DMR focuses on the interpretation of the empirical evidence that purportedly supports this thesis. Some objections point to obstacles that face any attempt to understand human cultures empirically. For example, it may be said that the supposed evidence is incomplete or inaccurate because the observers are biased. In support of this, it may be claimed that anthropologists often have had preconceptions rooted in disciplinary paradigms or political ideologies that have led them to misrepresent or misinterpret the empirical data. Or it may be said that even the most objective observers would have difficulty accurately understanding a society's actual moral values on account of phenomena such as self-deception and weakness of will. These concerns point to substantial issues in the methodology of the social sciences. However, even if they were valid, they would only cast doubt on whether DMR had been established: They would not necessarily give us reason to think it is false. Of course, this would be an important objection to someone who claims DMR is established or relies on DMR to argue for MMR .

Another objection, more directly pertinent to DMR , is that anthropologists have tacitly and mistakenly assumed that cultures are rather discrete, homogenous, and static entities—rather like the shapes in a Piet Mondrian painting or a checkerboard. In fact, according to this contention, cultures typically are rather heterogeneous and complex internally, with many dissenting voices. Moreover, they often interact and sometimes influence one another, and they may change over time. From this perspective, the world of cultures is closer to an animated Jackson Pollock painting than to the unambiguous configuration suggested by the first image. If these contentions were correct, then it would be more difficult to know the moral values of different cultures and hence to know whether or not DMR is true. As before, this would not show that it is false (in fact, the point about heterogeneity might point the other way). However, we will see later that these contentions also pose challenges to MMR .

Other critics try to establish that the empirical evidence cited in support of DMR does not really show that there are significant moral disagreements, and is consistent with considerable moral agreement. A prominent contention is that purported moral disagreements may result from applying a general moral value (about which there is no disagreement) in different circumstances or in the same circumstances where there is a factual disagreement about what these circumstances are. Either way, there is no real moral disagreement in these cases. For example, everyone might agree on the importance of promoting human welfare (and even on the nature of human welfare). But this may be promoted differently in different, or differently understood, circumstances. Another contention is that moral disagreements may be explained by religious disagreements: It is only because specific religious assumptions are made (for instance, about the soul) that there are moral disagreements. Once again, the apparent moral disagreement is really a disagreement of a different kind—here, about the nature of the soul. There is no genuine moral disagreement. Of course, these possibilities would have to be established as the best explanation of the disagreements in question to constitute an objection to DMR .

Finally, some objections maintain that proponents of DMR fail to recognize that there is significant empirical evidence for considerable moral agreement across different societies. Several kinds of agreement have been proposed. For example, the role-reversal test implied by the Golden Rule (“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”) has been prominent beyond Western traditions: A version of it is also endorsed in The Analects of Confucius, The Way of the Bodhisattva of the Indian Buddhist philosopher Shāntideva, and elsewhere. Another form of this claim maintains that basic moral prohibitions against lying, stealing, adultery, killing human beings, etc. are found across many different and otherwise diverse societies. Yet another contention is that the international human rights movement indicates substantial moral agreement. On the basis of evidence of this kind, some such as Sissela Bok (1995) and Michael Walzer (1994) have proposed that there is a universal minimal morality, whatever other moral differences there may be. In a similar vein, Hans Küng (1996) and others have maintained that there is a common “global ethic” across the world's major religious traditions regarding respect for human life, distributive justice, truthfulness, and the moral equality of men and women. These contentions, which have received increased support in recent years, must be subjected to the same critical scrutiny as those put forward in support of DMR . However, if they were correct, they would cast doubt on DMR . In the final analysis, there may be significant agreements as well as disagreements in people's moral values. If this were the case, it would complicate the empirical background of the metaethical debate, and it might suggest the need for more nuanced alternatives than the standard positions.

Philosophers generally agree that, even if DMR were true without qualification, it would not directly follow that MMR is true. In particular, if moral disagreements could be resolved rationally for the most part, then disagreement-based arguments for MMR would be undermined, and there would be little incentive to endorse the position. Such resolvability, at least in principle, is what moral objectivism would lead us to expect. One of the main points of contention between proponents of MMR and their objectivist critics concerns the possibility of rationally resolving moral disagreements. It might be thought that the defender of MMR needs to show conclusively that the moral disagreements identified in DMR cannot be rationally resolved, or again that the moral objectivist must show conclusively that they can be. Neither is a reasonable expectation. Indeed, it is unclear what would count as conclusively arguing for either conclusion. The center of the debate concerns what plausibly may be expected. Adherents of MMR attempt to show why rational resolution is an unlikely prospect, while their objectivist critics try to show why to a large extent this is likely, or at least not unlikely.

Moral objectivists can allow that there are special cases in which moral disagreements cannot be rationally resolved, for example on account of vagueness or indeterminacy in the concepts involved. Their main claim is that ordinarily there is a rational basis for overcoming disagreements (not that people would actually come to agree). Objectivists maintain that, typically, at least one party in a moral disagreement accepts the moral judgment on account of some factual or logical mistake, and that revealing such mistakes would be sufficient to rationally resolve the disagreement. They suggest that whatever genuine moral disagreements there are usually can be resolved in this fashion. In addition, objectivists sometimes offer an analysis of why people make such mistakes. For example, people may be influenced by passion, prejudice, ideology, self-interest, and the like. In general, objectivists think, insofar as people set these influences aside, and are reasonable and well-informed, there is generally a basis for resolving their moral differences. (They might also say that at least some agreements about moral truths reflect the fact that, with respect to matters pertaining to these truths, people generally have been reasonable and well-informed.)

Proponents of MMR may allow that moral disagreements sometimes are rationally resolved. In particular, they may grant that this often happens when the parties to a moral dispute share a moral framework. The characteristic relativist contention is that a common moral framework is often lacking, especially in moral disagreements between one society and another, and that differences in moral frameworks usually cannot be explained simply by supposing that one society or the other is making factual or logical mistakes. These moral disagreements are ultimately rooted in fundamentally different moral orientations, and there is usually no reason to think these differences result from the fact that, in relevant respects, one side is less reasonable or well-informed than the other. This conclusion might rest on the observation that it is not evident that mistakes are at the root of these disagreement. But it might also depend on a theory, developed to explain such observations, that the frameworks are incommensurable: They do not have enough in common, in terms of either shared concepts or shared standards, to resolve their differences, and there is no impartial third standpoint, accessible to any reasonable and well-informed person, that could be invoked to resolve the conflict.

Various objectivist responses may be made to this argument. One is the Davidsonian approach, already considered, that precludes the possibility of incommensurable moral frameworks. Another response is that incommensurability does not preclude the possibility of rationally resolving differences between moral frameworks. For example, Alasdair MacIntrye (1988: ch. 18 and 1994) has argued that, in some circumstances, it is possible to realize, through an exercise in imagination, that a conflicting and incommensurable moral tradition is rationally superior to one's own tradition. However, the most common objectivist response is to claim that some specific moral framework is rationally superior to all others. For example, it might be argued, following Kant, that pure practical reason implies a fundamental moral principle such as the Categorical Imperative (see Kant, moral philosophy), or it might be claimed, following Aristotle, that human nature is such that virtues such as courage, temperance, and justice are necessary for any plausible conception of a good life (see the sections on the human good and methodology in the entry on Aristotle's ethics, and the entry on virtue ethics ). If such an argument were sound, it might provide a compelling response to the relativist contention that conflicts between moral frameworks cannot be rationally resolved.

Proponents of MMR are unimpressed by these responses. They may say that the Davidsonian account cannot assure sufficient common ground to resolve conflicts between moral frameworks (or to ensure that there is really only one framework), and that MacIntyre's approach is likely to work at best only in some cases. And they usually consider debates about the Kantian and Aristotelian arguments to be as difficult to resolve rationally as the conflicts between moral frameworks the relativists originally invoked. They may add that the fact that moral objectivists disagree among themselves about which objectivist theory is correct is further indication of the difficulty of resolving fundamental moral conflicts.

A rather different objectivist challenge is that the position of the proponent of MMR is inconsistent. The relativist argument is that we should reject moral objectivism because there is little prospect of rationally resolving fundamental moral disagreements. However, it may be pointed out, the relativist should acknowledge that there is no more prospect of rationally resolving disagreements about MMR . By parity of reasoning, he or she should grant that there is no objective truth concerning MMR .

To this familiar kind of objection, there are two equally familiar responses. One is to concede the objection and maintain that MMR is true and justified in some metaethical frameworks, but not others: It is not an objective truth that any reasonable and well-informed person has reason to accept. This may seem to concede a great deal, but for someone who is a relativist through and through, or at least is a relativist about metaethical claims, this would be the only option. The other response is to contest the claim that there is parity of reasoning in the two cases. This would require showing that the dispute about the irresolvability of moral disagreements (a metaethical debate) can be rationally resolved in a way that fundamental moral disagreements (substantive normative debates) themselves cannot. For example, the metaethical debate might be rationally resolved in favor of the relativist, while the substantive normative debates cannot be resolved.

Even if it were established that there are deep and widespread moral disagreements that cannot be rationally resolved, and that these disagreements are more significant than whatever agreements there may be, it would not immediately follow that MMR is correct. Other nonobjectivist conclusions might be drawn. In particular, opponents of objectivism might argue for moral skepticism, that we cannot know moral truths, or for a view that moral judgments lack truth-value (understood to imply a rejection of relative truth-value). Hence, proponents of MMR face two very different groups of critics: assorted kinds of moral objectivists and various sorts of moral nonobjectivists. The defender of MMR needs to establish that MMR is superior to all these positions, and this would require a comparative assessment of their respective advantages and disadvantages. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the alternative positions (see cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism, moral anti-realism, moral epistemology, moral realism, and skepticism, moral). What can be considered are the challenges the proponent of MMR faces and what may be said in response to them.

It might be thought that MMR , with respect to truth-value, would have the result that a moral judgment such as “suicide is morally right” (S) could be both true and false—true when valid for one group and false when invalid for another. But this appears to be an untenable position: Nothing can be both true and false. Of course, some persons could be justified in affirming S and other persons justified in denying it, since the two groups could have different evidence. But it is another matter to say S is both true and false.

The standard relativist response is to say that moral truth is relative in some sense. On this view, S is not true or false absolutely speaking, but it may be true-relative-to- X and false-relative-to- Y (where X and Y refer to different societies or moral frameworks, and their respective standards). This means that suicide is right for persons in X , but it is not right for persons in Y ; and, the relativist may contend, there is no inconsistency in this conjunction properly understood.

Once this position is taken, another objection arises. Relativism usually presents itself as an interpretation of moral disagreements: It is said to be the best explanation of rationally irresolvable moral disagreements. However, once moral truth is regarded as relative, the disagreements seem to disappear. For example, someone in X who affirms S is saying suicide is right for persons in X , while someone in Y who denies S is saying suicide is not right for persons in Y . It might well be that they are both correct and hence that they are not disagreeing with one another (rather as two people in different places might both be correct when one says the sun is shining and the other says it is not, or as two people in different countries may both be correct when one says something is illegal and the other says it is not). The relativist explanation dissolves the disagreement. But, then, why did it appear as a disagreement in the first place? An objectivist might say this is because people assume that moral truth is absolute rather than relative. If this were correct, the relativist could not maintain that MMR captures what people already believe. The contention would have to be that they should believe it, and the argument for relativism would have to be formulated in those terms. For example, the relativist might contend that MMR is the most plausible position to adopt insofar as moral judgments often give practically conflicting directives and neither judgment can be shown to be rationally superior to the other.

A common objection, though probably more so outside philosophy than within it, is that MMR cannot account for the fact that some practices such as the holocaust in Germany or slavery in the United States are obviously objectively wrong. This point is usually expressed in a tone of outrage, often with the suggestion that relativists pose a threat to civilized society (or something of this sort). Proponents of MMR might respond that this simply begs the question, and in one sense they are right. However, this objection might reflect a more sophisticated epistemology, for example, that we have more reason to accept these objectivist intuitions than we have to accept any argument put forward in favor of MMR . This would bring us back to the arguments of the last section. Another relativist response would be to say that the practices in question, though widely accepted, were wrong according to the fundamental standards of the societies. This would not show that the practices are objectively wrong, but it might mitigate the force of the critique. However, though this response may be plausible in some cases, it is not obvious that it always would be convincing.

This last response brings out the fact that the proponent of MMR needs an account of relative truth. To say that S is true-relative-to- X presumably means more than that the people in X accept S . For example, we ordinarily suppose that truths can be undiscovered or that people can make mistakes about them. As just noted, a moral relativist could make sense of this by supposing that a set of fundamental standards are authoritative for people in X : What is morally true-relative-to- X is whatever these standards would actually warrant. By this criterion, there could be moral truths that are unknown to people in X , or they could be mistaken in thinking something is a moral truth. On this approach, however, an explanation is needed of why some standards are authoritative for people in a society.

A similar point arises from the fact that it is sometimes thought to be an advantage of MMR that it maintains a substantial notion of intersubjective truth or justification: It avoids the defects of moral objectivism, on the one hand, and of moral skepticism and theories that disregard moral truth-value altogether, on the other hand, because it maintains that moral judgments do not have truth in an absolute sense, but they do have truth relative to a society (and similarly for justification). This is thought to be an advantage because, notwithstanding the supposed difficulties with moral objectivism, morality is widely regarded as “not merely subjective,” and MMR can capture this. However, this purported advantage raises an important question for relativism: Why suppose moral judgments have truth-value relative to a society as opposed to no truth-value at all? If the relativist claims that a set of fundamental standards is authoritative for persons in a society, it may be asked why they have this authority. This question may arise in quite practical ways. For example, suppose a dissident challenges some of the fundamental standards of his or her society. Is this person necessarily wrong?

Various answers may be given to these questions. For example, it may be said that the standards that are authoritative in a society are those that reasonable and well-informed members of the society would generally accept. This might seem to provide a basis for normative authority. However, if this approach were taken, it may be asked why that authority rests only on reasonable and well-informed members of the society. Why not a wider group? Why not all reasonable and well-informed persons?

A different response would be to say that the standards that are authoritative for a society are the ones persons have agreed to follow as a result of some negotiation or bargaining process (as seen above, Harman has argued that we should understand some moral judgments in these terms). Once again, this might seem to lend those standards some authority. Still, it may be asked whether they really have authority or perhaps whether they have the right kind. For example, suppose the agreement had been reached in circumstances in which a few members of society held great power over the others (in the real world, the most likely scenario). Those with less power might have been prudent to make the agreement, but it is not obvious that such an agreement would create genuine normative authority—a point the dissident challenging the standards might well make. Moreover, if all moral values are understood in this way, how do we explain the authority of the contention that people should follow a set of values because they agreed to do so? Must there be a prior agreement to do what we agree to do?

A related objection concerns the specification of the society to which moral justification or truth are said to be relative. People typically belong to many different groups defined by various criteria: culture, religion, political territory, ethnicity, race, gender, etc. Moreover, while it is sometimes claimed that the values of a group defined by one of these criteria have authority for members of the group, such claims are often challenged. The specification of the relevant group is itself a morally significant question, and there appears to be no objective map of the world that displays its division into social groups to which the truth or justification of moral judgments are relative. A proponent of MMR needs a plausible way of identifying the group of persons to which moral truth or justification are relative.

Moreover, not only do people typically belong to more than one group, as defined by the aforementioned criteria, the values that are authoritative in each group a person belongs to may not always be the same. If I belong to a religion and a nationality, and their values concerning abortion are diametrically opposed, then which value is correct for me? This raises the question whether there is a basis for resolving the conflict consistent with MMR (the two groups might have conflicting fundamental standards) and whether in this circumstance MMR would entail that there is a genuine moral dilemma (meaning that abortion is both right and wrong for me). This point is not necessarily an objection, but a defender of MMR would have to confront these issues and develop a convincing position concerning them.

The fact that social groups are defined by different criteria, and that persons commonly belong to more than one social group, might be taken as a reason to move from relativism to a form of subjectivism. That is, instead of saying that the truth or justification of moral judgments is relative to a group, we should say it is relative to each individual (as noted above, relativism is sometimes defined to include both positions). This revision might defuse the issues just discussed, but it would abandon the notion of intersubjectivity with respect to truth or justification—what for many proponents of MMR is a chief advantage of the position. Moreover, a proponent of this subjectivist account would need to explain in what sense, if any, moral values have normative authority for a person as opposed to simply being accepted. The fact that we sometimes think our moral values have been mistaken is often thought to imply that we believe they have some authority that does not consist in the mere fact that we accept them.

Another set of concerns arises from purported facts about similarities and interactions across different societies vis-a-vis morality. People in one society sometimes make moral judgments about people in another society on the basis of moral standards they take to be authoritative for both societies. In addition, conflicts between societies are sometimes resolved because one society changes its moral outlook and comes to share at least some of the moral values of the other society. More generally, sometimes people in one society think they learn from the moral values of another society: They come to believe that the moral values of another society are better in some respects than their own (previously accepted) values. The Mondrian image of a world divided into distinct societies, each with it own distinctive moral values, makes it difficult to account for these considerations. If this image is abandoned as unrealistic, and is replaced by one that acknowledges greater moral overlap and interaction among societies (recall the Pollock image), then the proponent of MMR needs to give a plausible account of these dynamics. This is related to the problem of authority raised earlier: These considerations suggest that people sometimes acknowledge moral authority that extends beyond their own society, and a relativist needs to show why this makes sense or why people are mistaken in this acknowledgement.

Discussions of moral relativism often assume (as generally has been assumed here so far) that moral relativism is the correct account of all moral judgments or of none. But it is possible that it is the correct account of some moral judgments but not others or, more vaguely, that the best account of morality vis-a-vis these issues would acknowledge both relativist and objectivist elements. Such a mixed position might be motivated by some of the questions already raised. On the empirical level, it might be thought that there are many substantial moral disagreements but also some striking moral agreements across different societies. On the metaethical plane, it might be supposed that, though many disagreements are not likely to be rationally resolved, other disagreements may be (and perhaps that the cross-cultural agreements we find have a rational basis). The first point would lead to a weaker form of DMR (see the suggestions in the last paragraph of section 3 ). The second point, the more important one, would imply a modified form of MMR . This approach has attracted some support, interestingly, from both sides of the debate: relativists who have embraced an objective constraint, and (more commonly) objectivists who have allowed some relativist dimensions. Here are some prominent examples of these mixed metaethical outlooks.

David Copp (1995) maintains that it is true that something is morally wrong only if it is wrong in relation to the justified moral code of some society, and a code is justified in a society only if the society would be rationally required to select it. Since which code it would be rationally required to select depends in part on the non-moral values of the society, and since these values differ from one society to another, something may be morally wrong for one society but not for another. Copp calls this position a form of moral relativism. However, he believes this relativism is significantly mitigated by the fact that which code a society is rationally required to select also depends on the basic needs of the society. Copp thinks all societies have the same basic needs. For example, every society has a need to maintain its population and system of cooperation from one generation to the next. Moreover, since meeting these basic needs is the most fundamental factor in determining the rationality of selecting a code, Copp thinks the content of all justified moral codes will tend to be quite similar. For instance, any such code will require that persons's basic needs for such things as physical survival, self-respect and friendship be promoted (these are said to be necessary for minimal rational agency). The theory is mixed insofar as the rationality of selecting a code depends partly on common features of human nature (basic needs) and partly on diverse features of different societies (values). Whether or not justified moral codes (and hence moral truths) would tend to be substantially similar, despite differences, as Copp argues, would depend on both the claim that all societies have the same basic needs and the claim that these needs are much more important than other values in determining which moral code it is rational for a society to select.

Wong (1996) defended a partly similar position, though one intended to allow for greater diversity in correct moral codes. He argued that more than one morality may be true, but there are limits on which moralities are true. The first point is a form of metaethical relativism: It says one morality may be true for one society and a conflicting morality may be true for another society. Hence, there is no one objectively correct morality for all societies. The second point, however, is a concession to moral objectivism. It acknowledges that objective factors concerning human nature and the human situation should determine whether or not, or to what extent, a given morality could be one of the true ones. The mere fact that a morality is accepted by a society does not guarantee that it has normative authority in that society. For example, given our biological and psychological make-up, not just anything could count as a good way of life. Again, given that most persons are somewhat self-interested and that society requires some measure of cooperation, any plausible morality will include a value of reciprocity (good in return for good on some proportional basis). Since these objective limitations are quite broad, they are insufficient in themselves to establish a specific and detailed morality: Many particular moralities are consistent with them, and the choice among these moralities must be determined by the cultures of different societies.

Wong has developed this approach at length in more recent work (2006). His “pluralistic relativism” continues to emphasize that there are universal constraints on what could be a true morality. The constraints are based on a naturalistic understanding of human nature and the circumstances of human life. For Wong, given a variety of human needs and the depth of self-interest, morality's function is to promote both social co-operation and individual flourishing. In addition, morality requires that persons have both effective agency and effective identity, and these can only be fostered in personal contexts such as the family. Hence, the impersonal perspective must be limited by the personal perspective. Any true morality would have to respect requirements such as these.

Nonetheless, according to Wong, the universal constraints are sufficiently open-ended that there is more than one way to respect them. Hence, there can be more than one true morality. This is pluralistic relativism. For Wong, the different true moralities need not be, and typically are not, completely different from one another. In fact, they often share some values (such as individual rights and social utility), but assign them different priorities.

Wong presents pluralistic relativism as the best explanation of what he calls “moral ambivalence,” the phenomenon of morally disagreeing with someone while recognizing that the person is still reasonable in making the conflicting judgment—to the point that one's confidence in being uniquely right is shaken. It might be wondered if moral ambivalence is sufficiently widespread to play a central role in determining whether or not moral relativism is correct. However, this should not detract attention from Wong's sustained and detailed argument that an empirically-based understanding of the nature and conditions of human life both limits and underdetermines what a true morality could be.

In many respects, Wong's pluralistic relativism is the most sophisticated form of relativism developed to date, and it has the resources to confront a number of the issues raised in the last section. But at least one issue remains. On this view, for each true morality, a portion of that morality will be consistent with the universal constraints, but not required by them. What authority does this portion have? For Wong, since one function of morality is to advance social co-operation, groups rather than individuals must determine the particular ways in which a morality will meet the universal constraints. But the fact that a group has determined these particulars in one way rather than another does not seem sufficient to establish that everyone in the group has reason to accept its decision. Something needs to be said about the conditions under which the decision was reached. Suppose that some persons within the group disagree with the group's decision about these particulars—for example, persons with a communitarian Confucian heritage who live in an individualistic society such as the United States. What reason do these persons have to conform to the individualistic values of the larger society?

This example raises another question for pluralistic relativism. As Wong recognizes, sometimes people belong to more than one group and the values of these groups may conflict. More needs to be said about the truth conditions of moral statements of persons in this situation. The moral authority Wong assigns to groups, in contrast to individuals, makes this a pressing concern.

A somewhat similar mixed position has been advanced, though more tentatively, by Foot (2002a and 2002b; see also Scanlon 1995 and 1998: ch. 8). She argued that there are conceptual limitations on what could count as a moral code (as seen in section 3 above), and that there are common features of human nature that set limits on what a good life could be. For these reasons, there are some objective moral truths—for example, that the Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews was morally wrong. However, Foot maintained, these considerations do not ensure that all moral disagreements can be rationally resolved. Hence, in some cases, a moral judgment may be true by reference to the standards of one society and false by reference to the standards of another society—but neither true nor false in any absolute sense (just as we might say with respect to standards of beauty).

Foot came to this mixed view from the direction of objectivism (in the form of a virtue theory), and it might be contended by some objectivists that she has conceded too much. Since there are objective criteria, what appear as rationally irresolvable disagreements might be resolvable through greater understanding of human nature. Or the objective criteria might establish that in some limited cases it is an objective moral truth that conflicting moral practices are both morally permissible. In view of such considerations, objectivists might argue, it is not necessary to have recourse to the otherwise problematic notion of relative moral truth.

A position related to Foot's has been advanced by Martha Nussbaum (1993). With explicit reference to Aristotle, she argued that there is one objectively correct understanding of the human good, and that this understanding provides a basis for criticizing the moral traditions of different societies. The specifics of this account are explained by a set of experiences or concerns, said to be common to all human beings and societies, such as fear, bodily appetite, distribution of resources, management of personal property, etc. Corresponding to each of these is a conception of living well, a virtue, namely the familiar Aristotelian virtues such as courage, moderation, justice, and generosity. Nussbaum acknowledged that there are disagreements about these virtues, and she raised an obvious relativist objection herself: Even if the experiences are universal, does human nature establish that there is one objectively correct way of living well with respect to each of these areas? In response, Nussbaum conceded that sometimes there may be more than one objectively correct conception of these virtues and that the specification of the conception may depend on the practices of a particular community.

As with Foot, Nussbaum came to this mixed position from the objectivist side of the debate. Some moral objectivists may think she has given up too much, and for a related reason many moral relativists may believe she has established rather little. For example, bodily appetites are indeed universal experiences, but there has been a wide range of responses to these—for example, across a spectrum from asceticism to hedonism. This appears to be one of the central areas of moral disagreement. In order to maintain her objectivist credentials, Nussbaum needs to show that human nature substantially constrains which of these responses could be morally appropriate. Some objectivists may say she has not shown this, but could, while relativists may doubt she could show it.

Another approach might be construed as a mixed position, though it was not put forward in these terms. Isaiah Berlin (1998) argued that, though some moral values are universal, there are also many objective values that conflict and are not commensurable with one another. He called his position pluralism and rejected the label ‘relativism’. But if incommensurability implies that these conflicts cannot be rationally resolved, then it might suggest a concession to relativism.

Against such a position, an objectivist may ask why we should think objective goods are incommensurable: If X and Y are both objectively good, then why not say that the statement ‘ X is better than Y ’ (or a more restrictive comparative statement specifying respects or circumstances) is objectively true or false, even if this is difficult to know? Berlin's view was that there are many examples of conflicting goods—for example, justice and mercy, or liberty and equality—where it is implausible to suppose they are commensurable.

Finally, it should also be noted that a rather different kind of mixed position was proposed by Bernard Williams (1981 and 1985: ch. 9). He rejected what he called “strict relational relativism,” that ethical conceptions have validity only relative to a society. But he endorsed another form of relativism. This was explained by reference to a distinction between a “notional confrontation,” where a divergent outlook is known but not a real option for us, and a “real confrontation,” where a divergent outlook is a real option for us—something we might embrace without losing our grip on reality. Williams's “relativism of distance” says ethical appraisals are appropriate in real confrontations, but not in notional ones. For example, we could never embrace the outlook of a medieval samurai: Since this is a notional confrontation, it would be inappropriate to describe this outlook as just or unjust. This is the sense in which relativism is correct. But in real confrontations, relativism unhelpfully discourages the evaluation of another outlook that is a genuine option for us.

Williams was a strong critic of most forms of moral objectivism, yet he also criticized many of the nonobjectivist alternatives to objectivism. His outlook is not easily classified in terms of standard metaethical positions. With respect to his relativism of distance, it may be wondered why appraisals are inappropriate in notional confrontations: Why should the fact that an outlook is not a real option preclude us from thinking it is just or unjust? On the other hand, in real confrontations Williams thought the language of appraisal was appropriate, but he also thought these confrontations could involve rationally irresolvable disagreements. Though Williams rejects strict relational relativism, objectivists may argue that his position suffers from defects as serious as those that attend MMR . If the confrontations are real because the two outlooks have something in common, objectivists might ask, could this not provide a basis for resolving these disagreements?

The central theme in mixed positions is that neither relativism nor objectivism is wholly correct: At least in the terms in which they are often expressed, these alternatives are subject to serious objections, and yet they are motivated by genuine concerns. It might seem that a mixed position could be developed that would give us the best of both worlds (there are a number of other proposals along these lines; for example see Hampshire 1983 and 1989). However, an implication of most mixed positions (this does not apply to Williams) seems to be that, in some respect, some moral judgments are objectively true (or justified), while others have only relative truth (or justification). This should not be confused with the claim that an action may be right in some circumstances but not others. For example, a consequentialist view that polygamy is right in one society and wrong in another because it has good consequences in the first society and bad consequences in the second would not be a mixed position because the judgments “Polygamy is right in circumstances A ” and “Polygamy is wrong in circumstances B ” could both be true in an absolute sense. By contrast, a mixed position might say that “Polygamy is right” is true relative to one society and false relative to another (where the two societies differ, not necessarily in circumstances, but in fundamental values), while other moral judgments have absolute truth-value. This is a rather disunified conception of morality, and it invites many questions. A proponent of a mixed view would have to show that it is an accurate portrayal of our moral practices, or that it is a plausible proposal for reforming them.

Relativism is sometimes associated with a normative position, usually pertaining to how people ought to regard or behave towards those with whom they morally disagree. The most prominent normative position in this connection concerns tolerance. In recent years, the idea that we should be tolerant has been increasingly accepted in some circles. At the same time, others have challenged this idea, and the philosophical understanding and justification of tolerance has become less obvious. The question here is whether moral relativism has something to contribute to these discussions, in particular, whether DMR or MMR provide support for tolerance. In this context, tolerance does not ordinarily mean indifference or absence of disapproval: It means having a policy of not interfering with the actions of persons that are based on moral judgments we reject, when the disagreement is not or cannot be rationally resolved. The context of discussion is often, but not always, moral disagreements between two societies. Does moral relativism give us a reason to be tolerant in this sense?

Though many people seem to think it does, philosophers generally think they are mistaken. DMR may provide the occasion for tolerance, but it could not imply that tolerance is morally obligatory or even permissible. DMR simply tells us there are moral disagreements. Recognition of this fact, by itself, entails nothing about how we should act towards those with whom we disagree. MMR fares no better. For one thing, MMR cannot very well imply that it is an objective moral truth that we should be tolerant: MMR denies that there are such truths. (A mixed position could contend that tolerance is the only objective moral truth, all others being relative; but it would have to be shown that this is more than an ad hoc maneuver.) It might be said that MMR implies that tolerance is a relative truth. However, even this is problematic. According to MMR , understood to concern truth, the truth-value of statements may vary from society to society. Hence, the statement, “people ought to be tolerant” ( T ), may be true in some societies and false in others. MMR by itself does not entail that T is true in any society, and may in fact have the result that T is false in some societies (a similar point may be made with respect to justification).

Some objectivists may add that in some cases we should be tolerant of those with whom we morally disagree, but that only objectivists can establish this as an objective moral truth (for example, by drawing on arguments in the liberal tradition from Locke or Mill). To the objection that moral objectivism implies intolerance (or imperialism), objectivists typically contend that the fact that we regard a society as morally wrong in some respect does not entail that we should interfere with it.

Nonetheless, the thought persists among some relativists that there is a philosophically significant connection between relativism and tolerance. Perhaps the conjunction of MMR and an ethical principle could give us a reason for tolerance we would not have on the basis of the ethical principle alone. Such an approach has been proposed by Wong (1984: ch. 12). The principle is, roughly speaking, that we should not interfere with people unless we could justify this interference to them (if they were rational and well-informed in relevant respects). Wong called this “the justification principle.” Of course, it is already a tolerance principle of sorts. The idea is that it gains broader scope if MMR is correct. Let us suppose the statement that there is an individual right to freedom of speech is true and justified for our society, but is false and unjustified in another society in which the press is restricted for the good of the community. In this case, given MMR , our society might not be able to justify interference to the restrictive society concerning freedom of the press. Any justification we could give would appeal to values that are authoritative for us, not them, and no appeal to logic or facts alone would give them a reason to accept our justification.

If the justification principle were widely accepted, this argument might explain why some people have had good reason to think there is a connection between relativism and tolerance. But there is a question about whether the position is stable. Wong derived the justification principle from Kant, and Kant rejected MMR . If we were to accept MMR , would we still have reason to accept the justification principle? Wong thought we might, perhaps on the basis of considerations quite independent of Kant. In any case, this argument would only show that MMR plays a role in an argument for tolerance that is relevant to people in a society that accepted the justification principle. The argument does not establish that there is a general connection between relativism and tolerance. Nor does it undermine the contention that MMR may have the result that T is true in some societies and false in others.

In his more recent defense of pluralistic relativism (2006), Wong has argued that, since some serious moral disagreements are inevitable, any adequate morality will include the value of what he calls accommodation. This involves a commitment to peaceful and non-coercive relationships with persons with whom we disagree. Accommodation appears to be related to tolerance, but Wong argues for more than this: we should also try to learn from others, compromise with them, preserve relationships with them, etc. Wong's defense of accommodation is immune to the objection that relativism cannot be a basis for such a universal value because his defense purports to be based on considerations that any adequate morality should recognize. However, for this reason, though it presupposes the considerations supporting the relativist dimension of his position (there is no single true morality), it argues from the non-relativist dimension (there are universal constraints any morality should accept, in particular, that one function of morality is to promote social co-operation). Hence, it is not strictly speaking an argument from relativism to accommodation.

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• Article Summary
• 1 Descriptive relativism
• 2 Meta-ethical relativism
• 3 Normative relativism
• 4 Relativism and moral confidence
• Bibliography

Moral relativism

• Wong, David B.
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2. Meta-ethical relativism

The most heated debate about relativism revolves around the question of whether descriptive relativism supports meta-ethical relativism : that there is no single true or most justified morality. There is no direct path from descriptive to meta-ethical relativism; the most plausible argument for meta-ethical relativism is that it is part of a larger theory of morality that best explains actual moral diversity (see Metaethics §6 ).

Critics of meta-ethical relativism point out that moral disagreement is consistent with the possibility that some moral judgments are truer or more justified than others, just as disagreement among scientists does not imply that truth is relative in science. Some relativists are unimpressed by the analogy with science, holding that disagreements about the structure of the world can be sufficiently radical to undermine the assumption that there is an absolute truth to be found. This defence of meta-ethical relativism amounts to founding it upon a comprehensive epistemological relativism that expresses scepticism about the meaningfulness of talking about truth defined independently of the theories and justificatory practices of particular communities of discourse (see Epistemic relativism ).

An alternative relativist response is to take a nonrelativist stance towards science and to drive a wedge between scientific and moral discourse. Defenders of such a morality-specific meta-ethical relativism argue that scientific disagreements can be explained in ways that are consistent with there being a nonrelative truth about the structure of the physical world while moral disagreements cannot be treated analogously. For example, much scientific disagreement may be traced to insufficient or ambiguous evidence or distortions of judgment stemming from personal interests. Relativists have argued that such explanations will not work for moral disagreements such as the ones mentioned above concerning the eating of animals, abortion, and the sacrifice of an innocent to save more lives.

In offering alternative explanations of moral disagreement, morality-specific relativists tend to adopt a ‘naturalistic’ approach to morality in the sense that they privilege a scientific view of the world and fit their conceptions of morality and moral disagreement within that view. They deny that moral values and principles constitute an irreducible part of the fabric of the world and argue that morality is best explained on the theory that it arises at least in part from custom and convention. On Wong’s view ( 1984 ), for example, a good part of morality arises out of the need to structure and regulate social cooperation and to resolve conflicts of interest. Meta-ethical relativism is true because there is no single valid way to structure social cooperation.

Morality-specific relativism divides into cognitive and non-cognitive versions (see Moral judgment §1 ). On C.L. Stevenson ’s emotivist view ( 1944 ), for example, moral discourse merely expresses emotion and influences the attitudes and conduct of others (see Emotivism ). Cognitive relativists, such as Mackie, Harman, Foot and Wong, interpret moral judgments as expressing belief, on the grounds that moral judgments are often argued or judged true or false on the basis of reasons. Within cognitive relativism, there are those who believe that there is no single true morality because more than one morality is true, and those who believe that there is no single true morality because all are false. J.L. Mackie ( 1977 ) represents the latter camp, on the ground that while morality actually arises out of custom and convention, the meanings of moral terms presuppose a mistaken reference to sui generis properties that provide everyone with a reason for acting according to morality (see Value, ontological status of ). Other cognitive relativists see no need to construe moral terms as containing a reference to nonexistent properties and instead tie their cognitive content to certain standards and rules.

According to such a standards relativism, moral language is used to judge and to prescribe in accordance with a set of standards and rules. Different sets of standards and rules get encoded into the meaning of ethical terms such as ‘good’, ‘right’ and ‘ought’ over time, and into individuals, groups, or societies in such a way that two apparently conflicting moral beliefs can both be true. Though under a relativist analysis the beliefs express no conflicting claims about what is true, they do conflict as prescriptions as to what is to be done or as to what kinds of things are to be pursued. The disagreement is purely pragmatic in nature, though parties to the disagreement may not be aware of this if they erroneously assume they share the relevant standards.

Another crucial question for the standards relativist concerns whose standards and rules apply when someone makes a moral judgment. Suppose that Jones makes a moral judgment about what Smith ought to do, but that the standards Jones applies to guide his own conduct are not the same as the standards Smith uses to guide hers. One possibility is that Jones uses Smith’s standards to judge what she ought to do. Another possibility offered by Harman in some of his writing about relativism is that one must judge others by standards one shares with them. His theory is that morality consists of implicit agreements for the structuring of social cooperation. Moral judgments implying that the subjects have a reason to do what is prescribed make sense only as prescriptions based on what the speakers and subjects (and the intended audience of the judgments) have agreed to do. Other standards relativists observe that people use their own standards in judging the conduct of others, whether or not they believe these others to share their standards.

There are radical and moderate versions of meta-ethical relativism. Radical relativists hold that any morality is as true or as justified as any other. Moderate relativists, such as Foot ( 1978 ), Walzer and Wong ( 1984 ), deny that there is any single true morality but also hold that some moralities are truer or more justified than others. On Wong’s view, for instance, certain determinate features of human nature and similarities in the circumstances and requirements of social cooperation combine to produce universal constraints on what an adequate morality must be like. It may be argued, for example, that a common feature of adequate moralities is the specification of duties to care and educate the young, a necessity given the prolonged state of dependency of human offspring and the fact that they require a good deal of teaching to play their roles in social cooperation. It may also be a common feature of adequate moralities to require of the young reciprocal duties to honour and respect those who bring them up, and this may arise partly from role that such reciprocity plays in ensuring that those who are charged with caring for the young have sufficient motivation to do so. Such common features are compatible with the recognition that adequate moralities could vary significantly in their conceptions of what values that cooperation should most realize. Some moralities could place the most emphasis on community-centred values that require the promotion and sustenance of a common life of relationships, others could emphasize individual rights, and still others could emphasize the promotion of utility.

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• Introduction
• Arguments for ethical relativism
• Ethical relativism and postmodernism

Criticisms of ethical relativism

• What is ethics?
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Ethical relativism, then, is a radical doctrine that is contrary to what many thoughtful people commonly assume. As such, it should not be confused with the uncontroversial thought that what is right depends on the circumstances. Everyone, absolutists and relativists alike, agrees that circumstances make a difference. Whether it is morally permissible to enter a house, for example, depends on whether one is the owner, a guest, or a burglar. Nor is ethical relativism merely the idea that different people have different beliefs about ethics , which again no one would deny. It is, rather, a theory about the status of moral beliefs, according to which none of them is objectively true. A consequence of the theory is that there is no way to justify any moral principle as valid for all people and all societies.

Critics have lodged a number of complaints against this doctrine. They point out that if ethical relativism is correct, it would mean that even the most outrageous practices, such as slavery and the physical abuse of women, are “right” if they are countenanced by the standards of the relevant society. Relativism therefore deprives us of any means of raising moral objections against horrendous social customs, provided that those customs are approved by the codes of the societies in which they exist.

But should we not be tolerant of other cultures ? Critics reply that it depends on what sort of social differences are at issue. Tolerance may seem like a good policy where benign differences between cultures are concerned, but it does not seem so when, for example, a society engages in officially approved genocide, even within its own borders. And in any case, the critics say, it is a mistake to think that relativism implies that we should be tolerant, because tolerance is simply another value about which people or societies may disagree. Only an absolutist could say that tolerance is objectively good.

Moreover, the critics continue, we sometimes want to criticize our own society’s values, and ethical relativism deprives us of the means of doing that as well. If ethical relativism is correct, we could not make sense of reforming or improving our own society’s morals , for there would be no standard against which our society’s existing practices could be judged deficient. Abandoning slavery, for example, would not be moral progress; it would only be replacing one set of standards with another.

Critics also point out that disagreement about ethics does not mean that there can be no objective truth . After all, people disagree even about scientific matters. Some people believe that disease is caused by evil spirits, while others believe it is caused by microbes, but we do not on that account conclude that disease has no “real” cause. The same might be true of ethics—disagreement might only mean that some people are more enlightened than others.

But there is actually far less disagreement than the relativists imply. Anthropologists have observed that, while there is some variation from culture to culture, there are also some values that all societies have in common. Some values are, in fact, necessary for society to exist. Without rules requiring truthfulness, for example, there could be no communication, and without rules against murder and assault, people could not live together. These are, not surprisingly, among the values that anthropologists find wherever they look. Such disagreements as do exist take place against a background of agreement on these large matters.

Lastly, to the claim that there is no legitimate way to judge a society’s practices “from the outside,” critics may reply that we can always ask whether a particular cultural practice works to the advantage or disadvantage of the people within the culture. If, for example, female genital mutilation does more harm than good for the members of the societies that practice it, that fact may be an objective reason for judging the practice to be bad. Thus the appeal to what is helpful or harmful appears to be a standard that transcends local disagreements and variations.

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Moral Relativism

Moral Relativism asserts that moral standards are culturally-defined and therefore it may be impossible to determine what is truly right or wrong.

Moral relativism is the idea that there is no universal or absolute set of moral principles. It’s a version of morality that advocates “to each her own,” and those who follow it say, “Who am I to judge?”

Moral relativism can be understood in several ways.

Descriptive moral relativism, also known as cultural relativism, says that moral standards are culturally defined, which is generally true. Indeed, there may be a few values that seem nearly universal, such as honesty and respect, but many differences appear across cultures when people evaluate moral standards around the world.

Meta-ethical moral relativism states that there are no objective grounds for preferring the moral values of one culture over another. Societies make their moral choices based on their unique beliefs, customs, and practices. And, in fact, people tend to believe that the “right” moral values are the values that exist in their own culture.

Normative moral relativism is the idea that all societies should accept each other’s differing moral values, given that there are no universal moral principles. Most philosophers disagree however. For example, just because bribery is okay in some cultures doesn’t mean that other cultures cannot rightfully condemn it.

Moral relativism is on the opposite end of the continuum from moral absolutism, which says that there is always one right answer to any ethical question. Indeed, those who adhere to moral relativism would say, “When in Rome, do as the Romans do.”

Related Terms

Moral Absolutism

Moral Absolutism is a form of deontology that asserts that certain actions are intrinsically right or wrong.

Moral Pluralism

Moral Pluralism is the notion that various conflicting values may all be equally valid and worthy of respect.

Values are society’s shared beliefs about what is good or bad and how people should act.

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Reason and Meaning

Philosophical reflections on life, death, and the meaning of life, personal moral relativism.

What is Personal Ethical Relativism?  

If morality is not relative to culture, as we discussed in yesterday’s post , might it be relative to a person’s beliefs, attitudes, emotions, opinions, desires, wants, etc.? Personal relativism is a theory that holds that moral judgments are relative to, conditioned by, or dependent upon, individuals. This theory has ancient roots, but it’s also popular today. 2  These remarks capture the basic idea:

• You have your opinion, and I have mine.
• Truth is relative to my beliefs.
• Truth is subjective, truth depends on me.
• My belief is true for me, while your is true for you.
• You do your thing, and I’ll do mine.

Analogous to the cultural relativist, the personal relativist claims that there is no objective moral truth. Relativists say that while you may hate homosexuality whereas they don’t, there is no objective truth about whether homosexuality is right or wrong. Instead of moral statements merely report  opinions, feelings, and attitudes; they just tell what people prefer. Thus, to say that x is right/good/moral, just means you like, favor, or approve of x. And to say that x is wrong/bad/immoral, simply means that you dislike, disfavor, or disapprove of x. In other words, moral truth is relative, it is subjective. (Personal moral relativism is also called ethical subjectivism.)

But notice that, according to personal relativism, there is a way that a moral judgment can be true or false. If we say homosexuality is moral and we’re telling the truth, then it’s true that we think homosexuality is moral. But if we’re lying, then it’s false that we think homosexuality is moral. Of course, moral judgments aren’t objectively true or false according to personal relativism, since there is no standard independent of a person’s feelings, but they are subjectively true or false if we report our beliefs truthfully.

Critique of Personal Relativism  

Personal relativism is open to the same objections as was epistemological and cultural relativism, as the following questions suggest. What does it mean to say something is true  for me ? Is the claim that truth is relative to me, relatively or absolutely true? If the former, relativism is inconsistent, if the latter, it’s trivial. Is there as much individual disagreement as it appears, or is most moral disagreements on the surface only? Don’t most people share common moral beliefs? And don’t the consequences of taking this theory seriously conflict with our moral intuition? Aren’t some actions just plain wrong?

Given our previous critique, we should reject personal relativism at first glance. Why then is the theory so appealing?  Maybe personal relativism attracts because it reminds us that not everything we believe is true. Perhaps it helps us be open to new ideas. Or possibly we tend to accept it because others do. Whatever the reason we find relativism compelling, let’s consider it in more detail.

Consider the following. If I enjoy torturing small children in the most painful way possible , do you think that’s ok? Do you believe that whether this is right or wrong depends on me? Or do you think it’s just plain wrong? Remember, if personal relativism is true then there is nothing wrong with torturing small children. But you don’t believe that. And you don’t believe that Gandhi and Hitler were moral equivalents because you think that good and bad are in some sense objective. That’s why you think there is something wrong with torturing children, and any moral theory that suggests otherwise must be flawed.

This critique of relativism relies on our intuition. To believe that torturing children is morally acceptable is counter-intuitive. Of course, it is true that our intuition is not always a good guide. For example, it seems intuitive that the earth is flat. But if a moral theory leads to consequences that contradict a strongly held moral intuition, then we are probably justified in questioning that moral theory. If a moral theory advocates torture, and nearly everyone thinks torture is immoral, we should probably reject such a theory unless there is other compelling reasons not to. So the claim that a theory is strongly counter-intuitive doesn’t prove it’s wrong, but it counts as a reason to reject that theory.

Consider another intuitive argument against moral relativism. Suppose I gave you an F on your ethics test, even though I admit that your answers were perfect. Puzzled, you ask why you received an F, and I tell you that I don’t like you. Furthermore, I tell you that your friend received an A because I really like her. What would you think about this? Wouldn’t you feel that this was unfair? If so, you’re assuming there is some objective standard of fairness. However, if you’re a relativist, consistency demands that you accept that your grade is relative to whether I like you or not. But you think your grade on the test shouldn’t  be relative to me because that’s not fair. So you do think that there is an objective standard of fairness after all.

There is something else peculiar about personal relativism. It is easy to say that you are a relativist, but it is hard to actually be a relativist. If the beliefs of both child-torturers and child-lovers conflict, the relativist says that they’re both correct. And while you can say this, it’s hard to believe it. In fact, when confronted with moral disagreements, we make judgments and debate what we should believe and do. In practice, we act as if what we do matters as if some courses of action and some beliefs are morally preferable to others. In practice, it is virtually impossible to be a relativist. We do think there it is wrong for a samurai swordsmen to try out his new sword on an innocent passer-by.

Questioning the Connection Between Tolerance and Relativism  

Tolerance is generally a good thing. I don’t want my neighbors to exterminate me because I philosophize too much; I’m sure they don’t want me to attack them because they watch too much TV. Tolerance is good, serving to remind us that we may be mistaken about our beliefs. But what is the relationship between moral relativism and tolerance? Are the two connected? Does the theory of moral relativism lead to tolerance?

In the first place, there is a contradiction between tolerance and moral relativism. If you’re a relativist, then you can’t consistently defend tolerance as a universal value. If you do, then you’re not a relativist, you’re an absolutist for whom tolerance is an objective value. So relativism and tolerance are logically incompatible.

Now suppose I am a moral relativist. As a relativist, I may be tolerant of your views, but I may also decide that I can do anything I want to you—say, torture and kill you because there is nothing wrong with that. After all, it’s just relative.  On the one hand as a relativist I might be tolerant of you, but, on the other hand, I might not. My view that the truth depends on me doesn’t seem to be related to how I treat you. There doesn’t seem to be a necessary connection between relativism and tolerance.

Now suppose I am a moral absolutist. As an absolutist, I may be intolerant of your views, but I may also be tolerant of them. So it’s hard to see any connection between moral objectivism or relativism and tolerance. Moral relativism may lead to tolerance or intolerance, as may moral absolutism. In the end, neither moral relativism nor moral objectivism recommends any specific action at all.

In the end, we just don’t know the relationship between moral theory and practice, which is probably obvious from your experience. Ethics professors may espouse moral theories, but they may also be horrific people. The religious may espouse charity but steal the Sunday collection. Theories about how we should act, often don’t translate into action. So even if there should be a connection between moral relativism and tolerance, it doesn’t follow that there is one.

On closer examination tolerance doesn’t appear affected by the content of your belief; rather, tolerance is affected by how certain you are of what you believe. If you’re certain that you know the truth about something, then you will likely be intolerant; if you’re less certain you know the truth about something, you will likely be more tolerant. If we value tolerance, we should be humble.

Conclusion 

Some things are relative—whether carrots taste good to you; and some things aren’t relative—throw this book out the classroom window and it will fall. Some elements of morality may be relative, but surely not all of them—you shouldn’t kill your good friend because he owes you a dollar. Tolerance is a generally a good thing, but there is no special connection between it and relativism. Killing an innocent person could possibly be justified, but are you ever justified in torturing someone for your own pleasure when there is no good reason to do so? As long as you answer no to this question, you aren’t a personal relativist. And few ethicists believe that personal relativism is a sound theory.

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5 thoughts on “ personal moral relativism ”.

I cannot resist the observation that, while economists are reputed to have three hands (“…on the other hand…”), you appear to have just one:

“As an absolutist, I may be intolerant of your views, but I may also be intolerant of them.”

Here’s another odd angle from which to view the problem you tackle here: the physicist’s notion of “hidden variables”. This was a hot topic in the middle 20th century. The concept was that the apparently random (arbitrary) behavior of some systems was actually being determined by “hidden variables” — mysterious physical forces that we could not identify that nevertheless operated in a logical fashion. (This is a much-simplified characterization of a rather complex debate.) The crucial point I wish to make is that the resolution of the debate was to simply deny the *relevance* of hidden variables, regardless of the truth or falsity of the notion. In other words, we don’t need to argue about what is forever hidden behind a veil — we need only concern ourselves with what actually happens in the real world.

Perhaps we can approach moral systems in the same way. Instead of constructing some complex logical structure called a ‘moral system’, we simply deny its significance and concentrate instead on behavioral causality. We thereby reduce the logical connections, like this:

1. Joe tortures small children. 2. Torturing small children is wrong. 3. Therefore, society punishes Joe

reduces to:

1. Joe tortures small children. 2. Therefore, society punishes Joe.

Of course, this conflates law with ethics, and we know that law is but a poor approximation of our moral systems. So let’s limit it to a single observer, like so:

1. Joe tortures small children. 2. I believe that torturing small children is unethical. 3. Therefore, I conclude that Joe is unethical. 4. Therefore, I don’t like Joe.

but why can’t I cut out the two intermediate steps (hidden variables):

1. Joe tortures small children. 2. Therefore, I don’t like Joe.

The idea here is that we remove the internal mental machinations from consideration and simply jump from input to output. This, of course, removes those mental machinations from rational consideration. What’s the point of having a moral system if you can’t argue about it? 😉

Here I come to another odd point. As an atheist, I am sometimes challenged by pious people who imagine that I must be amoral if I do not have a theology to tell me what’s right and what’s wrong. My answer is “Your morality comes from a translation of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy of a translation of a copy of a copy of a book. My morality comes from my heart. People interpret your book in different ways to come to all sorts of contradictory conclusions about ethics. Your book has been used to justify many acts that we now consider to have been unethical. How can you possibly be as certain of and sincere in your moral beliefs as I am?”

My approach is vaguely Eastern in that I consider ethics to be an utterly personal system that each person establishes as part of their own sense of worth. “De ethicibus non est disputandem”. If you and I dispute some ethical point, there is no rational basis for us to resolve our dispute. This, of course, would throw all ethicists out of a job, something I’m not sure I’d like to see. I think it’s good to have a few specialists sweating out the details of the tricky ethical problems that technology sometimes poses. Still, if those ethicists come to a conclusion I don’t like, I’ll look at their reasoning, but I’m unlikely to be swayed.

Enough of the late-night divagations!

just so much to say but here’s a few points – i don’t think your syllogisms would convince most ethicists; law and ethics are connected but not the same as discussed in my book; i agree with your religion/ethics points and those issues are covered in detail on the site; and again u r an anti-realist like many philosophers.

Well, I am certainly wobbly about these issues. If most ethicists would not accept my corner-cutting, then my reaction is to abandon the idea. I retain a great deal of respect for people who’ve spent more time working on a problem than I have.

I’ll add this caveat. First, philosophers disagree among themselves about almost everything, and second I may not have given some of your ideas the careful consideration they deserve for lack of time. You don’t make as good a moves as you would otherwise when you’re playing speed chess.

Well, to me you did a good job, which if anyone is a relativist they must agree that I’m right, right? 😉

I’ve been doing a little study about this, and your article is very helpful. Thanks!

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